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Race for sanctions : the movement against aparteid, 1946-1994/

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RACE FOR SANCTIONS: THE MOVEMENT AGAINST APARTEID, 1946-1994

A Dissertation Presented

by

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ABSTRACT

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This study traces the evolution of the anti-apartheid movement from its emergence in the radical Diaspora politics of the 1940s through the civil rights and black power eras and its maturation in the 1980s into a national movement that transformed US foreign policy. Chapter one traces the emergence of this counter-hegemonic discourse in the radical African Diaspora politics of the 1940s and its repression through government intervention. Chapter two takes a close look at the government's efforts to reestablish discursive hegemony in the United States by co-opting African-American leaders and organizations through "enlightened paternalism" that included covert and overt CIA funding and the establishment of anticommunist journals. Chapter three examines the re-emergence of anti-apartheid sentiment during what became known as the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter four and five look at the radicalization of the

black freedom movement and the development of an anti-apartheid discourse and culture in the 1970s. Chapter six examines the emergence of TransAfrica --the black lobby for Africa and the Caribbean and its challenge to Reagan's "constructive engagement" policies. Chapter seven examines the Free South Africa Movement and the revival of direct action to pressure Congress to pass anti-apartheid sanctions. Chapter eight looks at role of the Congressional Black Caucus in passing sanctions against South Africa over President Reagan's veto. And finally chapter nine examines the impact of sanctions on the release of Nelson Mandela and his colleagues from prison and his eventual election as the first democratically elected president of South Africa.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the role of African Americans in the global anti-apartheid movement which emerged with the effort to impose economic sanctions against South Africa at the first General Assembly of the United Nations in 1946 and ended in 1994 with after South Africa's first democratic elections. The study argues that although African Americans of many ideological orientations were involved in trying to influence US foreign policy toward South Africa, the majority fell into three broad ideological camps: left, nationalist and liberal.[i] Each of these perspectives has a distinct history and was represented in the anti-apartheid movement with varying intensity depending on the general state of race relations in the United States. This study seeks to show that the anti-apartheid movement emerged from the black internationalist politics of the 1940s; survived the anti-communist crusades and the decline of white liberal support in the 1950s and 1960s; and reemerged as a black-led interracial movement in the 1980s.

Studies of the anti-apartheid movement fall into two broad categories: those that focus on the anti-apartheid movement per se; and studies of black internationalism in general. Studies of the anti-apartheid movement itself, like Love (1985), Shepherd (1977), Massie (1997) and De Villiers (1995) tend to focus on the role of white liberals in the movement. Studies of black internationalism like Walters (1993), Magubane (1987), Von Eshen (1997) Plummer (1996) and biographies like Baldwin (1995), Horne (1986), Robinson (1998) and Duberman (1989), do a better job of covering the role of African Americans in the movement but do not focus on the anti-apartheid movement per se thus providing a blurry and fragmented picture.

A major difference between the two approaches is that the black internationalist perspective foregrounds the role of Africans and people of African descent in the movement. Scholars like Hollis Lynch, St. Clair Drake, Francis Korengay, Barnard Magubane, Randall Robinson and Ronald Walters frame the movement in the context of the long history of Pan African activity in the African Diaspora. They focus on organizations like the Council on African Affairs (1937-1955), the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, TransAfrica, the Free South Africa Movement and other African American organizations that had a record of opposing racial oppression in South Africa since the second world war. Organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Negro Congress, the National Council of Negro Women and the black churches were among the first organizations in the United States to call on the U.S, the United Nations and the international community in general to impose sanctions on South Africa after the white supremacist National Party made apartheid the official policy in 1948.[ii]

While the black internationalist approach to the study of the anti-apartheid movement tends to be more informed, no study has attempted a comprehensive history of the role of African Americans in the movement from 1946 to 1994. Most of the anti-apartheid studies in black internationalist literature are chapters in books on other topics or passing references in biographies and short journal articles. This study fills this gap in the historiography of the anti-apartheid movement by placing it in the context of the evolving Pan Africanist and anti-colonial politics of African-American leaders in the twentieth century. It shows how the movement emerged in radical black politics of the 1940s, was adopted by civil rights leaders in the 1960s and the nationalists of the 1970s before becoming a multi-racial coalition for South Africa in

the 1980s. The study shows the continuity of black leadership and strategies reflected in the adoption of non-violent direct action tactics by the Free South Africa Movement in the 1980s. It examines the ideological and organizational connections between the early anti-apartheid activists like W.E.B. Du Bois, A. Philip Randolph, Paul and Eslanda Robeson, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. with the later activists like Stokely Carmichael, Rev. Jesse Jackson, Randall Robinson and legislators like Charles Diggs, Walter Fauntroy and Ron Dellums.

The study also delineates the ties between the internal struggle to destabilize the racist apartheid regime in South Africa and the external campaign for political, economic and cultural sanctions. At the heart of the movement was the struggle of black Africans in southern Africa to end white supremacy. This internal movement was the catalyst for actions at the international level and the critical link that gave coherence to the movement as a whole. The external level can be divided into efforts coordinated by the Organization of African Unity to provide military bases, material and diplomatic support for liberation movements; and the Diaspora movement which focused on seeking international sanctions against the regime and providing direct aid to liberation movements. This Diaspora movement was closely connected to the continental movement through the United Nations where the efforts of the African block of nations led to the isolation and eventual expulsion of South Africa from most UN agencies.

In the United States, the trajectory of the anti-apartheid movement parallels that of the US civil rights movement and the communications revolution that brought an unprecedented amount of information about national and world events into people's homes. This increased flow of information also brought a unique opportunity for social movements to challenge dominant perspectives and present alternatives to

policy makers and the public. Both the civil rights and anti-apartheid movements relied on exposing the brutality of the system in the media to change public opinion and the policy agenda. The shocking images of white mobs lynching, hosing, beating and abusing black children in the South galvanized thousands of African Americans into action in what became known as the civil rights movement. The equally horrific images of the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres in South Africa led a new generation of African-American activists to link their struggle to that of the black people in South Africa. This study uses activists' speeches, media reports and US policy statements and voting record at United Nations agencies to trace the movement of anti-apartheid discourse from the "radical" margins to the center of the US foreign policy agenda. This evolution is evident in the adoption of anti-apartheid discourse: "divestment," "divestiture," "disinvestment," "sanctions," "sports boycott," "shanty towns" by the national media in the United States and eventually by Congress. This dissertation will trace the process through which these concepts became "common sense" and entered the public sphere as a legitimate counter discourse in US foreign policy despite the fact that all US presidents from Truman to Bush, Democratic and Republican, vetoed United Nations sanctions against South Africa.

This maturation of the movement was marked by four key moments that facilitated the discursive shift against the hegemony of pro-apartheid perspectives in the United States: (1) the decolonization of African and Asian countries after world war two that undermined the racist theory of white supremacy (2) the civil rights movement of the 1960s that led to the election of thousands of black legislators at the national, state and municipal levels -- these legislators then helped shift the Democratic Party toward an anti-apartheid position in the 1980s, (3) the intensity of resistance in South Africa itself, where anti-apartheid forces steadily increased the pressure on the South African government until they made the country ungovernable,

and (4) the impact of media coverage of (a) racist repression in South Africa and (b) the spectacular arrests of celebrities and politicians staged by the Free South Africa Movement outside the South African embassies and businesses around the country. The carefully choreographed "arrests by appointment" used media obsession with celebrity in a textbook case of prime time activism that catapulted sanctions to the top of the foreign policy agenda despite a pro-apartheid administration. This study will trace the evolution of the anti-apartheid movement from its emergence in the radical Diaspora politics of the 1940s through the civil rights and black power eras and its maturation in the 1980s into a national movement that transformed US foreign policy.

Chapter one traces the emergence of this counter-hegemonic discourse in the radical African Diaspora politics of the 1940s and its repression through government intervention. Chapter two takes a close look at the government's efforts to reestablish discursive hegemony in the United States by co-opting African-American leaders and organizations through "enlightened paternalism" that included covert and overt CIA funding and the establishment of anticommunist journals. Chapter three examines the re-emergence of anti-apartheid sentiment during what became known as the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter four and five look at the radicalization of the black freedom movement and the development of an anti-apartheid discourse and culture in the 1970s. Chapter six examines the emergence of TransAfrica --the black lobby for Africa and the Caribbean and its challenge to Reagan's "constructive engagement" policies. Chapter seven examines the Free South Africa Movement that revived the use of direct action to pressure Congress to pass anti-apartheid sanctions. Chapter eight looks at role of the Congressional Black Caucus in passing sanctions against South Africa over President Reagan's veto. While chapter nine examines the impact of sanctions on the release of Nelson Mandela and his colleagues from prison and his eventual election as the first democratically elected

president of South Africa.

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[i]Although there were some conservatives like Max Yergan and George Shuyler, these were apologists for apartheid and are beyond the purview of this dissertation.

[ii]Kornegay, Francis, "Black Americans and U.S.-South African Relations" in Mohamed El-Khawas (ed.) American South African Relations: Bibliographic Essays. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975; "Free South Africa! New Life in an Old Movement: A Freedomways Report," Freedomways 25 (Summer, 1985): 69-73.; "U.S. Antiapartheid Upsurge" Black Scholar 16 (Nov.-Dec. 1985).

CHAPTER 2

COLD WAR AND APARTHEID

> The race is on in Africa as in every other part of the world --the race between the forces of progress and democracy on one side and the forces of imperialism and reaction on the other.
>
> Paul Robeson, 1946

> We have today anti-apartheid movements in many countries playing a crucial role in the campaign against racial discrimination in South Africa. These are all fairly new, and the first of these movements, we must recall, was founded by Paul Robeson and the black people of the United States.
>
> *Leslie O. Harriman (Nigeria) Chairman*
> *the United Nations Special Committee*
> *Against Apartheid, 10 April, 1978*

In the late1940s and the early 1950s, black radicals like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois were leading figures in black anti-colonial politics. Operating through the Council on African Affairs, these black radicals tried to influence US foreign policy through sit-ins, demonstrations, marches and petitions. They also collected funds for victims of apartheid and colonialism and sponsored lectures by African nationalists. The CAA's journals, *Africa News* (1946-1951), *Spotlight on Africa* (1951-54) and *Freedom* (1951-55), were relied upon by activists as sources of credible information about Africa. Historian Hollis Lynch, who has written the best assessment of the role of the Council on African Affairs in the Africa support movement, argues that between 1937 and 1955:

> There is little question that the CAA was the most important American organization specifically concerned with Africa. Others ... did not command the formidable leadership, the resources and the expertise of the CAA, which received wide publicity in the black press.[1]

St. Clair Drake, who wrote the introduction to Lynch's study, agreed. Drake argued that the CAA was a "forerunner of the African Liberation Support Committee."[2] Recent studies by Penny Von Eshen (1997) and Brenda Gayle Plummer (1996) also give credit to the black radicals associated with CAA as the founders of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement.

At the end of the Second World War, Paul Robeson was at the height of his popularity in the African American community. Even the liberal National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), for instance, recognized his prominence in 1945 with its highest award, the Spingarn Medal (Von Eshen, 1997; Duberman, 1988). This recognition from the NAACP demonstrates both the more liberal atmosphere of the time and Robeson's own popularity in the African American community. As the chairman of the NAACP at the time, Roy Wilkins, put it: "the downtown audience will follow Robeson anywhere."[3] Martin Duberman, Robeson's biographer, argues that "the Spingarn Medal marked both the apex of Robeson's public acclaim and his fall from official grace."[4] . This fall from "official grace" was linked to the changing political climate engendered by the emergence of the Cold War. After World War II, Robeson's leftist perspective and ties to the Soviet Union became a liability in his relations to the government, media and liberal African American

organizations like the NAACP. This fall from grace did not, however, stop Robeson from playing an important part in the post-war emergence of both the modern civil rights and anti-apartheid movements. Historian Sterling Stuckey argues, for instance, that Robeson became even more active in Africa-related issues after 1949.[5] Hollis Lynch also argues that the Africa support component of the CAA was enhanced after the fall from grace but he also argues that the CAA "became a Harlem community organization." Despite the persecution, therefore, Robeson's name and example continued to inspire young African Americans. Ollie Harrington, for instance, writes that when he was growing up in Bronx, there were few sources of inspiration and fewer positive role models. That is until he met a Jewish storekeeper who told him (Harrington) stories about black poets, teachers and doctors. "One day he told me of an unbelievable Black man named Paul Robeson. He told me of this black man who was not as good as white men. He had to be, and he was, ten times better. ... It was a soul-splitting thought. It was a blowtorch burning out the foundations of existence.[6]

Both Paul Robeson and Max Yergan, the founders of the first anti-apartheid organization in the United States, were influenced by the internationalist tradition of the Black church.[7] According to David Anthony, Max Yergan was influenced by his grandfather, Frederick Yergan, a former slave who "shared the concerns of many of his contemporaries who sought to play a role in the 'redemption of Africa' during the European imperial scramble for African colonies."[8] Yergan joined the YMCA at Shaw University where he was "influenced by a gospel-rooted brand of Christian radicalism."[9] After graduating with a degree in theology, Yergan became a YMCA

secretary, serving as a missionary in India and East Africa before settling down in South Africa between 1921 and 1936 as the secretary for the "native" branch of the Student Christian Association. He cultivated friendships with black nationalists like Govan Mbeki, who later became a leader of the South African Communist Party, and Clements Kaldie, a radical trade unionist and former Garveyite who founded the International Commercial Union (ICU). Unable to reconcile his Christian missionary work with his leftist ideological orientation, Yergan resigned from the YMCA in 1937. On his way back to the United States, Yergan met Paul and Eslanda Robeson in London where they formed the International Committee on African Affairs with Yergan as the executive secretary and Robeson as the chairman.

Like Yergan, Robeson came from a deeply religious background before gravitating toward a Marxist perspective.[10] His father, Rev. William Drew Robeson was the pastor of St. Thomas A.M.E. Zion in the town of Somerville, New Jersey, while Paul was growing up. Paul's elder brother Benjamin also became an AME pastor at Mother AME Church in Harlem that hosted many foundational anti-apartheid events.[11] Robeson, who was the "premier symbol, the main fund-raiser and a major policy maker of the Council,"[12] wrote in his autobiography that he "discovered" Africa after meeting African nationalists like Jomo Kenyatta, Namadi Azikiwe and Kwame Nkrumah in London in the 1920s and 30s.[13] Robeson and his wife, Eslanda, also met Caribbean radicals C.L.R. James and George Padmore and became honorary members of the West Africa Students Union. James, who had worked closely with Trotsky and other revolutionary leaders throughout Europe and the Americas, said of Robeson:

"That was an unusual man. I've met a lot of people in many parts of the world and he remains, in my life, the most distinguished and remarkable of them all."[14] While in London, Paul enrolled at the University of London to study African languages and Eslanda at the London School of Economics to study African anthropology.[15] This "discovery" of Africa led to a lifelong commitment to studying his African roots. As he put it: "In my music, my plays, my films, I want to carry always this central idea; to be African. Multitudes of men have died for less worthy ideals; it is even more eminently worth living for."[16]

Like Yergan, therefore, the Robesons were radicalized by this contact with African nationalists: "It is an African who directed my interest in Africa to something he had observed in the Soviet Union" Robeson writes in his autobiography.[17] This African (possibly Jomo Kenyatta who met Robeson in London after a visit to the Soviet Union) had pointed out that under socialism, the "backward races" of Central Asia, like the Yakuts and Uzbeks, were "leaping ahead from tribalism to modernity, illiteracy to knowledge in less than 20 years."[18]

Far from believing in the "racial uplift" or "civilizationist" ideology of the black bourgeoisie, Robeson argued that Africans were going to liberate themselves.[19] In contrast, W.E.B. Du Bois believed, until 1945, that the Diaspora should lead Africans to independence through the "trusteeship" system led by African Americans and developed states. Du Bois' four Pan-Africanist congresses were predicated on this perspective.[20] Du Bois only changed his mind on this issue after the emergence of

African independence movements during the Second World War. In this sense, Du Bois' perspective is similar to that of 19th Century black nationalists Martin Delany, Henry McNeal Turner, Alexander Crummell and back-to-Africa prophets like Marcus Garvey who subscribed to the "civilizationist" creed of racial uplift.[21] In contrast, Robeson's association with revolutionary African nationalists like Nkrumah, Kenyatta and Azikiwe, and with African-American communists like William Patterson and Benjamin Davis Jr., led him to support African national liberation movements.[22]

Robeson's speeches indicate that he saw the liberation struggle in the United States as part of the struggle of the colonial world for freedom. In 1944, for instance, Robeson warned the United States "It is impossible to keep 150 million Africans in Slavery and think we can be free here."[23] Robeson also linked his struggle with that of the working class and sought coalitions with white workers around the world. In this sense Robeson's perspective was pluralist and pragmatic. He sought to develop a "united front" in the struggle against both colonialism and segregation.

This black-led, anti-colonial organization took shape in 1939 after Robeson returned to the United States as the chairman of the International Committee on African Affairs with Max Yergan as executive secretary. The board featured a cross-section of African-American leaders including Garveyites, Pan Africanists, nationalists and integrationists foreshadowing the creation of TransAfrica in 1977. Among the board of directors were Ralph Bunche and Mordecai Johnson of Howard University; Y.M.C.A. secretaries Channing Tobias and F.E. DeFrantz; Rene Maran, a

Caribbean-born novelist who was the committee's representative in France; Dr. Rosebery T. Bokwe, a black South African who was also a member of the African National Congress; and five white liberals.[24] By 1943, this membership list included other prominent African Americans like Dr. Alphaeus Hunton a former Howard University professor, Charlotta Bass, a Garveyite and publisher of the *California Eagle*, E. Franklin Frazier, professor of sociology at Howard University, Earl Dickerson, president of the black National Bar Association and William Yansey Bell, professor of theology at Gammon Theological Seminary, Mary McLeod Bethune of the National Association of Negro Women and A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.[25] Scholar and Pan Africanist W.E.B. Du Bois was to join the CAA as vice chairman in 1948 after being sacked, again, from the NAACP for his radical political perspective.

Alphaeus Hunton, Charlotta Bass, Du Bois and Robeson reflected the CAA's radical position in the post-war period. Hunton, who was the editor of the CAA's journal *New Africa* and Paul Robeson's right hand man, was a former English professor at Howard University who had been educated at Howard, Harvard and New York universities. Hunton became a Marxist in the 1930s and played an active role in the Washington branch of the National Negro Congress.[26] Hunton and Eslanda Robeson also represented the CAA at the United Nations where they were deeply involved in anti-colonial politics and initiated the involvement of Americans in the campaign to impose global sanctions on the Union of South Africa.

The CAA focused on South Africa from the outset and worked in tandem with African nationalists to influence Congress. In 1945, the CAA was the only organization in the United States to take note of a devastating famine in South Africa. Responding to appeals from the ANC, the CAA set up the National Sponsors' Committee for South African Famine Relief. The campaign began with a rally of five thousand at the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem on 7 January 1946, which was followed by rallies in forty major cities throughout the United States.[27] *New Africa* described the Harlem rally as "One of the greatest meetings ever held in Harlem."[28] Marian Anderson and Paul Robeson addressed the meeting, among others. According to the article, the keynote of the meeting was a message of support sent to Dr. R.T. Bokwe, a member of the Council of African Affairs and the African National Congress in South Africa. The message read:

> We want our brothers and sisters in South Africa to know that they have friends here in America who realize that the fight against discrimination in the United States can be won only as part of the war against human exploitation and oppression in South Africa and everywhere else. We are your allies and together we shall achieve the first people's victory.

Several thousand cans of food and cash, together valued at about $14,000 was collected in the campaign as "a practical demonstration of the unity between the people of this country and the Africans." The meeting unanimously approved resolutions sent to Prime Minister Jan Smuts of South Africa, the United Nations and the U.S. State Department. The messages called on the UN to "to insure the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race in the Union of South Africa." They also urged the international community not

to grant South Africa "the retention of authority over the mandate territory of Southwest Africa, or the right of trusteeship or control over any other territory unless and until the Dominion's discriminatory practices embodied in the pass laws, color bar, residential restrictions, and other devices have been abrogated."[29]

During the South African miners' strike in 1946, the CAA organized a meeting in Madison Square Garden attended by 19,000 to "cast a searing spotlight on the vicious discrimination in the Union of South Africa and the plight of the African millions resident there."[30] The rally opposed the annexation of Namibia; demanded an investigation of racism; the abolition of pass laws and restrictions on land ownership; and condemned US support for South African whites.[31] At the meeting, Robeson argued that Africa was the "jackpot" of the post-war world because it was the source of strategic minerals like uranium, cobalt and industrial diamonds that were used to make American bombs. He assailed the U.S. for supporting white supremacy in southern Africa and called on the West to implement the Atlantic Charter's promise of self-determination.[32] The meeting, which was described as the largest meeting on African issues ever held in the United States, adopted a "Charter of African Freedom" that urged the United States and South Africa to abolish racial segregation.[33]

Although apartheid became official policy in South Africa in 1948, the campaign for international sanctions was launched by India and the Council on African Affairs at the first General Assembly meeting in London in 1946. The Council on African Affairs, which had been formed in 1937 to lobby for African causes,

maintained a lobbyist at the UN form the outset. In 1946, CAA lobbyists Alphaeus Hunton and Eslanda Goode-Robeson successfully lobbied against South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts' attempt to annex South West Africa (now Namibia) with the blessing of the United Nations. Foreshadowing anti-apartheid activism in the 1980s, CAA members (with the support of members of the liberation movements) attended sessions of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Non-self-governing Territories, the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, distributed literature prepared by the CAA and personally lobbied members of the Trusteeship Council.[34]

Although the UN refused to allow the annexation, the United States voted with South Africa. U.S. representative John F. Dulles, said: "I do not feel that the United States, in view of its own record, was justified in adopting a holier-than-thou attitude toward the Union of South Africa."[35] In 1947, Dulles again told the United Nations that it was regrettable that South Africa had not complied with the request of the United Nations for information but that the United Nations could not force South Africa to bring the territory under trusteeship. The United States eventually requested that the issue be reviewed by the International Court of Justice. Meanwhile, South Africa proceeded to incorporate the mandate territory through the South West Africa Act of 1949.[36]

Hunton and Eslanda Robeson also worked behind he scenes to shape the anti-racism resolution presented by India's representative Vijaya Pandit Nehru.[37] India's representative, V.L. Pandit, challenged South Africa's right to exclude people of

Indian descent from voting. To support India's call for sanctions, the CAA organized a letter writing campaign to President Truman, the U.S. State Department and the United States delegate to the UN, urging "full support to the Indian government's petition to the United Nations."[38] On December 8, 1946, the U.S. representative, John Foster Dulles, voted "No" on a majority resolution that India and South Africa report on the next session on the treatment of Indians in South Africa.[39] The General Assembly also proposed that negotiations take place between India, Pakistan and South Africa with respect to the treatment of Indians in South Africa. Both the United States and South Africa voted "No." On the same day the General Assembly plenary meeting passed Resolution 616 (VII) A to establish a United Nations Commission to study the government of South Africa and its white supremacist system. The United States abstained. [40] The representative of India, Sir Maharaj Singh, noted the CAA's work on behalf of South West Africa during the 1947 session of the General Assembly. The African National Congress also congratulated the CAA during its 1947 annual conference when it adopted a resolution saying: "Congress desires to make special mention of the Council on African Affairs for its noble efforts to defend fundamental human rights."

In 1948 the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drafted by the United States and colonial powers including Prime Minister Jan Smuts of the Union of South Africa. Despite its dubious origins, the UN charter, like the United Nations itself, was to become an important site of struggle in the anti-apartheid movement. During the drafting process, the commission had received

petitions from the National Negro Congress, the Council on African Affairs and the NAACP urging the investigation of racial discrimination in the United States and South Africa. The Council on African Affairs called on the newly formed Commission on Human Rights to "give specific consideration to the flagrant violation of the most elementary principles of human rights in South Africa where Africans are kept in a status of permanent subservience to a white minority."[41] The statement urged the United Nations body to outlaw legal and political discrimination such as prevailed in South Africa; investigate and make public its findings on the degree to which fundamental freedoms are observed in countries such as South Africa where the great majority are barred from exercising citizenship rights; and expel from the United Nations states like South Africa that practice racial discrimination.[42]

In a letter dated 12 September 1952, 13 African and Asian countries brought the issue of racial discrimination before the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This time, however, the issue was apartheid in general and not just the treatment of Indians and the issue of South West Africa. The letter said:

> The race conflict in the Union of South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the South African Government is creating a dangerous and explosive situation, which constitutes both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.[43]

The NAACP, the War Resisters' League, and several African American organizations also launched a campaign to get the United Nations to allow Prof. Z.K. Matthews to address the General Assembly on the issue of apartheid. On November

13, 1952, Executive Secretary Walter White sent a telegram to the United States delegation at the United Nations urging them to allow "native Africans to give oral evidence on apartheid legislation and other discriminatory policies of the Union of South Africa" before the Ad Hoc Political Committee considering the South Africa question.[44] On December 5, the NAACP presented an anti-apartheid petition endorsed by 30 church, labor and civic organizations calling on the United States to "take a course of action that will identify our country with the hopes and feelings of millions of Africans."[45] The letter argued that the United States "dare not act in a way that will shut off the United Nations as the last hope of millions of increasingly desperate Africans and thus drive them down the dark path of violence and anarchy." The letter, which was signed by a Who's Who of the African American civil rights leaders, concludes with an anticommunist broadside:

> We have to think and act in a manner consistent with out great purpose which is to help bring into being a world of free men whose freedom will give them the strength to turn back and dissipate the forces of despair and Soviet totalitarianism.

At the 1952 General Assembly meeting, however, the United States opposed the establishment of a United Nations Commission to "study the racial situation in South Africa" and "report its conclusion" at the next General Assembly.[46] The resolution was adopted by a majority of 35 members of the United Nations. One member, South Africa, voted against, while the United States and 20 other countries abstained. During the meeting, U.S. spokesman Charles A. Sprague stressed the close relations between the Union of South Africa and the United States. "My government

respects fully the sovereignty of the Union of South Africa with which it has had a long and friendly relationship. There is a steady interchange of travel and trade between our countries.... my delegation is exceedingly reluctant in this gathering of the nations to point an accusing finger at this Member State and does not intend to do so."[47]

While the CAA's and India's call for United Nations sanctions against South Africa was opposed by the United States and the United Kingdom and failed, the campaign to raise the world conscience to the plight of non-whites in South Africa set in motion the sanctions movement that would eventually lead to the sanctions resolution of November 6, 1962, when member states voted in the General Assembly to sever diplomatic, transportation and economic relations with South Africa. Although this resolution was non-binding, it was a major victory for the external anti-apartheid movement. To be effective, however, the movement needed the support of the Security Council where the UK and the US continued to block mandatory sanctions.[48]In 1963 the Security Council adopted a voluntary arms embargo and the sympathetic Kennedy administration in the United States announced an end to military sales to South Africa. Britain also banned arms sales to South Africa in 1963. International organizations like the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1956) and the International Labor Organization (1961), voted to expel South African representatives to protest the country's racial policies.[49]

Apartheid and Jim Crow

On 26 May 1948, a massive turnout by rural Afrikaners gave Rev. Daniel Malan's Nationalist Party a majority of five seats in the whites-only Parliament of the Union of South Africa. The Nationalists had won on a racist platform that played on white fears of the so-called "black threat" and promised to establish strict "apartheid" or separate development policies to counter it. Soon after the Nationalists took power they began to implement apartheid policies including the Population Registration Act (1949) which required registration and racial classification of all persons above 16 years of age; the Mixed Marriages Act (1950) which made the marriage of whites and non-whites a criminal act; the Suppression of Communism Act (1950) that associated anti-apartheid activities with communism; the Group Areas Act (1950) which allowed the government to determine areas in which members of particular groups could reside and own property; and the Bantu Education Act (1953) which brought mission schools under government control and circumscribed the education of Africans.[50]

In the United States, Harry Truman won the presidential elections of 1948 with a huge majority despite defections by Democrats on the right and left. On the right, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina formed the States' Rights Party and led a defection by a group of Southern Democrats called the "Dixiecrats." Thurmond and his segregationist cohorts objected to Truman's concessions to African Americans. In particular they attacked Truman's Executive Order 9981 of 1948 to desegregate the armed forces. Thurmond called this presidential order "un-American." Truman also survived a defection from the left that led to the formation of the Progressive Party led

by former vice president Henry Wallace. The party, which attracted the support of leftist African Americans like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois, took a strong pro-civil rights, anti-lynching position and called for peace talks with the Soviet Union. Truman's campaign stayed on the middle ground while redbaiting the left and dissociating the president from the extremism of the Dixiecrats and Republicans.

This first presidential election of the Cold War also established the parameters of political action and discourse for African Americans. In 1947, the Truman Doctrine had made it clear that the United States would not tolerate criticism of its foreign policy while engaged in a struggle with the Soviet Union for the "hearts and minds" of newly decolonized countries in Africa and Asia. Truman courted mainstream civil rights organizations like the NAACP and the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) with civil rights concessions while marginalizing and eventually criminalizing leftist groups like the Council on African Affairs and the National Negro Congress. In June 1947, Truman made an unprecedented appearance before the NAACP where he said the United States "can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack on segregation," and promised to support civil rights and anti-lynching legislation. In February 1948, after a particularly heinous lynching, the president delivered a national civil rights message that promised to strengthen the civil rights division of the Justice Department, abolish the poll tax, and pass anti-lynching legislation.[51] Pressured by Paul Robeson, A. Philip Randolph and civil rights groups, who were threatening unrest if the president allowed a Jim Crow draft, Truman issued Executive Order 9981 on 26 July 1948 to desegregate the Armed Forces.[52] The order also established the

President's Committee on Equal Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces. The members of the committee reflected a new African American elite including industrialist Dwight Palmer and Lester Granger of the Urban League and John Sengstacke, publisher of the *Chicago Defender*.[53]

Truman's concessions to civil rights groups and strong-arm tactics against the left convinced moderate groups like the NAACP and the Urban League that "full American nationalism apparently promised greater immediate rewards than racial internationalism."[54] Historian Gerald Horne argues that African American moderates made a "Faustian bargain" to abandon racial internationalism for civil rights concessions at home.[55] W.E.B. Du Bois, who had supported Wallace's candidacy, was expelled from the NAACP for partisan politics although the NAACP's leadership itself had supported Truman.[56] Du Bois's biographer Gerald Horne argues that the octogenarian was "ousted from the (NAACP) principally because of his leading role in the Wallace campaign and his persistence on pressing the issue of United States racism in the United Nations."[57] Du Bois had been invited back to the NAACP in 1944 as Research Director after a ten-year hiatus. He returned to the association during a period of renewed interest in international issues in the African American community. While at the association, he had helped organize the fifth Pan African Congress in Manchester, England and wrote two influential books, *Color and Democracy* and *The World and Africa.*

With the emergence of the Cold War, however, Du Bois's leftist and anti-imperialist politics became a liability to forces in the NAACP that deemed it safer to conform to the new order. These tensions were played out in the battle over Du Bois's petition to the United Nations detailing racial oppression in the United States. The petition, *An Appeal to the World: A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress,* was presented to the UN Human Rights Committee by the Soviet Union because the U.S. delegation, which included NAACP board member Eleanor Roosevelt, refused to present it.[58] The petition led to a serious rift between Du Bois and the NAACP's liberal leaders. Walter White and Eleanor Roosevelt opposed the petition on the grounds that it would embarrass the United States.[59] In addition to the controversies over the Wallace candidacy and the United Nations, Du Bois had continuing personal problems with Executive Secretary Walter White and other board members.[60] By 1948 these tensions led to his second expulsion from the organization he helped to found ostensibly because he was engaging in partisan politics. Du Bois then joined the CAA that was undergoing its own readjustment process.

Cold War politics also led black newspapers like the *Chicago Defender* and *Amsterdam News* to tone down the anti-imperialist rhetoric they had adopted during the war.[61] Like the NAACP, black leaders and commentators continued to advocate decolonization as a defense against communism. At the same time, they also argued that the United States could not claim to be a leader of the "free world" while holding

10 percent of its population in bondage.[62] Although studies show that the majority of African Americans were against aid for European countries, the Marshall Plan and NATO,[63] the NAACP supported the programs while urging that "similar aid should be extended as needed to peoples in Asia, the Mideast and Africa." Executive Secretary Walter White urged the United States to extend the European Recovery Program to Africa in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee in 1948. He argued that the United States "has a moral obligation to require that the countries receiving foreign aid adopt programs under which people currently subjected to their rule shall speedily be given a chance for freedom."[64]

In contrast to White's position, Paul Robeson, chairman of the left-wing Council on African Affairs, argued that the council was "morally bound" to take a stand against the ERP because the countries that would receive aid from the United States had nothing to offer except the raw materials to be found in their African colonies. The CAA released a policy statement on U.S. foreign policy that said:

> It is the United States that is decisive in determining Africa's immediate future. Without American loans and credits, without the political backing of the Truman administration ... and without the military assistance of the United States already granted or promised, the European colonial powers could not now maintain the imperialistic control they exercise over Africa and other colonial areas.[65]

Although the CAA was actually reflecting popular Black opposition to aid for Europeans, the policy led to a major rupture in the CAA's ranks and cut it off from important sources of funding.[66] In early 1948, Executive Secretary Max Yergan tried

to force the CAA to conform to the Truman Doctrine and support the European Recovery Program (ERP). When he failed to wrest control of the organization from Robeson and Hunton, Yergan resorted to Redbaiting.[67] He told the press that a Communist-led minority was trying to force the CAA to support the candidacy of Henry Wallace.[68] At a press conference called to reply to Yergan's charges, Robeson, speaking as the chairman of the CAA, said Yergan has resorted to "public Red-baiting in an effort to cover-up his own retreat from genuine struggle on behalf of African freedom and against imperialist oppression." Robeson said that the real issue that had split the CAA's membership was the decision to oppose the European Recovery Program of foreign aid funded by the United States. Although the Robeson camp won, Yergan left with others like founding members Channing Tobias, Hubert Delany and Rene DeFranz and Adam Clayton Powell Jr.[69]

After his ouster from the CAA, Yergan became a spokesman for the State Department, traveling to South Africa in 1949 where he spoke, in a complete about face, in favor of apartheid.[70] Yergan was embraced by the South Africans who hosted him repeatedly in the 1960s and 70s and even gave him "honorary white" status.[71] Yergan turn to the right was timely as some of his former Communist Party associates, Benjamin Davis, Eugene Dennis and Henry Winston, were jailed under the Smith Act of 1948. During the 1950s and '60s Yergan was associated with the South African diplomatic corps and right wing intellectuals and journalists like William Buckley and William Rusher of the *National Review*. In the 1960s he supported the Katanga secession movement that had been backed by Belgian mercenaries and was a major

supporter of Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.[72] Yergan was one of the first African American apologists for South African apartheid who emerged out of the woodwork in the 1950s. He joined longtime conservative Pittsburgh Courier commentator George Shuyler who had declared that Africans were not ready for independence.

Nationalist groups like the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement led by Carlos Cooks and the United African Nationalist Movement formed by James Lawson in 1948, continued to organize along Garveyite principles of back-to-Africa and self-reliance under the ubiquitous "buy-black" and "don't buy where you can't work" campaigns. Like the left, these African American nationalists showed consistent interest in South Africa during the course of the anti-apartheid movement. Nationalists played an important part in mobilizing a constituency for Africa among the new migrants from the South and immigrants from the Caribbean. These communities lived "below the radar screen" of the black and white press and have thus been erased from the recent historiography of black internationalism. Instead of using the black press as an organizing tool, the Harlem nationalists mastered the technique of "street-speaking" which was initially associated with immigrants from the Caribbean but had been Harlemized by the first world war. Among the most accomplished street speakers during the Depression and World War Two were nationalists like Carlos Cooks and Richard B. Moore, a Harlem resident from the turn of the century. Malcolm X also sharpened his debating skills on "Africa Square" in Harlem where he also displayed his pan-Africanist orientation.

James Lawson's UANM established strong ties with representatives of African nations at the UN and organized famine relief and informational campaigns in the 1950s. After a trip to Tunisia and Ethiopia in 1952, for instance, the *New York Amsterdam News* praised Lawson for his internationalist perspective saying that although the paper did not agree "when his preachments for 'African Nationalism' come close to setting black people against whites ... Mr. Lawson has recognized the potentialities of these colored people who have voices in the United Nations and how both Negro Americans and they can be of overwhelming mutual benefit, both in the short and long runs."[73] Elijah Mohammed's Nation of Islam had a relatively unenlightened position on Africa during this period, preferring instead to call themselves "Asiatic" black men and to identify with the Arabs of North Africa and the Middle East. The NOI's position , however, changes in the mid-1950s with the independence movements in Africa and the emergence of Malcolm X as a national spokesman. In "Africa Conscious Harlem," Richard Moore argued that "consciousness of Africa was by no means limited to the various groups which called themselves 'nationalists' and who are quite vocal but who actually contribute little or no substantial, direct support to African liberation movements."[74] Moore argued that the nationalist groups were unable to put aside their power struggles and unite and had the destructive tendency of opposing more popular and effective groups.

As apartheid began to take shape in 1948, therefore, the black left was still vibrant (Ben Davis was still the communist New York City Councilor) although leftist

groups had become targets of the FBI and the Justice Department. Liberal groups like the NAACP had thrown their lot in with the Truman administration while the nationalists continued to push Garvey's black pride and self-reliance agenda. Meanwhile, a small but vocal right was beginning to emerge under the direction of George Schuyler and Max Yergan.

Financing Apartheid

In the United States, the Truman administration considered the Union of South Africa an important source of strategic raw materials and an ally in the struggle against communism.[75] Key to this relationship was the fear that southern Africa's uranium deposits might fall into Soviet hands.[76] In 1948 the United States was still getting 90% of its uranium from the Belgian Congo although it had started negotiations with South Africa which had large deposits of the strategic mineral. During the war, Africa had become a critical sources of strategic minerals including asbestos, lead, manganese, tin, uranium, coal, cobalt, copper, chrome, diamonds and gold. As the *New York Times* put it:

> Africa is the continent of the future. We learned its strategic value in the Second World War. Its economic potentialities are the hope of the Western Europe not in the sense of exploitation but for the good of the Africans and the rest of the world.[77]

As the undisputed leader of the "free world," the United States chose to maintain control of the region through the existing colonial structure established by its NATO allies, France, Portugal, and Britain. President Truman himself had stated the

importance of Africa to U.S. foreign policy arguing that the continent could not be allowed to "fall to Soviet Russia. We would lose the sources of our most vital raw materials including uranium which is the basis of our atomic power."[78]

By 1948, New Africa was calling the United States the "new boss in Africa."[79] The newsletter reported that Africa was getting the attention of American bankers, industrialists, diplomats and military heads. The report said, "The United States, through the Marshall Plan, has acquired top priority to the strategic minerals it wants from (Africa)." In a March 26, 1953 article the New York Times also reported in a story "Africa Called Key to World's Future, Army Officer Emphasizes Its Importance as Storehouse of Strategic Minerals," that a Col. Alvin R. Glafka of the United States Army had described Africa as "the continent of tomorrow" during a two-week Economic Mobilization Course attended by 400 business and military leaders. Col. Glafka told the participants that the United States and its NATO allies Portugal, France, Belgium and Great Britain planned to make large investments in Africa to counter any threat from the communists. Detailing Africa's economic potential Colonel Glafka said the continent produced 98 percent of the world's diamonds, 89 percent of its uranium oxide, 85 percent of its cobalt and 30 percent of its manganese.

Colonel Glafka's predictions were accurate. In 1946 a New York bank group Laedenburg, Thelman and Co., merged with British-South African interests covering extensive mining properties over 100 South African industrial companies called Lezard Freres and Company.[80] *Time* magazine described this merger as "the first big

beach-head of American capital in South Africa." By 1949 the Truman administration also moved to cement ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa. Faced with an economic crisis in 1949, the South African government sent its finance minister to the United States to seek a loan of $70 million.[81] After some negotiations, however, it was announced that there would be no loans because South Africa "could not accept the strings attached." By December 1950, however, an agreement had been reached allowing the United States and Britain access to South African's uranium mines as an alternative to the mines in the Belgian Congo.[82] The U.S. helped South Africa apply for and receive a loan of $80 million from the U.S. dominated World Bank in January 1951. South Africa also received $30 million from private banks in the United States.[83] In June 1951, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, at the request of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, allocated $35 million for uranium production in South Africa, and advanced another $27 million in 1952. The uranium project was expected to cost $100 million.[84] This infusion of investments and loans bailed out Malan's Nationalist Party and allowed it to win a larger majority in parliament in the all-white elections of 1953. *New Africa* warned that the money was "intended to speed up the exploitation of African resources" and to "guarantee and expand the super profits derived from imperialist enslavement of African workers."[85] The newsletter went on to condemn the U.S. for "guns and loans to Malan's regime and says nothing in criticism of its "free world" ally's policy of Jim Crow oppression. Instead it persecutes the one organization in America which has been exposing South African racism and seeking support for Africa."[86]

Liberal African American organizations like the NAACP also noted the growing ties between the United States and South Africa. Although the NAACP had supported the Truman administration's foreign policies in 1948, it continued to question certain polices although the queries were cloaked in anticommunist garb. In February 1951, for instance, Walter White received mail from a Mr. Palmer Webber urging the NAACP to protest to the World Bank over an $80 million loan it was considering for South Africa.[87] The letter urged White to send the chairman, Mr. Eugene Black, "a clear statement ... strongly protesting the $80 million loan to South Africa specifying that it is completely false to the fundamental interests of this country to strengthen fascist and racist powers in Africa, South America or Asia."

On February 1, White fired off an urgent protest letter to Eugene Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) via Western Union on behalf of the NAACP "and its 1,600 branches." The letter vigorously urged the bank to reconsider the "$50 million" loan to South Africa until the country "ceases its defiance of the United Nations with respect to South West Africa and abandons its dangerous racist policies." Comparing the apartheid system to Nazism, the letter said:

> Granting of this loan to the Union of South Africa is all the more remarkable and dismaying in light of the recent refusal of both government and financial leaders in Britain to give financial aid to the Union of South Africa because its policies infuriate colored people everywhere, who constitute two-thirds of the world's population.[88]

Five days later White received an answer from Black stating that the bank would not "reconsider such loans since the agreements have been signed following

official approval by the Bank's Executive Directors, who represent governments of the Bank's 49 member nations, including the government of the United States."[89] Black also quoted the bank's articles of agreement stating that loans shall be made "without regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations." Nevertheless, the World Bank president assured White that the projects that the bank had agreed to finance would benefit "all of the South African people regardless of color." Two days later, White answered taking issue with the bank's contention that the loan would benefit all South Africans. He argued that the "grim and bloody truth" was that Africans enjoyed none of the benefits of government. Indeed, he continued, "The dangerous apartheid doctrine of the Malan Government proposes denial to an even greater extent of the few crumbs that have been grudgingly given to the native population."[90] In conclusion White urged the bank to weigh future loans carefully as it was "entirely proper, we believe, to advocate that no economic assistance be given to governments which unashamedly advocate a dangerous racist policy."

In 1952, White was again informed that the South African government had sent a delegation to the United States to seek a $19 billion loan. In a letter to Jonas Reiner of New York seeking more information, White recalls that the World Bank loan had helped the South African economy at a time when more moderate forces were hoping that the Nationalists would fail. "The International Bank's loan not only saved Malan's hide but the loan was widely used to convince English-speaking South Africans ... that the racial policies of South Africa were not disapproved."[91] White asked Rainer to find him any information on the amount and sources of loans to South

Africa "to use as a basis for opposition to any loans to the Union of South Africa until the government there is willing to act in a more civilized manner." On July 21, 1953, White followed up his earlier communication with Eugene Black, president of the World Bank, by asking whether the bank still believed that the loan it had made to South Africa in January 1951 had benefited all South African people regardless of color "in the light of hat has happened in South Africa since 1951."[92] A week later, Black replied informing White that the loans had financed electric power production and improvement of railroads which had "helped the whole economy grow (and) created more job opportunities at higher pay for everyone."[93] Incredibly, Black added that, "On balance, it is likely that Africans have benefited economically rather more from this growth than other sections of the community."

The Defiance Campaigns

> The African National Congress highly appreciates the good work and tireless efforts made by your Council (on African Affairs) in educating our American Negro brothers and the public of America as a whole. We also express our gratitude for the assistance you have given us in our Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws.[94]
>
> African National Congress

South African communists and the African National Congress called the May Day 1950 strike to protest the Suppression of Communism Act that had been passed by Malan's regime. On May 1, thousands of black workers boycotted their jobs. The government responded violently, sending thousands of armed policemen to disperse the crowds. Press reports indicated that eighteen workers were killed in Johannesburg. On 26 June, the ANC called another strike to protest the shootings and the

Suppression of Communism Act. The protest was well supported by Communists, Indians and ANC members leading the formation of a broad-based, nationalist movement that was unprecedented. The May Day strikes, however, were only a prelude to the mass civil disobedience campaigns of 1952 and 1953 called the Campaign of Defiance of Unjust Laws.

The plan was for a civil disobedience Campaign of Defiance where Africans would defy petty apartheid regulations like whites-only drinking fountains, train compartments and waiting rooms.[95] The campaign was launched on April 1952 when whites were marking the 300th anniversary of the arrival of Jan Van Riebeck and the first colony of Dutch settlers in South Africa. Before the campaign, the ANC sent a letter to Prime Minister Malan urging him to repeal the land acts, pass regulations, and the Group Areas and Suppression of Communism acts or face mass action.[96] The letter deplored apartheid legislation like Group Areas Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, and Bantu Authorities Act:

> The cumulative effect of this legislation is to crush the national organizations of the oppressed people, to destroy the economic position of the people and to create a reservoir of cheap labor for the farms and the gold mines, to prevent the unity and development of the African people towards full nationhood and to humiliate them in a host of other manners.

Saying that the ANC can no longer remain silent in "a matter of life and death" the letter called on Malan to repeal apartheid legislation "by NOT LATER THAN THE 29TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1952, failing which the African National Congress will

hold protest meetings and demonstrations on the 6th day of April 1952 as a prelude to the implementation of the plan for the defiance of unjust laws."

On 29 January 1952, the prime minister's office responded with a threat that "the government will make full use of the machinery at its disposal to quell any disturbances."[97] The letter also claimed:

> You will realize, I think, that it is self-contradictory to claim as an inherent right of the Bantu who differ in many ways from the Europeans that they should be regarded as not different, especially when it is borne in mind that these differences are permanent and not man-made.[98]

Following this rebuff, Walter Sisulu of the ANC and Yusuf Chachalia of the Indian Congress were appointed joint secretaries and Nelson Mandela volunteer-in-chief of the defiance campaign.[99] The campaign was launched at meetings on April 6, 1952 when thousands of nonwhites vowed to "defy unjust laws that subject our people to political slavery, economic misery and social degradation."[100] In Johannesburg, The *New York Times* reported that "several thousand non-whites marched in Fordsburg Freedom Square to the tune of Paul Robeson songs played on a loud speaker. The carried banners reading, "Down with Apartheid," "Down with Passes."[101] As volunteer-in-chief, Mandela made hundreds of speeches throughout the country urging Africans to confront the apartheid machine and invite arrest. The government reacted by "banning" four known ANC militant leaders including Dr. Dadoo and J.B. Marks from public gatherings. The leaders promptly defied the ruling by addressing public

meetings and were arrested. The government also banned Paul Robeson's songs, radical newspapers and warned the public not to support the ANC action.[102]

On June 22, 1952, the first batch of 52 "volunteers" was arrested at the Boksburg "Native" Location 20 miles from Johannesburg.[103] The ANC reported later that its volunteers broke apartheid laws in six different cities and that mass meetings preceded the acts of defiance. Mandela, Sisulu, Chachalia and other leaders of the campaign were arrested on 26 June. Yusuf Dadoo, president of the Indian Congress, Moses Kotane, of the ANC, and J.B. Marks of the African Mineworkers Union were given four to six months in jail under the Suppression of Communism Act.[104] Between July and August 1952, the police raided the homes and offices of ANC leaders around the country seizing numerous documents. On August 26, 1952 they arrested twenty leaders of the campaign including Dr. Moroka, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, J.B. Marks, Dr. Dadoo and Yusuf Chachalia and charged them with promoting communism.[105] The group were eventually found guilty of "statutory communism" under the Suppression of Communism Act and sentenced to 9 months in prison.[106] In sentencing these leaders, the magistrate said:

> It is common knowledge that one of the aims of communism is to break down racial barriers and strive for equal rights for all sections of the people, and to do so without discrimination of race, color, or creed. The Union of South Africa, with its peculiar problems created by a population overwhelmingly non-European, is fertile ground for the dissemination of Communist propaganda. This would endanger the survival of the Europeans and therefore legislation must be pursued with the object of suppressing communism.[107]

By December 16, 1952, 8,057 had been arrested in the campaign, 5,719 in Eastern Cape, 423 in Western Cape, 1,411 in Transvaal, 246 in Natal, and 258 in Orange Free State.[108]

To coincide with the ANC's defiance campaign, the CAA, which had also been accused of being a "communist-front" by the Justice Department, organized a large support rally on April 6, 1952 in Harlem.[109] The *Daily Worker* of April 7, 1952 led with a story titled "Harlem Rally Cheers African Freedom Struggle."[110] The article reported that Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. D-N.Y., and Councilman Earl Brown addressed the rally of 5,000 people where they urged the U.S. to stop supporting the racist regime in South Africa with loans and other forms of aid. Robeson and Charlotta Bass, a former Garveyite and the publisher/editor of the *California Eagle,* also spoke.[111] The meeting was followed by 30 hours of picketing (from Monday April 7 to Friday April 11) outside the South African consulate in New York. The demonstrators called on the United States to stop providing financial and military support to the racist regime in South Africa.[112] The CAA also circulated a widely endorsed petition to the President of the United States urging him to "halt United States assistance in any form to the government of the Union of South Africa, and to denounce publicly that government's racist program as an international menace."[113] The petition was launched on July 24, 1952, at a conference in New York City attended by over 60 leaders of African American and white churches, labor unions, civic and peace organizations from New York, Philadelphia and Boston.[114] The conference resolutions demanded the immediate release of the hundreds of

Africans jailed for their participation in the defiance campaign under the Suppression of Communism Act. The group also pledged to seek 100,000 signatures on the petition and to raise $5,000 to be sent to the Fund For the Victims of Nationalist Persecution which had been established in South Africa by the leaders of the defiance campaign.[115] In September of that year, the CAA reported that $900 had been forwarded to the ANC to support the civil disobedience struggle. Announcing the continuation of the petition and fund drive Alphaeus Hunton called for "redoubled efforts on the part of the organization's members and friends to broaden the petition drive and thus translate into concrete and effective action the widespread bitterness and indignation of Americans, particularly black Americans, over the rampant racist barbarism of the Malan government."[116] The CAA described the trial of 28 Africans and Indians as "desperation in seeking to crush the rapidly growing Campaign of Defiance of Unjust Laws which has resulted in the jailing of over 4,000 volunteers who deliberately violated various Jim-Crow and pass law regulations." Eventually, the CAA collected and forwarded $2,500 for legal defense of the over 8,000 men, women and children who were incarcerated during the defiance campaign.[117] This support for the legal defense fund and the campaign for the release of political prisoners were a precursor to the massive "Free Mandela" campaign that emerged in latter years.

Is African Liberation Subversive?

The anti-apartheid movement therefore emerged in a period of extreme Cold War hysteria. CAA leaders were subjected to severe harassment by the FBI and the Justice Department.[118] Paul Robeson's passport was withdrawn in 1950; W.E.B. Du

Bois was indicted as a foreign agent in 1951; and Alphaeus Hunton was jailed for contempt.[119] Although Robeson was never charged with any crime, the U.S. State Department revoked his passport on August 7, 1950 on the grounds that "Paul Robeson's travel abroad would be contrary to the best interests of the United States." Although the State Department did not elaborate on the decision at the time, a government attorney justified the passport cancellation during an appeal hearing on March 13, 1953, when he argued that the passport had been revoked "in view of the applicant's frank admission that he has been extremely active politically in behalf of the independence of the colonial peoples of Africa ... the diplomatic embarrassment that could arise from the presence abroad of such a political meddler, traveling under the protection of an American passport is unimaginable."[120] The CAA and its supporters in the anti-colonial press interpreted this statement as indicating that African independence was not in the interest of the United States. Lloyd L. Brown, writing in *Freedom*, argued, "The conclusion is clear: the U.S. State Department considers that advocating independence for the colonial peoples of Africa is against the best interests of the United States."[121]

Although the interest of the United States in maintaining colonialism in Africa only became clear in the 1950s, the FBI and the Justice Department were already associating support for African liberation with communism and subversion when they put the CAA under surveillance in 1942.[122] Director J. Edgar Hoover initiated investigations "in view of the fact that the informant describes this organization as being a Communist front."[123] Three months later, Hoover authorized a full-scale

investigation as per bureau policy on "active front" organizations.[124] A FBI report prepared for the Justice Department included a report from an informer that argued that:

> The purpose of the CAA is to stimulate the Negroes here to a sense of hostility to the U.S. by stimulating consciousness of Africa and showing the Negro people are of African nationality. It is the purpose of the CAA to attempt to divorce the American Negroes from the American way of life and to stimulate consciousness of Africa. The above statement concerning the CAA has been discussed in my presence at Communist meetings.[125]

In July 1947, Attorney General Tom Clark put the CAA on a list of organizations he considered "totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive." In 1950, the organization was ordered to submit its membership records to the Federal Government in 1950 under the McCarran Act.[126] Congress had passed the Internal Security (McCarran) Act in 1950, that required communists and "Communist-front" organizations to register as foreign agents or be prosecuted. During the same year South Africa passed the Suppression of Communism Act that was used to silence and prosecute scores of African nationalists. In South Africa, the *Bantu Forum* (June 1950) called the Suppression of Communism Act "a direct attack on the progress of African people. Communism is being used merely as a cloak to conceal the real character of this legislation."[127]

The intersection between anti-communism, colonialism and anti-black racism was demonstrated in the mob scene that prevented a Robeson concert at Peerskill, N.Y. on August 28, 1949 and badly marred another on September 4, 1949.[128] The mob

scenes were a result of national hysteria after Robeson was misquoted by an Associated Press reporter. At the World Peace Conference in Paris, France in April, 1949, Robeson said that "it is inconceivable that American Negroes would fight with those who have oppressed them for generations against the Soviet Union, which, in a generation, has raised them to a position of equality."[129] When Robeson returned from Paris he found that this statement had became "Negroes won't fight for the U.S." and that the establishment had decided to make him an example. Former colleagues turned against him. Adam Clayton Powell was quoted as saying that Robeson "does not speak for the overwhelming majority of the Negro people." According to Paul Robeson Jr., Jackie Robinson, Max Yergan, and Josh White were induced to give similar statements by the FBI. The NAACP's *Crisis* published a vicious attack on Robeson and the CAA by Walter White, claiming the CAA was "long ago labeled a Communist-front by the Department of Justice."[130]

Despite the difficulties posed by the anticommunist witch-hunts, the CAA continued to be active to the very end. On April 24, 1954, for instance, it held a Conference in Support of African Liberation in Harlem's Friendship Baptist Church and a series of public meetings on Harlem street corners where "Africa Must be Free" buttons were sold.[131] Among the conference resolutions was a message to the ANC and SAIC which saluted them for the "courageous and heroic struggle which they have waged against the face of fascist like repression by the Malan government." In a "Declaration in Support of African Liberation" sent to the United Nations and the United States government, the conference called on the UN to "abolish the practice of

gross racial discrimination ... particularly in Kenya, the Union of South Africa, and other territories where rule by tyrannical decree and armed might prevails." The declaration also called on the United Nations to set a specific time-limit for the achievement of self-government in every colonial territory in Africa; to stop the annexation of Namibia, Swaziland and Bechuanaland; and to bar the granting of military, financial and technical assistance to governments that suppressed the rights of racial minorities.[132]

"Nothing illustrates more clearly the hysteria of our times than the career of the Council on African Affairs," W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1952 in an assessment of the CAA's work.[133] By 1952, the CAA was reeling from sustained attacks from the FBI and the Justice Department. W.E.B. Du Bois was indicted as a foreign agent in 1951; Alphaeus Hunton was jailed for contempt; and Du Bois' and Paul Robeson's passports were withdrawn.[134] The withdrawal of Paul Robeson's passport led to the cancellation of hundreds of concerts around the world. The passport debacle was disastrous for the CAA because it cut off the flow of funds from Robeson, the principal fund-raiser and benefactor. Thus the first anti-Apartheid organization was hounded into oblivion in the mid-1950s principally because of its anti-colonial and anti-apartheid work.[135]

As apartheid began to take shape in 1948, therefore, the African American constituency for Africa was divided between the left, the liberals and the nationalists. On the left, the CAA was a target of the FBI, the Justice Department and the House UnAmerican Activities Committee; liberal groups like the NAACP had thrown their

lot in with the Truman administration; the nationalists continued to push Garvey's black pride and self-reliance agenda; while the right was beginning to emerge under the direction of George Schuyler and Max Yergan.

[1]Lynch 13.

[2]St. Clair Drake. "Introduction," Lynch, 7.

[3]Martin Duberman, Paul Robeson, 299.

[4]Duberman, 301.

[5]Sterling Stuckey, Slave Culture: Nationalist Theory and the Foundations of Black America. (New York: Oxford university Press, 1987) 356-58.

[6]Ollie Harrington, "Our Beloved Pauli," in Ernest Kaier (ed.) A Freedomways Reader Afro-America in the Seventies. (New York: International Publishers, 1977)273.

[7]David Anthony. "Max Yergen and South Africa: A Transitional Interaction," in Sidney Lemelle and Robin Kelly, Imagining Home Class, Culture and Nationalism in The African Diaspora. (New York: Verso, 1994) 185-207; Martin Duberman. Paul Robeson A Biography. (New York: The New Press, 1989) 170. Paul Robeson. Here I Stand. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988) 6-28.

[8]Anthony, 185

[9]Anthony, 186

[10]Martin Duberman, Paul Robeson A Biography, (New York: The New Press, 1989) 8-10.

[11]Robeson, Here I Stand, 6-7

[12]Lynch, 19. The FBI also notes that Robeson was the leader of the Council.
[13]Paul Robeson, Here I Stand. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988) 33

[14]Quoted in Stuckey, "'I want to be African': Paul Robeson and the ends of Nationalist theory and practice, 1941-1945," *Massachusetts Review,* Vol. XVII, Spring, 1976, p.84.

[15]Martin Duberman, Paul Robeson A Biography. (New York: The New Press, 1989) 170.

[16]"I want to be African," in Robeson Speaks, 88-91

[17]Robeson, 35.

[18]Robeson, 35.

[19]Robeson, 33-35

[20]W.E.B. Du Bois, The World And Africa. (New York: International Publishers, 1965) 336-337.

[21]Tunde Adeleke, UnAfrican Americans Nineteenth-Century Black Nationalists and the Civilizing Mission. (Lexinton, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998) 92-111.

[22]Penny Von Eshen. "Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism 1937-1955"

[23]Quoted in Tribute to Paul Robeson. 19-20

[24]Lynch, Hollis. Black American Radicals and The Liberation of Africa The Council on African Affairs 1937-1955. Ithaca; Cornell University Africana Studies Center, 1978. 19-20.

[25]Lynch, 21.

[26]Lynch, 22.

[27]*New Africa*, Jan., March, April, 1946; *New York Times* Jan. 8, Feb. 12, March 5, 1946.

[28]*New Africa,* Volume 5, No. 1, January 1946.

[29]*New Africa*, January 1946, 2.

[30]*New Africa*, Sept. 1946; *New York Times*, 7 June 7 1946.

[31]*New York Times*, 7 June 1946.

[32]Robeson Speaks, 169.

[33]D. Hunton, Tribute to Robeson,

[34]Lynch, 34-35.

[35]*New Africa,* Dec. 1946.

[36]ANC Memorandum, 59.

[37]Lynch, 34-35; Penny Von Eshen, Race Against Empire Black American and Anticolonialism 1937-1957. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 84.

[38]*Chicago Defender*, Oct. 18, 1946 pg. 3.

[39]General Assembly resolution: Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa. A/RES/44 (I), 8 December 1946. United Nations archives. Camille A. Bratton, "A Matter of Record: The History of the United States Voting Pattern in the United Nations Regarding Racism, Colonialism and Apartheid, 1946-1976." Freedomways Third Quarter, 1977, pg. 157

[40]Alphaeus Hunton, "A Postscript for Americans" in "Resistance Against Fascist Enslavement in South Africa," (New York: Council on African Affairs, 1953), 56

[41]*New Africa*, June 1946.

[42]*New Africa,* ibid.

[43]Letter dated 12 September 1952 addressed to the Secretary-General by the permanent representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. A/2183, 12 September 1952

[44]NAACP telegram to U.S. delegation at the U.N., November 13, 1952. NAACP papers Part 14, Reel 5.

[45]NAACP Press Release, December 5, 1952.; NAACP telegram to U.S. delegation at the U.N., November 13, 1952. NAACP papers Part 14, Reel 5.

[46]General Assembly resolution: The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa. A/RES/616 A (VII), 5 December 1952.

[47]Alphaeus Hunton, Postscript, "Resistance to Fascist Enslavement in South Africa," Council on African Affairs Papers, Schomburg Center for the Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library. Hunton attended the General Assembly and Ad Hoc Political Committee meetings as the representative of the Council.

[48]John Dugard, "Sanctions against South Africa: An international law perspective," Sanctions Against Apartheid, ed. Mark Orkin (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989) 103-113.

[49]Romeo Barros, African States and the United Nations versus apartheid; the efforts of the African States to affect South Africa's apartheid policy through the United

Nations. (New York, Carlton Press, 1967) 20-25. At the United Nations, the campaign for international sanctions registered its first victory on November 6, 1962, when the General Assembly urged member states to sever diplomatic ties with South Africa, ban South African Airways flights, boycott South African goods, and refrain for trading with South Africa.

[50]*Spotlight on Africa,* August 13, 1953. Memorandum forwarded by the Council to the UN Commission on Racial Discrimination in South Africa set up by the UN General Assembly in December 1952. The memorandum was forwarded on July 23, 1953, to the UN Commission.

[51]Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Washington, D.C., 1963), 121-126.
[52]Gerald Astor, The Right to Fight A History of African Americans in the Military. (Navato, Calif. : Presidio Press, 1998), 320-322.

[53]Astor, 321.

[54]James L. Roark, "American Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and the Cold War, 1943-1953," in Michael Krenn (ed.) The African American Voice in U.S. Foreign Policy since World War II. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 50.

[55]Gerald Horne, Black and Red W.E.B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War 1944-1963. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 97.

[56]Pittsburgh Courier, Oct. 19, 1948.

[57]Gerald Horne, Black and Red W.E.B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War 1944-1963. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 97.

[58]"NAACP Petition to the United Nations," Reel 62, No. 935, Du Bois Papers.

[59]Horne, 75-83.

[60]Horne, 41-49.

[61]Von Eshen, Plummer, Horne.

[62]Chicago Defender, 5 July 1947; *Amsterdam News*, 7 February 1948.

[63]Alfred Hero, "American Negroes and United States Foreign policy, 1937-1967," in Michael Krenn, The African American Voice in Foreign Policy Since world War II. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 5.

[64]Crisis Jan., 1955 24.

[65]Herald Tribune, April 7, 1948; New York Times, April 7, 1948.

[66]Alfred Hero, "American Negroes and United States Foreign policy, 1937-1967," in Michael Krenn, The African American Vioce in Foreign Policy Since world War II. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 5.

[67]Lynch, 35-37.

[68]New York Times, April 7, 1948.

[69]Lynch, 39.

[70]Anthony, "Max Yergen and South Africa" 197-198.

[71]Anthony, 198.

[72]Anthony, 198.

[73]*New York Amsterdam News*, Oct. 10, 1952.

[74]Richard Moore, "Africa Consciousness Harlem," in John Henrick Clarke, (ed.) Harlem A Community in Transition. p. 91.

[75]Borstelmann, Thomas. Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993 105-107.

[76]Borstelmann, 163-65, 185-86. By 1948 the United States was getting 90% of its uranium from the Belgian Congo and had began negotiations with South Africa which had large deposits of the strategic mineral.

[77]New York Times, March, 22 1949.

[78]Quoted in St. Clair Drake, "The International Implication of Race and Race Relations," Journal of Negro Education, XX 3(Summer, 1951) 264.

[79]New Africa, Vol. 7, No. 2 Nov. 1948. 1.

[80]*Spotlight on Africa,* July 25, 1952.

[81]*New York Times,* Jan. 4, 1950.

[82]Borstelmann, 105-7.

[83]*New Africa*, Nov., 1951, 9.

[84]*New York Times,* January 20, 1953.

[85]*New Africa*, Jan.-Feb. 1951.

[86]*New Africa*, Jan.-Feb..., 1951.

[87]Memorandum to Walter White from Palmer Webber, January 26, 1951. NAACP Papers, Part 14, Reel 5.

[88]Walter White to Eugene Black, February 1, 1951. NAACP Papers, Part 14, Reel 5.

[89]Eugene R. Black to Walter White, February 6, 1951. NAACP Papers, Part 14, Reel 5.

[90]White t o Black, February 8, 1951. NAACP Papers, Part 14, Reel 5.

[91]White to Jonas Reiner, may 19, 1952. NAACP Papers, Part 14, Reel 5.

[92]White to Black, July 21, 1953. NAACP Papers, Part 14, Reel 5.

[93]Black to White, July 30, 1953. NAACP Papers, Part 14, Reel 5.

[94]You Be The Judge, 4.

[95]African National Congress Memorandum to the United Nations, November 1952. 40.

[96]Letter dated 21 January 1952 from the African National Congress to Prime Minister D.F. Malan. ANC Archives, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/struggles/correspondence.html.

[97]ANC Memorandum, 41.

[98]Letter dated 29 January 1952 from the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister to the A.N.C. ANC Archives.

[99]This civil disobedience campaign predated the Montgomery Bus Boycott by 5 years.

[100]ANC Memorandum, 41.

[101]*New York Times,* April 7, 1952.

[102]ANC Memorandum, 45. Heidi Holland, The Struggle A History of the African National Congress, (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1989) 77.

[103]Holland, 78.

[104]ANC Memorandum, 46.

[105]ANC Memorandum, 46; Holland, 81-82.

[106]ANC Memorandum, 46.

[107]ANC Memorandum, 45.

[108]*New York Times,* January 8, 1953.

[109]*Spotlight on Africa*, April 14, 1952.

[110]*The Daily Worker*, Monday, April 7, 1952 Vol. XXIX No. 70.

[111]*New Africa,* April 14, 1952.

[112]*New Africa,* April 14, 1952.

[113]"Here Are the Facts .. You Be The Judge!" Council On African Affairs pamphlet issued by Paul Robeson, November 11, 1953, 3.

[114]Council on African Affairs News Release, July 25, 1952. Schomburg Center For Research in Black Culture, Paul Robeson Collection.

[115]*The Daily Worker,* New York, Monday, July 28, 1952.

[116]Council New Release, September 19, 1952. Shomburg Center.

[117]You Be The Judge, 3.

[118]Von Eshen, 138-9, Hollis Lynch, 25.

[119]Von Eshen, 139; Lynch, 25.

[120]Robeson, Here I Stand 33; Duberman, 434.

[121]Lloyd L Brown, "State Dept. Says African Freedom 'Against Best Interests of U.S.'" *Freedom*, March 1953. 5.

[122]Council on African Affairs FBI files. W.E.B. Du Bois collection, University of Massachusetts.

[123]Letter from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to New York office January 7, 1942. Du Bois Papers, Series 23 FBI Files on Council on African Affairs, Box 377, Folder 3.
[124]FBI files, Box 377.

[125]Du Bois collection, FBI files, Group 312 Series No. 23 Box 377 Folder 38.

[127]*Bantu Forum* June, 1950.

[128]Lynch, 40.

[129]Both Robeson and Du Bois, who was at the conference, claim that Robeson was misquoted.

[130]*Crisis*, 54:137; *Negro Digest*, 7 No. 5 (March 1950) 8: 10-14.

[131]ibid.

[132]Resolution adopted at Conference in Support of African Liberation at Friendship Baptist Church, New York City April 24, 1954. Shomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, Paul Robeson Collection.

[133]Du Bois In Battle for Peace (Millwood, N.Y. : Kraus-Thomson Organization Ltd., 1976) 16-17.

[134]Von Eshen, 139; Lynch, 25.

[135]Von Eshen 138-9; Hollis Lynch 25

CHAPTER 3

COLD WAR ALTERNATIVES

> The American Committee on Africa is a right-wing organization with Christianity and some big money behind it. Naturally it is doing some good work and publishing some facts about the present situation, but fundamentally it is reactionary. You cannot depend on it to tell the whole African story.
>
> W.E.B. Du Bois, 1956[1]

As Africans stepped-up the struggle for independence in the 1950s, the United States government and intelligence agencies began to pay closer attention to events on the continent. During the Second World War, Africa had become critical to U.S. foreign policy as the source of strategic minerals like uranium, industrial diamonds and cobalt. These minerals, found in abundance in southern Africa, were critical to the production of nuclear weapons.[2] As a result, intelligence agencies, the military and philanthropic foundations began to finance studies of African societies by cold warriors designed to ensure that the United States would maintain control of these strategic resources. They also established "African Studies" programs at major universities and provided scholarships for selected African students to study in the United States. The aim was to develop a new generation of pro-capitalist African leaders by reaching out to African students in the United States. These Cold War liberal and religious interests led to the formation of the African-American Institute (1953), the American Committee on Africa (1954), the American Society for African

Culture (1957), and the African Studies Association (1957).[3] Some, like the ACOA, became more radical in the 1960s and 70s while others like AAI and AMSAC maintained strong ties with the CIA.

Meanwhile, the collapse of the CAA reflected the marginalization of the left just as the modern civil rights movement was emerging. This movement was led by liberal clergymen who were anti-communists but were influenced behind the scenes by former leftists like Bayard Rustin, E.D. Nixon and A. Philip Randolph. Other former communists joined the Nation of Islam where they worked as teachers and writers/editors for the NOI's publications. African American liberals who had been involved in the anti-apartheid movement helped form an organization called Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR) in 1952 to support the ANC's Campaign of Defiance of Unjust Laws. As historian Hollis Lynch put it the AFSAR emerged "precisely because its liberal members of both races could not work through the council, seeing it as 'tainted' with Communist influence."[4]

Americans For South African Resistance

AFSAR (which became the American Committee on Africa in 1954) emerged out of the Congress of Racial Equality, a multi-racial organization that helped pioneer the modern civil rights movement in the United States. CORE activists had organized civil rights sit-ins at a Chicago restaurant in 1942 and "Freedom Rides" through the South in 1947.[5] George Houser, who was the secretary of AFSAR, says he was introduced to the apartheid issue by an African-American associate, Bill Sutherland,

who had toured South Africa and encouraged CORE to support the defiance campaign.[6] Houser, Sutherland, James Farmer, Adam Clyaton Powell Jr., Canada Lee, Bayard Rustin and others then organized the AFSAR, which began as a project of CORE.[7]

Houser began correspondence with the leaders of the defiance campaign soon after being appointed secretary of AFSAR. He wrote to several religious and community leaders seeking their impressions about the ANC's civil disobedience campaign planned for April 6, 1952. Among the first questions that came up was whether the ANC was a communist-front or under the influence of communists. These reports were fueled by people like Manilal Gandhi (Mohandes "Mahatma" Gandhi's son), who opposed the defiance campaign on grounds that, "There is too much of a communistic influence (in the ANC) and very little of the spirit of non-violence as preached and practiced by Mahatma Gandhi."[8] Yusuf Dadoo, president of the South African Indian Congress was a member of the Communist Party of South Africa before it was banned. Houser explains that "although our supporters were opposed to McCarthyism, we were not interested in joining forces with the Communists in a united front."[9]

Eventually, the group decided to support the defiance campaign and AFSAR was formed as an ad hoc support group for the campaign of defiance. Donald Harrington of the Community Church and Charles Y. Trigg, minister of the Salem Baptist Church of Harlem, were chosen as co-chairman and George Houser was

named secretary. The executive committee included Roger Baldwin, Norman Thomas, Bayard Rustin, A. Philip Randolph, and Conrad Lynn. The group saw itself as "a vehicle for information about the campaign and to raise funds" a statement of purpose that was remarkably similar to that of the CAA.[10]

AFSAR's first action was a rally of 800 at Abyssinia Baptist Church in Harlem on April 6, 1952. The meeting resolved to support the non-violent campaign and to "continue its work of education and of rallying support in this country for the struggle against Apartheid and for brotherhood and freedom in South Africa."[11] The meeting raised $200 for the non-European congresses in South Africa.[12]

As we saw above, a CAA rally earlier that day had attracted 5,000 and collected thousands of dollars for the same cause. Like the CAA, AFSAR organized a letter-writing campaign to the United Nations asking the organization to allow South African academic Z. K. Matthews to address it. A reply came from the Charles E. Allen, Director of the Office of Public Affairs at the UN mission, saying that allowing petitioners to address the UN would "involve radical changes in the structure of the U.N."[13] Allen made it clear that the United States would oppose the petition, saying that the function of the U.N. was to reconcile judgments and policies of governments, not to function as a fact-finding agency. The U.N., dominated at the time by the United States and its western allies, rejected Matthews' request.

Although the AFSAR was formed to support the ANC's defiance campaign, there is no record of events or activities that rival those of the CAA. Indeed, the activities of the group seem to have been confined to the first meeting at Abyssinia Baptist Church and a petition to the U.N. AFSAR was disbanded in 1953 after the Campaign of Defiance Against Unjust Laws was discontinued under extreme pressure from the South African government. According to Houser, "The AFSAR was transformed into an organization which would relate to the whole anti-colonial struggle in Africa. The name chosen for this new entity was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA)."[14]

American Committee on Africa

In a letter announcing the formation of ACOA George Houser wrote that AFSAR had garnered a remarkable response from around the country. The informal group had received numerous letters seeking more information on Africa and thousands of dollars in unsolicited donations. AFSAR concluded that "there is a growing and permanent interest in Africa among American people" and that "there is a definite need for an American organization adequately staffed and financed to provide information to Americans on Africa as well as to be a service agency for African projects."[15] A prospectus for the organization distributed to groups like the NAACP argued that another organization focusing on Africa was necessary because the only American group working directly on African problems "is the Communist oriented Council on African Affairs."[16]

ACOA was formed in 1954 with George Shepherd as the executive director and George Houser as secretary. The organization held its first conference on April 30, 1954, to introduce the members of the executive committee to the community, recruit volunteers and raise money. The conference featured a keynote address by Dr. Rayford Logan of Howard University and the NAACP titled "Is Colonialism Dying in Africa?"[17] Logan, who had just returned from a tour of West Africa, warned that the colonial powers were stronger than they seemed. Curtis Strong of the State Department, who also spoke at the conference, said he welcomed the formation of the ACOA but justified US support for colonial powers at the United Nations.

The first edition of its magazine, *Africa Today,* which was published in April 1954, said the ACOA had been formed because of: "Moral concern that America should fulfill our responsibilities in Africa by helping the emergence of democratic, self-governing states free from racialism, poverty and ignorance under which the people of Africa suffer today."[18] The ACOA's statement of purpose was to act as a "clearing house" for information and create a concern for "intelligent and constructive American action on Africa." However, the magazine's Cold War perspective was made clear in a story on the war of independence in Kenya titled "Mau Mau Threat Grows."[19] The story referred to "encouraging" news that a captured "Mau Mau" leader was arranging secret meetings "to discuss surrender terms" but that the "danger of Mau Mau spreading is greater than ever." This demonization of the war of independence and the use of derogatory language in reference to liberation fighters

revealed the limited political horizons of the ACOA's leaders and foreshadowed their inability to communicate with African and African American radicals.[20] The June-July issue of *Africa Today* continued to refer to African liberation fighters as "terrorists."[21] A story titled "Terror in North Africa," for instance, reported that "terrorism and violence" was spreading throughout "French North Africa" pointing to the killing of five white settlers in Tunisia by "terrorists" and several "bomb throwing" incidents in Algeria.

As Du Bois had predicted, therefore, the ACOA was constrained by its roots in liberal, anticommunist organizations while trying to support an African liberation movement that was becoming increasingly radical. Armed struggle had erupted in Kenya and Algeria in 1954 while minor bloodshed had led Britain to set a timetable for independence for its West African colonies. In 1956, Gamer Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in Egypt sparking the first major Cold War skirmish in Africa featuring Britain, France and Israel on one side and Egypt and the Soviet Union on the other. In 1955 recently liberated African and Asian countries held the Bandung Conference where they pledged to eradicate colonialism and racism. No white nations were allowed to attend the conference although Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. "acted as a vigorous unofficial spokesman for the United States."[22] According to an *Africa Report* analysis of the conference written by Homer Jack, Powell said that the United States was making progress in eradicating racism, a statement that sparked a heated argument between African American novelist Richard Wright and the Harlem Congressman. South Africa was singled out for special

attention at the conference. Prime Minister Nehru of India told South Africa to "forget about communism and anti-communism and learn some decency."

Africa-American Institute

As Africans stepped up their struggle for liberation, the US government sought ways to influence the direction of African nationalism. Among the strategies utilized by the CIA and State Department was to try to influence African students in the United States through social and cultural programs sponsored by CIA-fronts run by African Americans. The career of the African-American Institute, for instance, epitomizes the fate of liberal African-American organizations in the face of emerging corporate and government pressure.[23] The AAI was incorporated on May 18, 1953 as the Institute of African-American Relations, Inc.[24] The founding directors were Dr. William Leo Hansberry of Howard University, William Steen, Robert Williams, James P. Grant and Horace Mann Bond "to foster closer relations between the peoples of the United States and Africa."[25] The AAI established Africa House in Washington D.C. to provide "guidance and advisory services to African students in the United States," and to facilitate social and cultural exchanges. The organization also helped place Americans in teaching and other service positions in Africa.

During the early period, correspondence shows that the members of the institute were concerned about maintaining credibility with Africans and U.S. funding sources at the same time. In a letter to Robert Williams, for instance, Bond says:

> My own experience here has been that if you are "pro-African" you cannot get financial support. On the other hand, if you are not "pro-African" you will never get the sympathy and friendship of Africans. Faced with this dilemma I have remained consistently "pro-African."[26]

This concern with credibility among Africans is ironic given reports that the CIA sponsored the AAI. We can assume that Williams ignored Bond's advice because according to Waldmar Nielsen, who worked for the State Department before becoming the president of the AAI, the organization, "was largely funded by the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1950s."[27] Neilsen says CIA Director Allen Dulles recruited AAI board members Harold Hochschild, chairman of the board of American Metal Climax, Ltd., Dana Creel, head of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Alan Pifer, head of the Carnegie Corporation, "to take on this responsibility as a public service in the national interest."[28]

Neilson says he "was disturbed by the extent to which several emerging leaders in the decolonization process were becoming involved, often without their knowledge, in CIA-funded initiatives." Among the leaders he mentions are Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. Other African leaders associated with the AAI and the U.S. State Department were Kenya's Tom Mboya and Mbiyu Koinange.

The organization rapidly became a mouthpiece of the U.S. government and corporate interests in Africa. It virtually monopolized foundation and U.S. government support for Africa-related programs. By the late-50s it was providing scholarships to African students in the United States, assisting in the placement of American teachers

in African schools, disseminating information about Africa through its publication, *African Special Report,* and funding leadership-exchange programs. The Institute established Africa House in Washington, D.C., where it hosted African students studying in the city and other Africans visiting the capital. Africa House hosted receptions, films and informal get-togethers where African students met with diplomats and other U.S. government employees.

A major program funded by the Institute was the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program, which was created to develop "a wider knowledge and a basis of understanding between religious, professional, business and civic leaders of the United States and the Union of South Africa." Financed by "business and philanthropic organizations in both countries," the program provided one-year exchange fellowships for "librarians, journalists, industrial relations experts, clergymen, professors, school teachers, civil servants," to work on the staff of an organization in the U.S. or South Africa in the individual's field of specialization. It also sponsored short-term exchanges to allow individuals to undertake field trips in South Africa for less than a year.

Lists of participants in the exchange programs show that they were all white and included a steady stream of extreme Afrikaner nationalists from newspapers like Die Berger. Thus, these exchange programs were forms of "constructive engagement" with the apartheid regime 30 years before the Reagan administration adopted the policy.

The American Society of African Culture

The CIA, State Department and major foundations also sought to influence resurgent African nationalism by sponsoring tours of Africa by African American entertainers, journalists and civil rights leaders. These tours were designed to counter the embarrassing publicity lynchings and other forms of racist violence were receiving abroad. Journalist Carl Rowan, writer J. Saunders Redding, entertainer Duke Ellington and CORE activist James Farmer all went on Africa tours sponsored by the US government through organizations like the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC). AMSAC grew out of the First International Congress of Negro Writers and Artists that met in Paris between September 19 and 22, 1956. The conference brought together prominent members of the black bourgeoisie under the auspices of *Presence Africaine*, a magazine established by French-speaking Africans and Afro-Caribbeans writers like Leopold Sedar Senghor and Aime Cesaire with the help of French intellectuals like Albert Camus and Jean Paul Sartre.

The conference organizers asked African-American novelist Richard Wright, who was also living in Paris, to contact Black writers in the United States and encourage them to attend the conference. Wright wrote many black writers but most were unable to afford the trip. Those that did make it to Paris were sponsored by philanthropist Orin Lehman who had also sponsored the AAI. The delegation included of James Ivy, editor of the NAACP's *Crisis*; John Davis of City College; Horace Mann Bond, president of Lincoln University; William Fortune, professor of philosophy at

University of Pennsylvania, and Mercer Cook, professor of Romance Languages at Howard University who would become US ambassador to Niger.

According to a *Ramparts* article, the CIA funded AMSAC from the outset. The article argues that "at some point, the CIA decided that the development of a safe cultural nationalism was critically important to US interests in Africa." "Negritude" and other forms of cultural nationalism were deemed "safe" despite their anti-white rhetoric because they were hostile to communism. The United States followed the same strategy at home, where it tolerated the anti-white rhetoric of the Nation of Islam and US organization but destroyed leftist groups like the Council on African Affairs and the Black Panther Party.[29]

This cultural nationalist perspective was less threatening to the establishment than the political economy perspectives of radicals like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois. The report argued that the CIA's strategists had a sophisticated understanding of how African American culture could be used to maintain an effective presence in resurgent Africa while promoting pro-Western artists and writers. In other words AMSAC constituted a cultural strategy to complement the political strategy followed in the AAI.

The Americans who attended the first International Congress of Negro Writers and Artists formed the American Society of African Culture which was open to "men of culture ... of Negro descent in America." Horace Mann Bond was elected president,

Dr. Mercer Cook chairman, William Fortune secretary, James Ivy treasurer, John Davis executive director and James Harris assistant director. AMSAC's program included a plan for a series of seminars to discuss the impact of African culture on Western Civilization; a publication program including the distribution of *Presence Africaine*; the formation of personal and family relationships between African scholars and "men of cultural achievement" and "representative Negro families," and a festival of African culture.

Again Mr. Orin Lehman of New York and Matthew McCloskey of Philadelphia provided the funds for the establishment of the organization. John Davis and Orin Lehman were on the board of the Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs (CRCWA), which approved a $5,000 grant for AMSAC on November 27, 1957.[30] The CRCWA meeting that approved the funds included John Davis, Orin Lehman, Bethel Webster, Frederick Van Vatchen and James Harris. *Ramparts* identified the CRCWA as a CIA-front.[31] The CRCWA was the main financier of AMSAC with which it merged in 1957. The new organization was incorporated in 1961.

CIA funding of groups like AMSAC was designed to encourage ties between anticommunist writers and artists on both sides of the Atlantic. The agency used a strategy of "enlightened patronage" to influence favored artists who found ample opportunity to publish in magazines like *Africa Report* (African American Institute); *Transition* and *The New African* (Congress of Cultural Freedom); *African Forum*

(AMSAC) and *Classic* (Fairfield Foundation).[32] The writers whose works appeared in these journals and the members of some of these organizations were often not aware of the sources of funding but were deemed acceptable in the CIA's grand anticommunist scheme.

With this infusion of funds, AMSAC then proceeded to invite a number of "men of culture" to join the organization. Invitations went out to Lorenzo Turner of Roosevelt College, Claude Barnett of the Associated Negro Press, Lester Granger of the Urban League, St. Clair Drake of Roosevelt College, Melvin Tolson of Langston University, Martin Jenkins of Morgan State University, and John Davis of City College.[33] AMSAC quickly received acceptance letters from most of these academics.

AMSAC's cultural and educational programs sponsored visits to Africa by some of the most prominent black artists in the country: Odetta, Randy Weston, Nina Simone, Langston Huges, Jacob Lawrence and Elton Fax were all AMSAC spokesmen. The most interesting case, however, was that of James Farmer, a founder of CORE and its national president between 1961 and 1966 who became an unwitting instrument of CIA shenanigans in Africa. Farmer had impeccable "movement" credentials. He had organized the "Journey of Reconciliation" an integrated ride through the South in 1947 that became the model for the "Freedom Rides" of 1961, which Farmer also organized. He had been arrested numerous times and was almost lynched by state troopers. Farmer made two CIA-sponsored trips to Africa during this period.[34] He made the first trip in 1958 as a member of a five-man delegation of the

Public Services International (PSI), which was part of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which was the labor union mainstay of CIA operations in Africa and elsewhere. A PSI report on the trip indicated that Farmer's presence had benefited the delegation because the Africans were drawn to "the colored trade unionist." In 1964, Farmer was again called upon to make a trip to Africa to counter the bad publicity that the US had received after the assassination of John F. Kennedy and Malcolm X's two tours of African countries.

Although the members of AMSAC were "men of culture" and generally focused on scholarship and the arts, the organization sponsored two key conferences on Southern Africa and sometimes published articles about the volatile situation in the region in its journal *African Forum.* In the first issue of *African Forum*, James Farmer, then director of CORE detailed the situation in South Africa and called for economic sanctions against the regime. In 1960, John A. Davis protested the massacre at Sharpeville saying, "there are times when even 'men of culture' must protest against barbarous acts."[35]

In April 1963, AMSAC sponsored a conference called "Southern Africa in Transition" at Howard University. The conference was significant in that it attracted 600 participants and brought together leaders of African nationalist movements like Oliver Tambo, leader of the ANC in exile, Eduardo Mondlane, president of FRELIMO, and Ndabaningi Sitole of Zimbabwe. After the conference, Bond criticized

South African apartheid and called for sanctions. Rumors of CIA funding quickly led to the demise of AMSAC.

AMSAC seemed to vacillate between a focus on high culture and involvement in politics. Like the NAACP and the Urban League, AMSAC occasionally protested against the most heinous acts of the South African government. They also maintained contact with African nationalists in organizations like the ANC and FRELIMO. Yet its program was strictly liberal and informed by the "ideology of racial uplift."[36]

[1]Du Bois to Florence Lascomb, 22 October 1956, Du Bois Papers, reel 72, frame 68.

[2]New York Times 22 March 1949.

[3]Vernon McCay, "Africa and the U.S.," 1967, Korengay, 144.

[4]Lynch, 52.

[5]George Houser, No One Can Stop The Rain Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle. (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989) 8.

[6]Houser, Rain 8-9.

[7]Houser Rain 8-9.

[8]Maninlal Gandhi to George Houser, March 10, 1952. ACOA papers, Part 2: Reel 1, Frame 0006.

[9]Houser Rain, 8

[10]Houser, "American Supporters of the Defiance Campaign," statement at a meeting of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid on June 25, 1982. E.S. Reddy Collection. www.reddy.com.

[11]AFSAR Resolution, April 6, 1952. ACOA papers, Part 2: Reel 3, Frame 0283

[12]AFSAR press release, June 26, 1952. ACOA papers, Part 2: Reel 3, Frame 0277.

[13]Houser UN 5.

[14]Houser UN 6.

[15]Letter from Donald Harrington and George Houser announcing the formation of ACOA. 27 November 1953. NAACP Papers II Box A7. 1.

[16]Prospectus of the American Committee on Africa. 27 November 1953. NAACP Papers II Box A7. 1.

[17]*Africa Today* Vol 1, No. 2 June-July 1954 p. 1.

[18]*Africa Today* Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1954 p. 1.

[19]*Africa Today* Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1954 p. 2.

[20]In an interview with the author, Abdul Alkalimat, a veteran anti-apartheid activist and one of the founders of the African Liberation Support Committee said the ACOA was a "clearing house for information" but that "no one could relate to them, you know?" Abdul Alkalimat, personal interview 26 May 2000.

[21]*Africa Today* Vol 1, No. 2 June-July 1954 p. 3.

[22]*Africa Today* May-June 1955 Vol. 2, No. 2 p. 1

[23]Korengay 143-144.

[24]Horace Mann Bond Papers Part II, Series 3, Frame 0303. Special Collections, W.E. Du Bois Library, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

[25]African -American Institute, "Purpose and Program," Du Bois papers, ; Francis Kornegay Jr. "Black Americans and U.S.-Southern Africa Relations," in .... 144.

[26]Bond Papers, Part II, Reel 2, Frame 0310.

[27]African-American Institute "The Early Years" African Report 40th Anniversary Issue Sept.-Oct.. 1994 v39 n5 p20(3).

[28]ibid.

[29]Gerald Horne, "Myth and the Making of Malcolm," American Historical Review April 1993. 441

[30]Frederick Van Vachten, Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs Minutes, November 27, 1957. Horace Mann Bond Papers Group 411, Box 30, Series III, folder 78B.

[31]Dan Schechter, Michael Ansara and David Kobdney. "The CIA As Equal Opportunity Employer," *Ramparts* 26

[32]Dan Schechter, Michael Ansara and David Kobdney. "The CIA As Equal Opportunity Employer," *Ramparts* 27

[33]Copies of letters, Bond papers, Group 411, Box 30 Series III: Folder 78A.

[34]*Ramparts,* 30

[35]Quoted in Lynch, (1980) 25.

[36]Kevin Gaines, Uplifting the Race Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966)

CHAPTER 4

THE MOVEMENT AGAINST APARTHEID

> The international potential of nonviolence has never been employed. Nonviolence has been practiced within national borders in India and the United States and in regions of Africa with spectacular success. The time has come to fully utilize nonviolence through a massive international boycott which would involve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany and Japan. Millions of people can personally give expression to their abhorrence of the world's worst racism through such a far-flung boycott.[1]
>
> Martin Luther King Jr., 1965

With the demise of the CAA in 1955 and the silencing of the black left, the initiative passed to the nationalists and liberals at a time when Africans were entering a critical stage in their struggle for independence. Although both the black nationalists and liberals supported African independence in the abstract, they differed on the question of armed struggle. Nationalists like Carlos Cooks, Richard B. Moore and Malcolm X celebrated the emergence of armed struggle in the settler colonies of Kenya and Algeria in 1954. In Kenya, the Land and Freedom Army (LFA) engaged the British in a 10-year guerrilla struggle that inspired revolutionaries around the world and foreshadowed the armed struggles in southern Africa. The case of the Kenyan struggle epitomizes the myopia of recent scholarship on African Americans and Africa during the early cold war years. Most of this scholarship focuses on negative statements from the NAACP's *Crisis* and other liberal organizations without examining the response of black nationalists and the left. As we saw in the last

chapter, the leftist CAA was unequivocal in its support for the LFA and was indicted, in part, for supporting the Kenyan struggle. As we shall see below, black trade unionists in New York continued to demonstrate on behalf of South African workers into the late 1950s.

Black nationalists like Malcolm X and Carlos Cooks valorized the guerrillas in Kenya and supported the turn to armed struggle in southern Africa. Carlos Cooks, a former Garveyite and founder of the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement, lauded the "torch of freedom so gallantly blazing in the hearts of East African Nationalists."[2] Cooks described the Kenyan war of independence as "the eternal war against the white aliens. The spirit of Mau Mau is a forerunner of the mighty surge of Martial Black men (that will) drench Africa with the blood of the parasitical white colonial exploiters."[3] Cooks's program was closely related to that of the UNIA. He said the purpose of the Christian church was "to destroy Black people's minds and turn them into Negroes."[4] Cooks distinguished between "Negroes" (integrationists) who were anti-African and "Blacks" who were proud of their African origin. "As Negroes, Black people are the stoutest defenders of white supremacy and the loudest defamers of Africa and everything pertaining to it."[5] He argued that Negro was a "Caste name" that obscured "our true racial identity --Black people or Africans." Cooks's ANPM's newsletter continued to publish anti-imperialist tracts that were similar to those published in the CAA's *New Africa, Freedom* and *Spotlight on Africa.* Again this is contrary to conventional wisdom that claims that anti-imperialist voices were totally silenced in the United States during the 1950s. The ANPM's newsletter, for instance,

continued to carry articles by Africans, nationalists and Pan Africanists. An article by Tchekedi Eketembe on African nationalism described the South African Boers as "nothing more than the scum of Holland" and "the fiend that today assumes the power of life and death over the rightful owner of South Africa --the Black native ... those Parasites were practicing the same policy of exploitation, iniquity, debauchery and genocide on the people of South East Asia, even as they are currently doing in South and Southwest Africa." Eketembe argues that: "The African will have to reconcile his course of action to one based on a policy of total violence, asking no quarter, and giving none, scorching the earth if necessary, using all means to rid Africa of its greatest scourge since the Tsetse Fly --the European white man." Like Cooks, Eketembe considers both communists and capitalists "white supremacists" and thus the enemies of Africa and Africans.

According to Richard B. Moore, Malcolm X joined Cooks frequently at "Africa Square" in Harlem during the early 1950s and was influenced by his (Cooks's) pan-African orientation. Malcolm X had been appointed the minister of Temple No. 7 in Harlem in July 1954, a few weeks after the Supreme Court had outlawed segregation in the public schools. Moore argues that Malcolm "borrowed freely" from Cooks's rhetoric about Africa, the Buy Black campaign and the themes of black pride. In his autobiography, Malcolm X describes how he went "fishing" for converts at Black Nationalist meetings in Harlem:

> Next we went to work "fishing"... on the fringes of the Nationalist meetings. ... At a Nationalist meeting, everyone who was listening was interested in the

> revolution of the black race. We began to get results almost immediately after we began thrusting handbills into people's hands.[6]

Thus it is clear that in the mid-1950s, the constituency for African liberation in Harlem was in the left and nationalist movements which continued to promote an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial perspective through the worst years of cold war repression in the United States. The nationalist movement included a mixed group of revolutionary, economic and cultural nationalists. Some, like Carlos Cooks, had visited Africa during the Second World War and had established connections with African liberation movements. Many were Garveyites who maintained an interest in Africa and the Caribbean. As Malcolm X put it: "At a nationalist meeting, everyone was interested in the revolution of the black race." Since his concientization by the Nation of Islam in prison, Malcolm had developed an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial position. He read widely on African and African American history arguing that, "Of all our studies, history is the best qualified to reward our research."[7] He recalls how his seventh-grade teacher in Mason, Michigan, had covered "the history of the Negro in one paragraph."[8] Initially Malcolm was introduced to Black history through the teachings of the Nation of Islam as conveyed to him by his brother and sister. Through them he discovered that "history had been 'whitened' in the white man's books and that the black man had been brainwashed for hundreds of years." He learned that the "Original man was black, in a continent called Africa." The black man had built "great empires and civilizations and cultures while the white man was still living on all fours in caves." The NOI's teachings stressed that the greatest crime in history was the "traffic in black flesh" that brought millions of black women and men to the Americas.

These people were then cut off from "any knowledge of their religion and past culture" creating a "Negro" race that had "absolutely no knowledge of his true identity." In a Massachusetts prison where Malcolm taught himself to read and write, he read widely on African history. As he put it: "Once I heard of the 'glorious history of the black man' I took special pains to hunt in the library for books that would inform me on details about black history."[9] Malcolm traced his conscientization to his discovery of this African identity and claimed that: "(History) is the one reason why Mr. Muhammad's teachings spread so swiftly all over the United States, among all Negroes, whether or not they became followers of Mr. Muhammad." With this background, Malcolm became a formidable prison debater on African history and politics. His early debates with prisoners were on African history, what he called the "the glorious history of the black man."[10] Later, after he was released from prison in 1952, history would "became one of my favorite subjects when I became a minister of Mr. Mohammed's."

Malcolm's focus on Africa and the slave trade was a key theme of Black nationalist rhetoric from Martin Delany to Henry McNeal Turner to Marcus Garvey to Carlos Cooks. This invocation of the "glorious African past" as a justification for freedom is very different from the invocation of the Constitution of the United States and the bible by civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. This fundamental difference in orientation was to be erased after Malcolm's trip to Africa and the formation of the Organization of African American Unity in 1964. During the 1950s, however, Malcolm advocated the traditional nationalist position based on land in a

separate black nation in North America or in Africa. He was also constrained by the NOI's avoidance of politics. Yet his insistence upon Black pride and uncompromising support for liberation movements laid the groundwork for the numerous liberation support movements that emerge in the 1960s and 70s. Malcolm X is the link between the liberation support movements of the 1920s and 30s and the nationalism of SNCC and the African Liberation Support Committee in the 1970s. His early support for the armed struggle in Kenya was a precursor to the support for armed revolution in southern Africa during the 1970s. Although some in the black and white press and the civil rights leaders like Roy Wilkins condemned the "Mau Mau" as primitive and unacceptable, Malcolm X considered them "freedom fighters."

Nonviolence, The "Big Six" and South Africa

During the movement, the black liberal perspective on Africa was represented by the so-called "Big Six" civil rights leaders including Martin Luther King Jr., SCLC, Whitney Young, NUL, Roy Wilkins, NAACP, A. Philip Randolph, BSCP, Dorothy Height, NCNW, James Farmer, CORE. These individuals represented civil rights organizations that were liberal, nonviolent, integrationist and sought to influence government policies through mass action. Many of the leaders and the organizations they represented had been involved in anti-apartheid activism from the outset. James Farmer was on the founding committee of both the ACOA and its precursor the ASAR. A. Philip Randolph had been a member of the CAA in the 1940s and was involved with AMSAC and the ACOA. Roy Wilkins was also associated AMSAC and worked with the ACOA on issues related to Africa.

The liberal position on Africa in the late 1950s and early '60s was epitomized by Martin Luther King who believed that it would be a tragedy for Africans to turn to violence in their struggles for independence. In a 1957 speech, for instance, he claimed that "violent revolution in South Africa would be immoral and impractical."[11] King was catapulted onto the national and international stage by the spectacular success of the Montgomery Bus Boycott in desegregating public transportation in Montgomery, Alabama in 1955-56. The bus boycott had emerged in the wake of the 1954 school desegregation decision (Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas). The NAACP's legal victories against Jim Crow segregation in the south and the new willingness of the Supreme Court to rule against southern segregationists, had created an atmosphere of hope and belief in the power of non-violent direct action to engender change. King had been asked to lead the movement by more established leaders like E.D. Nixon, president of the Montgomery, Alabama, chapter of the NAACP and older pastors because he was a relative newcomer to the city and did not have ties to the establishment.[12] The success of the boycott, King's eloquence and the media spotlight ensured his rise to prominence in the budding civil rights movement.

Although the story of King's rise to leadership in the domestic civil rights movement is well-documented, few scholars have investigated his interest in Africa in general and South Africa in particular. One of the few studies on this aspect of King's legacy is Louis Baldwin's The Beloved Community: Martin Luther King And South Africa published in 1995. Baldwin argues that King's exposure to South Africa began

early because King Sr. had corresponded with Walter Sisulu in the 1940s and invited Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC, to his Atlanta church in 1948 where the young Martin would have heard him speak.[13] Once he became a pastor, King constantly compared apartheid in South Africa to Jim Crow segregation.

King's first major trip after the bus boycott was to attend Ghana's independence celebration in March 1957. The SCLC and church members held a special fund-raiser to send their young pastor to Ghana where he met leaders of the anti-colonial, anti-apartheid and Pan Africanist movements. He also met with white activists like Michael Scott, Trevor Huddleston and Ambrose Reeves and heard African leaders call for an international movement to eradicate white supremacy in Africa. On returning from Ghana, King delivered a speech titled "The Birth of A New Nation" a lyrical reflection on the powerful liberation movements emerging on the continent of Africa. The young pastor was obviously excited about the connections established between black freedom movements around the world. The delegation from the United States consisted of over 100 persons, many of them African American leaders like Charles Diggs, Adam Powell, Ralph Bunche, Mordecai Johnson, Horace Mann Bond and A. Philip Randolph.[14] King urged African Americans to emigrate to Ghana "and lend their technical assistance" and take advantage of "rich opportunities there." King also joined the ACOA as a member of the National Committee.[15] At this stage in his development King still thought non-violence could work in South Africa. In a 1957 speech, for instance, he claimed that "violent revolution in South Africa would be immoral and impractical."[16] In taking this position, King was reflecting the position of

the leadership of the liberation struggle in southern Africa at the time although armed struggle was imminent.[17]

In 1957 the ACOA organized a Declaration of Conscience campaign to protest the arrest of 156 leaders of the liberation movements in South Africa for "treason."[18] Among those arrested were Professor Z.K. Matthews, the principal of the historically black University College of Fort Hare. Matthews was well known in the Unite States because he had been a visiting scholar at Union Theological Seminary between 1952 and 1953. Also arrested was Albert Luthuli, president of the African National Congress. Luthuli was also well known to the U.S anti-apartheid community because he had traveled around the country as a representative of the Congregational Church in 1949 and had preached at Martin Luther King Sr.'s church in Atlanta.

The arrests shocked the growing international anti-apartheid community. In the United States, the ACOA organized an international "Declaration of Conscience on South Africa" to be unveiled on Human Rights Day, December 10, 1957. Eleanor Roosevelt and Martin Luther King Jr. were co-sponsors of the declaration that called on world leaders to join a "world-wide protest against the organized inhumanity of the government of the Union of South Africa."[19] In a letter to Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP, the campaign organizers argued:

> At this crucial time, when 156 leaders of the opposition to "apartheid" are being tried for treason because the desire a democratic, multi-racial society, and when new laws injecting racism into the churches, hospitals and

> universities are about to be passed, we are obliged to record our protest in hope that the Government of South African will respond to moral suasion.[20]

123 world leaders eventually signed the declaration.[21] The "Declaration of Conscience" was an example of international protest that sought to express horror at human rights violations and tried to persuade governments to change their policies. These petitions and declarations of solidarity were a standard technique of the post-war liberal activists in the ACOA. This had also been the strategy of the ANC under Albert Luthuli and his predecessors. By 1957, however, these strategies were seriously outdated in South Africa and the United States where petitions and declarations had been replaced by strikes, economic boycotts and talks of armed struggle.

The ACOA also organized the South Africa Defense Fund with the goal of raising $100,000 to help pay legal fees for the Treason Trial defendants.[22] The appeal for funds was signed by eighteen prominent clergymen including Martin Luther King Jr. and stated, in part:

> As Christians and Americans we feel a grave responsibility to help meet the need in South Africa. The treason trial is a challenge to people of goodwill around the world who realize what is at stake. Not unmindful of our own failures in race relations in the United States, we nevertheless call for your support to help a people whose government sponsors a most rigid program of segregation.[23]

These activities culminated in a "Day of Protest" on Human Rights Day, December 10, 1957. The call letter urged supporters to join the demonstration "to protest the apartheid policies of the Union of South Africa and to demand the Union

live up to its obligations under article 1, Paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter." The highlight of the "Day of Protest" was an address by Martin Luther King Jr.

The Declaration of Conscience received an overwhelming response from over 50 countries where Human Rights Day (December 10, 1957) was observed as a Day of Protest against South Africa's apartheid policy. In a report on the campaign, the ACOA said it had realized the aim of the campaign namely:

> To mobilize the spiritual, moral forces of mankind on this Day of Protest to demonstrate to the Government of the Union of South Africa, that free men abhor its policies and will not tolerate the continued suppression of human freedom.[24]

The campaign report included numerous statements of solidarity from church, labor, student and other organizations around the world demonstrating the growth of anti-apartheid sentiment.

Among the most remarkable responses to the campaign was a 3,000-word radio address by South Africa's Minister of External Affairs, Eric Louw, on the night of December 12, 1957. In an unprecedented speech, Mr. Louw told his national audience: "I have been requested by the cabinet to address you (and) deplore in the strongest terms this concerted effort to undermine our international position." An underlying theme of the speech was the claim that the opponents of apartheid were communist sympathizers. On December 12, 1957, the *New York Times* reported that Louw had characterized Eleanor Roosevelt as "not a stranger to American Left-wing

circles" and George Houser as "a known leftist." In response, Houser told the *New York Times* reporter: "I have never been connected with any Communist-front organization and have kept strictly away from them." A more extensive report in the *Christian Science Monitor* of December 13, 1957, quoted Mr. Louw claiming that "communist" groups like the ACOA were "propagating their doctrine of universal equality in the guise of protests against racial discrimination and that the latest charges against South Africa were 'false and spurious.'"[25] In a reference to the violent reaction of whites to the desegregation of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, early that year, Louw urged American to examine their own consciences and devote their energies to the elimination of racial discrimination in the United States. Louw also explained that certain "control measures" were necessary to subdue the "largely uncivilized" nonwhites of South Africa. The Christian Science Monitor's Johannesburg correspondent John Hughes then concluded:

> Nevertheless, although Mr. Louw's remarks indicated government concern at the effect on South Africa of this adverse international publicity, particularly insofar as it may influence American government policy toward the country, the External Affairs Minister gave no indication of any change in the South African Government racial policies as a result of the protest. Thus whether the protest had brought the South African government any nearer a reversal of its present policy or merely embittered it even further against its overseas critics is a question which remains unanswered at this stage.[26]

The Right Reverend Ambrose Reeves, Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, also thought that Mr. Louw's speech was irrational. According to Reeves:

> While he (Mr. Louw) accused the American Committee responsible for this document of having a 'a decidedly pinkish tinge' he did not tell his listeners

> that its membership includes four U.S. senators, sixteen members of the House of Representatives, both Republican and Democrat, two university presidents, as well as eight national religious leaders, and eleven authors and scholars ...Those who heard the Minister's broadcast would do well to recognize that it is the present government of South Africa, and not the white population as such, that is being criticized.[27]

On December 17, the South African Government announced that it was dropping the case against 61 of the 156 who had been arrested on charges of treason. The ACOA concluded "the Declaration of Conscience campaign with its worldwide support may well have been a factor in causing the Government to moderate its action against those accused of treason."

In 1958 the newly elected President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, visited Harlem where he addressed over 10,000 people, inviting them to come to Ghana as teachers and technicians. He was presented with a silver bowl on behalf of the people of Harlem as a symbol: "the vessel that has caught the tears of all the mothers of Africa weeping as their children were torn from them and sent across the ocean." Nkrumah, who had developed a close relationship with African American leaders, extended a formal invitation to black people to attend the Pan African conference in Ghana. Later that year, a contingent of African American leaders traveled to Ghana to attend the All Africa Peoples Congress. The AAPC was billed as the most important Pan Africanist conference of the post-second world war period and the first Pan African conference in an independent African country. At the AAPC, President Kwame Nkrumah said he was pleased to see so many black participants from the United States and the Caribbean:

> We take their presence here as a manifestation of their keen interest in our struggle for a free Africa. We must never forget that they are part of us. These sons and daughters of Africa were taken away from our shores and despite all centuries which have separated us they have not forgotten their ancestral links. ... Many of them have made no small contribution to the cause of African freedom. Names which spring to mind are Marcus Garvey and Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois.[28]

It was at this conference that the independent African states articulated their determination to eradicate colonialism and apartheid as the first step toward continental unity --the raison d'être of Pan Africanism. The AAPC declared: "the existence of colonialism in any shape or form is a threat to the security and independence of the African states and the world." South Africa was singled out for particular criticism because apartheid was seen as an extreme form of settler colonialism. During the conference African leaders called for international sanctions against South Africa and announced their determination to overthrow the racist regime. This call for sanctions was in line with the ANC's 1958 annual conference resolution, which declared that: "The economic boycott is going to be one of the major political weapons in the country."

Anti-apartheid organizations answered the AAPC's suggestion that the world observe April 15 as Africa Freedom Day until all African countries were independent. The first Africa Freedom Day celebration was organized by the ACOA on Wednesday, April 15, 1959.[29] Tom Mboya of Kenya was invited to make a major address along with Governor G. Mennen Williams of Michigan who had recently returned from a trip to the continent. The program included popular African American

entertainers like Harry Belafonte and Eartha Kitt, Langston Hughes and Olatundi's African ensemble.

In 1959, Representative Charles Diggs of Michigan caused a sensation in the African American community by suggesting that the NAACP should try to influence US policies on Africa by establishing a special office on African issues. These reports induced George Houser to send Roy Wilkins a letter supporting the idea and suggesting that the ACOA would be interested in discussing the idea "inasmuch as our committee is closely allied in its interest and approach on the international level with the NAACP viewpoint."[30] Wilkin's assistant, John A. Morsell, answered Houser on January 13 saying he doubted the NAACP would establish the office "in the near future."[31] Morsell told Houser that the NAACP's board had discussed the issue because it had been raised by Congressman Diggs. Despite Diggs' stature, the issue was referred to a committee. According to Morsell: "Ralph Bunche contributed most constructively to the discussion of the Board, pointing out, among other things that the Africans tended justifiably to regard themselves as reasonably capable of managing their advance toward freedom without outside advice."[32]

The earliest specific call for international economic sanctions against South Africa came from the ANC on June 26, 1959 when the ANC urged an international boycott to support their internal boycott of goods produced by Afrikaner nationalists. The call was answered in July 1959 when the Jamaican government announced a total ban on the importation of South African goods. Ghana's trade union federation also

announced a boycott on July 1959. On September 1959, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa and the Northern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress also announced a boycott of all South African products. On January 30, 1960, the Second All Africa People's Conference in Tunis, Algeria, urged a boycott of goods from South Africa and Southwest Africa. Also that January, the presidents of trade union federations in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark decided to support the boycott in principle.

Meanwhile, however, the brutality of the South African system of apartheid made itself evident in a small black township outside Johannesburg. On March 23, 1960 some 20,000 South Africans marched in a nonviolent protest against pass laws called by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). In Sharpeville, a stronghold of the PAC's, 7,000 marched to the police station where police opened fire on demonstrators, killing at least 72 men, women and children and wounding over 200. Most of the victims were shot in the back as they tried to escape. Photographs of the massacre victims were displayed around the world. Newspaper opinion and letters pages were filled with statements of outrage. South Africans were expelled from international sport, cultural and academic institutions. In the United States, the Sharpeville Massacre reinvigorated the anti-apartheid movement. On 24 March 1960, the ACOA sent a cable to Prime Minister Verwoerd of South Africa:

> Americans are shocked at (the) Sharpeville Massacre. The December violence in Windhoek has now been exceeded on the Rand. Your only answer to continued pleas of United Nations to end apartheid appears to be massacre of unarmed Africans by your armed police. How long will machine gun-enforced

> apartheid continue in face of African and world revulsion and increasing isolation of South Africa in community of nations? The demands of Africans to outlaw passes are just. We deplore the flagrant injustice and flaunting of world opinion in South Africa as in Hungary, Tibet, and our own Southern States.[33]

The cable was signed by John Gunther, A. Philip Randolph, Jackie Robinson, Donald Harrington, Rev. James Pike and George Houser. The group also announced plans for pickets from "Woolworth's up Fifth Avenue to the South African consulate on Madison Avenue between 60th and 61st streets" to protest the killings.

On 25 March, 29 African and Asian member states asked the Security Council to condemn South Africa for the massacre. During the debate the South African ambassador Bernadus Fourie blamed the massacre on "A splinter organization of extremists."[34] Fourie told the UN that the PAC had gathered thousands of people in the small town of Sharpeville "by intimidation of and threats to persons who do not belong to the group." He justified the shootings because "the police were attacked." After lecturing the Security Council on the dangers of police work, Fourie concluded: "No Government can allow hundreds of thousands of its citizens to be intimidated by extremists, as the Bantu in South Africa often are." According to Fouries, therefore, the men, women and children killed in Sharpeville were "extremists" who deserved to die. On April 1, the Security Council considered the issue and adopted Resolution 134 (April 1, 1960) in which it recognized the situation in South Africa had led to "international friction" and was a danger to international peace and security. The resolution deplored the loss of life and the called on the government of South Africa to "initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality in order

to ensure that the present situation does not continue to recur and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination." The resolution passed by 9 votes in favor and none against with two abstentions (the United Kingdom and France). The council also deplored the policies of the apartheid regime and asked the Secretary General, Dag-Hammerskjold, to consult with South Africa on the status of race relations. Hammerskjold met with the South African representative in London and visited South Africa in 1961 but was unable to report any progress. Instead, the South African Government declared a state of emergency on 30 March 1960; mobilized citizens' force to supplement the police, army and air force and detained thousands of people. On April 8, 1960, the regime banned the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress and arrested their leaders. PAC leader Robert Sobukwe was accused of organizing the anti-pass protests and sentenced to three years in prison. In a draconian measure against planned strikes, the government made refusal to work punishable by five years imprisonment and a heavy fine.

On Africa Freedom Day, 13 April 1960, the ACOA organized a protest meeting to "Protest the recent massacre in South Africa" and "Celebrate the freedom of new African states."[35] The honorary chairmen of the meeting were Martin Luther King Jr., Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A. Philip Randolph, Jackie Robinson and Harry Belafonte. The keynote speaker was Kenneth Kaunda, then head of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia on his first tour of the United States. Kaunda called on the participants to join his party in the struggle for independence and its boycott of South African goods:

> We of the United National Independence Party have boycotted South African goods to show how strongly we feel against the massacre of voteless and non-violent African peoples in the Union. Is it beyond the reach of the American people to organize a boycott of South African goods to show that men of all races are shocked by what the Verwoerd regime is doing?[36]

The meeting also featured the NAACP's Thurgood Marshall, who had recently returned from London where he was an advisor to the Kenya Constitutional Conference. Other speakers included Mlahleni Njisane, a sociologist from the University of Natal, and Dr. Tsefaye Gebre-Egzy, a representative of the Organization of Independent African States.

On the international level, the massacre reinvigorated the boycott movement in Britain where the Anti-Apartheid Movement voted to continue the embargo indefinitely. The Norwegian and German trade union federations also called for a consumer boycott of South African products, while Ghana's Positive Action Conference on April 10, 1960, called on religious and humanitarian organizations to "condemn the policies of the South African Government and give every possible help to its victims." The conference also called on African states to sever all trade and diplomatic ties with the South African regime. In the United States, *World Telegram* columnist Inez Robb called for a U.S. boycott of diamonds and other goods from South Africa, while Americans for Democratic Action released a statement signed by prominent Americans urging the United States to recall its Ambassador to Pretoria for

consultation. The NAACP's *Crisis* also protested the massacre in a May 1960 editorial, scoring the "brutality of apartheid" and predicting that the "tragic course in South Africa is still unfolding and will probably get worse before it gets better."[37]

On 4 June 4 1960, the ACOA announced that the U.S. Government had refused to grant Oliver Tambo, the deputy president of the African National Congress of South Africa a visa to visit the United States on a lecture tour organized by the ACOA. Tambo, who had escaped from South Africa in May, had been invited as the keynote speaker at the Emergency Action Conference on South Africa on May 31-June 1 in New York City and was scheduled to appear before a Congressional subcommittee evaluating U.S. policy toward Africa. He was also scheduled to address NAACP rallies in Petersburg, Virginia, St. Louis, Mo., and Younstown, Ohio. Tambo was also to be the main speaker at the third convention of the American Society for African Culture in Philadelphia. All these meetings were canceled because of the visa snag.

In a telegram to Secretary of State Christian Herter, Houser, the executive director of the ACOA, said:

> We are shocked that a visa for the lecture tour under our auspices is denied Oliver Tambo, Deputy-President of South African National Congress. The denial will inevitably be interpreted throughout Africa as prejudicial to opponents of apartheid and as resulting from South African government pressure. This will be a setback to the announced U.S. policy of condemning apartheid during Security Council meeting. At a time when our country and U.S.S.R. are vying for the allegiance of the whole continent of Africa, the one outstanding leader who has been able to escape from South Africa is

> denied entrance to the U.S. for the purpose of speaking to the American people. Further this denial comes at a time when the whole world has been aroused by the massacre of African by the South African police. On the other hand, a succession of architects of apartheid are routinely admitted from South Africa to the United States. We urge immediate reconsideration of Tambo's application and reversal of the decision."[38]

In the absence of Tambo, the Emergency Action Conference was addressed by South African exiles Prof. Absalom Vilakazi and Prof. Mlahleni Kjisane and Congressman Charles Diggs Jr. The conference adopted resolutions that called on United States consumers to boycott South African diamonds, lobster tails, wool, metal and furs. They urged U.S. firms with investments in South Africa to "abstain from participating in apartheid." U.S. labor unions were asked to consider refusing to unload ships with South African goods and the World's Fair in New York was asked to deny South Africa's request to erect a pavilion. In addition, the International Olympic Committee was asked to ban South Africa from appearing at its Rome games.[39] Members of the emergency committee included officials of the American Friends Mission at the United Nations, the United Automobile Workers, Americans for Democratic Action, the NAACP and the Prince Hall Masonic Lodge. On June 7, 1960, the U.S. finally announced that it would admit Oliver Tambo.[40] The policy reversal was seen as a victory by the anti-apartheid movement. It signaled a change in the unwritten policy of focusing on the white perspective in South Africa. As George Houser put it: "We welcome the decision to allow one of the leading nonwhites to address American audiences."

Meanwhile on June 15, 1960, the Second Conference of Independent African States meeting in Addis Ababa, renewed the call for sanctions against South Africa. The African Heads of State again expressed their conviction that "colonialism is one of the factors which provoke friction between peoples and endanger international peace and security." They unanimously agreed that their member states would close their ports to South African ships and their airports to South African airplanes. They also urged Arab states to stop selling oil to South Africa.[41] All the independent African states and several Asian governments severed relations with the regime and imposed restrictions on travel, trade and investment in South Africa. Disapproval in the Commonwealth meeting in London that May forced South Africa to resign and declare itself a "Republic" citing a whites-only referendum on 5 October 1960. The African Group of States at the United Nations proposed diplomatic, economic and other measures against the South African regime during the fifteenth and sixteenth sessions of the General Assembly but did not succeed because of opposition from western countries.

In November, John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon with a slim margin in one of the closest presidential races in American history. Kennedy won seven out of ten black votes during the election. This solid showing in the black community was attributed to the fact that Kennedy had called Mrs. Coretta Scott King on October 19, 1960, to express solidarity after the arrest of Martin Luther King Jr. during a sit-in at an Atlanta department store restaurant organized by black students. King and thirty-five other people were arrested and sentenced the following week to four months on a

Georgia road gang. According to Corretta Scott King, the call from Senator Kennedy led to the release of Dr. King the next day. The call by Kennedy also helped deliver the black vote to the Democratic Party candidate through the efforts of King Sr.

Africa had figured prominently in the U.S presidential elections of 1960. Kennedy charged repeatedly that the United States had lost ground in Africa. When the Eisenhower administration failed to support Kenyan students who had won American scholarships but could not afford the airfare, Kennedy organized a well-publicized airlift through the Kennedy Foundation. This airlift was in response to a petition from African American leaders like Harry Belafonte. Once in office, Kennedy appointed G. Mennen Williams assistant secretary for African Affairs. Williams created waves in the colonial world on his first trip to Africa when he was quoted by a Nairobi newspaper saying that Africa should be for the Africans. The statement produced a storm of protest in London but Kennedy stood by his aide. Kennedy also appointed Black American ambassadors to several emerging nations in Africa and to other important posts in his administration. Robert C. Weaver, a former member of the FDR's "Black Cabinet," was appointed Housing Administrator; George Weaver became Assistant Secretary of Labor; journalist Carl Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Andrew Hatcher, White House Deputy Secretary; Thurgood Marshall became one of five Blacks appointed to federal judgeships.

The Kennedy victory inaugurated a new era U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. The State Department had established the Bureau of African Affairs in 1957 in

response to the rising tide of African nationalism. Even after 1957, however, the United States continued to defer to European colonialists in its relations with Africa.[42] That year, for example, there were more Foreign Service personnel stationed in West Germany than in the whole of Africa. According to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., an advisor to the Kennedy administration:

> Now that the European colonial powers were joined with us in the Atlantic Alliance, there seemed all the more reason, in the interests of NATO solidarity, to defer to them in African matters.[43]

Nevertheless the U.S. government could not ignore African nationalism which had reached a boiling point in 1960. The emergence of African nations was especially evident in September and October 1960 when sixteen new African nations sent representatives to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. These African diplomats, with their flowing robes and impeccable English and French, had a major impact on black American observers. The fiery Patrice Lumumba of the Congo in particular became a shining example of uncompromising African nationalism. His visit to Harlem in 1960 was organized by nationalist groups like the Nation of Islam and the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement and held at the Henry Lincoln Johnson Lodge Hall at 15t W. 126th Street. Lumumba's visit electrified the nationalist community. Carlos Cooks wrote a glowing profile of Lumumba in his newsletter *The Street Corner* calling Lumumba "One of the greatest African personalities to appear on the stage of world affairs."[44] Cooks was particularly impressed with Lumumba's use of the United Nations system to thwart the secessionists in Katanga. In a rare compliment, Cooks argued that Lumumba was "more oriented towards orthodox

African Nationalism, along the Garveyism pattern, than any of the other African officials I have had the privilege to converse with." Malcolm X was also impressed with Lumumba and outraged at the machinations of the Belgians and their ally Moise Tshombe.

In early February 1961 supporters of African liberation were outraged to hear that Moise Tshombe's forces had executed Congo's Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Activists were convinced that the Central Intelligence Agency and United Nations forces had allowed Lumumba to be captured so they could install a pro-Western government in the Congo. African countries and their allies in the United Nations were also convinced that the Untied States and the United Nations were responsible for Lumumba's death.[45] Nationalist groups in Harlem put out a call to protest during a United Nations Security Council meeting called to debate a Soviet-sponsored resolution condemning the United Nations for complicity in the murder of Lumumba. On 15 February 1961 hundreds of protesters turned up at UN headquarters and packed the visitors' gallery. US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was about to speak when a woman in the gallery screamed: "Murderers of Lumumba, you Ku Klux Klan Motherfuckers!" Soon after, a melee broke out in the gallery as security guards and later police tried to clear the area. Demonstrators continued into the evening until a crowd chanting "Congo Yes, Yankee No" on 42nd Street was dispersed by mounted police. The press called the protest a "riot." Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who was an advisor to President Kennedy at the time, wrote later in his memoir that the demonstrations were "a frenzy of hatred" stirred up by the Soviet Union to discredit the United States.

Roy Wilkins of the NAACP said it was "natural that black should protest the murder of Lumumba" but added that the demonstrations at the United Nations on February 15 did not "represent either the sentiment or the tactics of American Negroes." Wilkins complained that the press had labeled the protest the work of black people in general creating a "misleading picture of the opposition of American Negro citizens."[46]

To counter the emergence of militant black internationalism, liberal groups organized a conference on "American Policy Toward Africa" on March 9-10, 1961, chaired by A. Philip Randolph, then vice president of the AFL/CIO and Donald Harrington, chairman of the ACOA.[47] The conference call letter urged the new administration to seize the opportunity "for the adoption of dynamic and courageous policies" arguing that "A re-assessment of American policy toward Africa is urgently required now. ... because Africa has emerged on the international stage with explosive force." Noting that "American prestige in Africa has suffered greatly in the last few months," the organizers called for a leadership conference "on American responsibilities towards Africa, believing that no more urgent or challenging task confronts the American people today than that of formulating a creative policy to meet the demands of the dynamic changes occurring in Africa."[48] The call was signed by a virtual "Who's Who" of the civil rights movement including Randolph, Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King, Lester Granger, Jackie Robinson, James Robinson, Thurgood Marshall, Charles Diggs, Dorothy Height and Harry Belafonte.[49]

The conference featured a debate between Senator Frank E. Moss (Utah), co-author of a joint Senate Report on Africa following a fact-finding tour, and Rep. Charles Diggs Jr. (D-Michigan), a member of the House Subcommittee on Africa. A. Philip Randolph gave the keynote speech, "Is the U.S. Meeting the Challenge of Africa in the World?"[50] The conference resolutions called on the United States to adopt a "much more vigorous policy toward Africa" by: (1) supporting the U.N.'s demand that colonial powers set target dates for the independence of colonies; (2) taking economic action against apartheid; (3) supporting the independence of South West Africa; (4) opposing white settler domination in Rhodesia; (5) recognizing the right of Algerian people to independence; and (6) bringing more recognized African nationalist leaders to the U.S. under the U.S. cultural exchange program.[51]

The most incisive analysis of the demonstration at the United Nations, however, was advanced by John Henrik Clarke, who wrote that fall in a *Freedomways* article that the demonstrations were a manifestation of a "new Afro-American nationalism."[52] Clarke argued that the crowd at the UN demonstration interpreted the execution of Lumumba as a "the international lynching of a black man at the alter of colonialism and white supremacy." Clarke said Lumumba had become a hero to African Americans because he was a symbol of the black man's struggle for freedom and recognition. This was why Lumumba was hailed as "Lincoln of the Congo" and "Black Messiah." Clarke described the Nation of Islam led by Elijah Mohammed in Chicago and Malcolm X in Harlem as "the most dynamic force for protest and change in the United States. Of all the Afro-American nationalist groups this is the one that is

most feared by white people." Other major nationalists groups in Harlem, "the incubator of black nationalism in the United States" were: the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Talib Ahmed Dawud, which claimed to follow orthodox Islam; the United African Nationalist Movement started by James Lawson in 1948, described as one of the most active groups that had established close relations with African missions at the United Nations; the Universal African Nationalist Movement led by Benjamin Gibbons, described as one of the many splinter groups formed after the break up of Garvey's UNIA; the Cultural Association for Women of African Heritage, led by Abby Lincoln and representing the entry of entertainers into the nationalist movement; and the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement headed by Carlos Cooks, which Clarke describes as the most active of the Garveyite groups. Other new nationalist groups identified by Clarke are the Liberation Committee for Africa; On Guard Committee for Freedom; and Provisional Committee for a Free Africa.

Clarke argued that these new Afro-American nationalists "had learned a lesson and discovered a great truth that still eludes the Negro leadership class. They have learned the value of history and culture as an instrument in stimulating the spiritual rebirth of a people." This turn to history, Africa and nationalism had been seen before in Black America. Cultural nationalism was an important aspect of Garvey's UNIA. Clarke argues, however, that many of these new Afro-American nationalists were "gravitating toward a form of African Socialism." In the terms of the time they were "revolutionary nationalists" inspired by the African revolutionary theorists like Julius Nyerere, Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral.

The renewed interest in Africa led to a revival of African religions like Vodun by a group called the Yoruba Temple. The leader of the Temple, Rev. Adefumi explains; "The Yoruba Temple is the advance guard for the change now being felt in the minds of every awakening Afro-American ... It is the only society which is the same in West Africa, Cuba, Haiti, Trinidad and Brazil, because it is African through and through. The Yoruba Temple does not believe we can ever fully succeed by trying to be Negroes, Arabs or Jews. ... There is only one thing we can be --Africans, because that is what we were meant to be--face it." Clarke also reported the emergence of a Black Nationalist political party called the "New Alajo Party." In a position statement the party declared: "The re-Africanization of the black people of America has begun."

For the NAACP and the Big Six civil rights leaders, the reemergence of Black Nationalism was disturbing. This discomfort with the growing identification with Africa was natural given that the organizations were committed to integration into full American citizenship and considered pro-Africanism a liability in that cause. This perspective is reflected in an article by NAACP official James A. Marshall in the *Crisis* of February 1962 titled "The Meaning of Black Nationalism." Marshall argued that black nationalism as represented in the UN demonstration of February 1961, was "an extremist cry rising out of deep and ancient fear and suspicion nourished by current frustration." For Marshall, "fixing Africa as the chief symbol of Negro militancy ... really implies acceptance of a derogatory stereotype of the Negro as submissive and dependent." Nevertheless he urged the NAACP to: "face the fact that

logic notwithstanding sizable segments of the community will continue to heed the call of false prophets and with disturbing implications."[53]

The Arden House Conference

In response to this upsurge in grassroots interest in Africa and pan- Africanism, some liberal African American leaders sought to form a black organization that could lobby Washington on African affairs. The ANLCA emerged from the efforts of A. Philip Randolph, the president and founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters who had been calling on civil rights leaders to form a black liberation support organization since the demise of the CAA in 1955. Randolph, who had worked with AMSAC, the NAACP and ACOA, felt there was a need for a black American organization to work with African leaders at the United Nations and support anti-colonial movements on the continent. In November 1959, Randolph called a meeting of African American leaders to discuss the "roles they can play both, collectively and individually, in the dramatic developments taking place so rapidly in Africa today."[54]

On May 16, 1962, a group of African American leaders held a meeting on a proposal to form an Afro-American Leadership Conference on American Policy Toward Africa.[55] The group agreed that there was an urgent need for such a conference to organize African American opinion on Africa because of the explosive situation in southern Africa. Violence had erupted in Angola and bloodshed seemed inevitable in South Africa. Noting that the United States was likely to "continue to follow a somewhat equivocal position on these issues because of the nature of the

western alliance and because of other factors" the group resolved to organize African American opinion "sympathetic to the aims of African nationalism which in turn backs up the idea of independence and equality." The group agreed to organize an Afro-American leadership conference on Africa in October while the United Nations General Assembly was in session. It was also agreed that the group would invite Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King Jr., Whitney Young, Hobson Reynolds and C.B. Powell to the next meeting.

The call for the conference argued that the struggle for freedom in Africa had reached a critical stage in Angola where armed resistance had broken out on March 15, 1961 and in South Africa, where black liberation organizations were banned, leaders imprisoned and freedom of movement curtailed.[56] The letter pointed out that the United States had a special responsibility in the implementation of UN resolutions because of its economic ties with both Portugal and South Africa. The letter also said:

> The Afro-American community in the U.S. has a special responsibility to urge a dynamic policy on our country. Although we have a serious civil rights problem which exhausts much of our energy, we cannot separate this struggle at home from that abroad. If the U.S. cannot take rigorous action to help win freedom in Africa's troubled zones, how can we expect to maintain trust, the friendship of the newly independent and soon to be independent peoples of Africa and Asia?[57]

This position reflected the evolution of liberal African American thought on Africa since the Sharpeville Massacre. It was a far cry from the dismissal of Africa at the NAACP board meeting on 1959 when Ralph Bunche argued that there was no connection between the struggles in Africa and the United States. This time a large

cross section of the African American leadership was involved in an effort to influence U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. The difference was that there was an upsurge of nationalism and race consciousness in the new generation of activists that sparked an interest in history and people of African descent around the world.

At a meeting held on June 15, 1962, the group had firmed up plans to hold the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa in October.[58] They formed a planning committee consisting of John A. Davis, AMSAC; James Farmer, CORE; George Houser, ACOA; Clarence Jones, Gandhi Society; Frank Montero, African Students' Foundation; John Morsell, NAACP; Guichard Parris, NUL; A. Philip Randolph, BSCP and Martin Luther King Jr. of the SCLC. The ANLCA was the second black united front for Africa formed by African American organizations since the Second World War. It included seventy-five of the nations largest Black organizations. Unlike the radical coalition led by the CAA in the 1940s and early 1950s, however, this organization reflected the nonviolent/integrationist politics of its principal leaders although it included radicals and black nationalists in its coalition. By the time of the Arden House Conference the ANLCA included representatives of organizations that ranged from black nationalists (E. Frederick Morrow of the Liberation Committee for Africa) to African American legislators and business owners.[59]

Both the Black and mainstream press compared the ANLCA conference to the Pan African conferences of the past. Clarence Hunter of the *Washington Evening Star,*

for instance, claimed that: "The last such gathering of this magnitude probably was the first Pan African conference organized by W.E.B. Du Bois in 1919."[60] The article announced that the conference would be concerned with the role of African Americans in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and the participation of African Americans in foreign policy through appointments to the State Department and diplomatic posts.[61] Scholars like Adelaide Cornwell Hill of Boston University, St. Clair Drake of Roosevelt College, John Marcum of Lincoln University and Eduardo Mondlane of Syracuse University had been asked to prepare papers for the conference. Theodore Brown, director of the conference, encapsulated the reinvigoration of Pan Africanist thought when he argued:

> Since the turn of the century Negro leaders and scholars have expressed the concern of Negro Americans for the elimination of colonialism and all its evils. While our conference will not initiate a new interest on the part of American Negroes, it will launch a more aggressive determination to make our influence felt on the policies of our government on the critical areas of that vast continent especially south of the Sahara."[62]

The *Washington Afro-American* claimed in an editorial that "November 23, 1962 may well be one of the most important days in the history of the colored American's relationship with Africa."[63] In a searing editorial titled "OUR Conference on Africa," the *Afro-American* argued that the ANLCA conference would debunk the "great myth that friction between colored Americans and Africans precluded any type of continuing relationship." The editorial argued that the relationship between Africans and African Americans was guaranteed by the presence of millions of people of African descent in the United States. Arguing that "Few can gainsay the enormous

impact Africa's successful freedom drive has had on the colored American's effort," the editorial predicted that the ANLCA would "render a great service to the entire spectrum of American foreign policy." In conclusion the Afro-American urged the conference to examine whether American foreign policy had a European orientation; to what extent the hostility toward Africa stemmed from the presence of southerners in key foreign affairs committees in Congress; the use of private foundations and businesses as a secret arm of the U.S. government policy toward the continent; and the resistance to the appointment of "colored" ambassadors in the State Department. Even the *Washington Post* picked up on the Pan African theme of the conference. In an editorial on September 11, 1962, the Post wrote:

> The announcement of a three-day conference, to be held at the Arden House campus of Columbia University in November, is indicative of the American Negro community's growing interest in United States policies toward the newly independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Interest by American Negroes in African affairs can be traced back to the first Pan African conference organized by W.E.B. Du Bois in 1919. The 1919 meeting and subsequent meetings in the 1920s were largely directed towards the establishment of cultural links. the forthcoming conference .. will be devoted to an analysis of the Government's Africa policies and the ways in which they can be influenced by the Negro community.[64]

Although the Post's analysis lacked historical depth, the contention that the ANLCA was comparable to the Pan African conferences of the past was apt. The conference's wide support in the African American community indicated a new discourse on Africa engendered by the successful liberation struggles in Africa and the emergence of armed struggle in South Africa. This struggle paralleled the Black American struggle in the United States creating an interesting situation where news

about civil rights workers being beaten in the south alternated with stories about massacres in South Africa.

On November 23, 1962 over 100 African American leaders met under the auspices of the American Negro Leadership Conference (ANLCA) at Arden House, Columbia University. Apartheid was very much on the agenda at the "Arden House Conference" of November 23-25, 1962. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP gave the keynote address stressing the United States had to go beyond verbal condemnations of colonialism and apartheid and impose sanctions on Portugal and South Africa.

> We well know sanctions is a war word, but in the cases of Angola and South Africa, it is a word in a war against terror, despotism, murder and massacre. South Africa, like Mississippi, justifies her course unashamedly upon the inglorious and debasing theory of white supremacy. And like Mississippi, she is exposing to the world, with a clarity not contemplated when the theory was adopted in another age, the bankruptcy of the hateful doctrine.[65]

The conference endorsed the "Appeal for Action Against Apartheid" sponsored by Martin Luther King Jr. and Albert Luthuli, president of the African National Congress in South Africa. It called on the United States government to support United Nations sanctions against South Africa; to impose a total arms embargo; and discourage public and private investment in the regime. The group demanded that the United States Armed Forces cease military maneuvers in South Africa and stop using South African waters or bases. The conference also called on participants to seek a meeting with the president to discuss U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.

At a wide-ranging press conference after the second day of deliberations on November 24, the leaders argued that the decision to formally link the civil rights movement in the United States to the independence struggle in Africa represented a "new phase in the civil rights struggle."[66] They agreed on a two-pronged program of action: The first was to instill a conscious identification with Africa in the Black communities of the United States through education and exchange programs. The second, to use the Black voting strength to convince the government to support the liberation movements in Africa. The leaders rejected the suggestion that identification with Africa "might stimulate a greater awareness of separateness as opposed to integration." Dr. King stressed that the new phase of the civil rights struggle was part of a worldwide struggle for freedom rather than a special African issue although African independence "has given the American Negroes inspiration for their struggles here." King called for a "Marshall Plan, the recruiting of American Negroes for official United States and unofficial American jobs of all categories in Africa, and an intensive effort to cultivate African diplomats and their families in this country." There was some discussion about the perception of Africans on the role of African Americans in the United States. Some thought that the Africans had an exaggerated view of Black American power in the American political system. Others accused the State Department of hiding behind the contention that African states preferred white ambassadors because they felt that Blacks had little access to the power structure in the United States. The leaders also disagreed with the view that African American

students were not interested in Africa because they rarely volunteered for the Peace Corps. They argued that even in cases where Black students were ignorant about Africa, they maintained an emotional attachment that could not be underestimated. They attributed the lack of Black Peace Corps volunteers to socio-economic conditions in the United States that made it inadvisable for a Black student to sacrifice two or three years. They also argued that educational foundations had helped establish African studies centers at white universities instead of historically black institutions. St. Clair Drake, for instance, attributed this disparity in funding to the fact that Black Americans were not part of the decision making process at major foundations.

On 26 November 1962, the *New York Times* reported that the "Arden House" conference had ended "with a set of resolutions designed to transform the struggle for civil rights into an international problem" because the program "would involve the American Negro community with sub-Saharan African affairs."[67] The report highlighted a resolution calling on a committee to seek an audience with President Kennedy on Human Rights Day, December 10, 1962 to transmit to him the resolution of the conference. The *New York Times* writer also informed readers that some of the Black leaders had indicated "in private conversation" that "they regarded the organized political action of Jewish groups in the United States as a model." Other resolutions included demands that the United States support the liberation of Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa and the unification of the Congo. In the final plenary session, which the reporter describes as "fiery", Roy Wilkins is credited with getting participants to remove "all phraseology that might have involved the United

States Government in any unpleasantness with its European allies ... as politically unsound and of no practical value."[68]

On December 17, 1962, the Big Six, King, Randolph, Height, Young and Wilkins, met President John F. Kennedy to discuss U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.[69] In an unprecedented 3-hour meeting with black leaders on foreign policy, they urged Kennedy to institute a "Marshall Plan" for Africa, impose sanctions on South Africa and support a United Nations proposal for an arms embargo on Portugal. The United States had voted against both sanctions and the arms embargo. Kennedy claimed the NATO agreements forced him to arm Portugal although he agreed with the ANLCA about the need to support the anti-colonial movements in Africa. The black press hailed the meeting as a major breakthrough in U.S. relations with Africa.

President Kennedy spelled out his administration's position on apartheid in a speech he gave to the General Assembly in November 1962 after African countries had presented a sanctions resolution that was passed by a heavy majority in the General Assembly. In a patronizing speech drafted by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Ambassador Francis Plimpton the president stated:

> We do not believe (sanctions) would bring us closer to our objective --the abandonment of apartheid in South Africa. We see little value in a resolution which would be primarily a means for a discharge of our emotions, which would be unlikely to be fully implemented and which calls for measures which could be easily evaded by the country to which they are addressed--with the result of calling into question the whole efficacy of the sanction process.[70]

The refusal of the United States to support the sanctions resolution outraged African leaders and anti-apartheid organizations around the world.

On Human Rights Day, 10 December 1962, Martin Luther King Jr. and Albert Luthuli issued a joint "Appeal for Action Against Apartheid."[71] The appeal recalled that the Declaration of Conscience of 1957 had shown the nonwhites in South Africa that they were not alone and also demonstrated how isolated white supremacists were in the international community. Since the declaration, the appeal continued, South Africa had banned the ANC and PAC, silenced the press, established an independent arms industry, defined protest against apartheid as sabotage --a crime punishable by death, and continued to maintain power through terrorism and violence. The appeal argued that the international community was faced with two options: (1) race war caused by repression of African liberation movements; and (2) a nonviolent solution based on Chief Albert Luthuli's statement in Oslo while receiving the Nobel peace Prize in 1960: ""Nothing which we have suffered at the hands of the government has turned us from our chosen path of disciplined resistance." Therefore, the appeal urged supporters to: Hold meetings and demonstrations on December 10, Human Rights Day; urge their churches, unions, lodges, or clubs to observe this day as one of protest; urge their Governments to support economic sanctions; write to their mission to the

United Nations urging adoption of a resolution calling for international isolation of South Africa; refuse to buy South Africa's products; trade or invest in South Africa; and translate public opinion into public action by explaining facts to all peoples, to groups to which they belong, and to countries of which they were citizens until an effective international quarantine of apartheid was established.

By this time, however, this appeal strategy was seriously outdated in both South Africa and the United States. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and other members of the ANC had decided to launch armed struggle against the South African regime after the banning of the liberation movements in 1960. In a statement titled "Why I Planned Sabotage in South Africa" Mandela said: "I consider myself neither legally nor morally bound to obey laws made by a parliament in which I had no representation."[72] In 1961 ANC launched Umkontho we Sizwe, its armed wing, with a series of attacks on military and strategic installations. The Verwoerd government quickly passed the Sabotage Act of 1962 that made it treason to engage in sabotage -- a crime punishable by death. In August 1962, Mandela was caught by security forces and sentenced to five years for incitement and leaving the country illegally. On 11 June 1963 police raided MK's headquarters in the town of Rivonia, confiscated boxes of incriminating materials and arrested the armed wing's leaders. Mandela was tried along with his colleagues in the infamous Rivonia Trial and given a sentence of life in prison.

Meanwhile the close ties between the United States and South Africa were becoming serious obstacles to relations with African countries. At its founding conference in May 1963, the Organization of African Unity made it clear that the United States would have to choose between Africa and colonial powers like Portugal and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The OAU also passed a resolution expressing "deep concern aroused in all African peoples and governments by the measures of racial discrimination taken against communities of Africa origin living outside the continent and particularly the United States of America."[73] The Nigerian Prime Minister, for instance, urged African states to: "use all the means at our disposal, especially at the United Nations, to ensure that the last vestiges of racialism and colonialism are wiped off the face of Africa."[74]

After the OAU meeting, "friendly" African leaders like Julius Nyerere and Houphuet-Boigny warned the Kennedy administration that verbal condemnation of apartheid would no longer be sufficient.[75] Mennen Williams informed Kennedy in mid-June, 1963 that the United States would have to back up its anti-apartheid rhetoric with action. In the memorandum, Williams recommended that the United States consider imposing a full embargo on sales of arms to South Africa. Adlai Stevenson, concurred, telling Kennedy that: "It seems clear that we are approaching a decisive situation from which the Africans will draw conclusions about the long-run nature of our policies."

Although the proposal for an arms embargo on South Africa drew strong resistance from the upper echelons of the State Department, Kennedy decided to call for a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa and to impose a unilateral ban on the sale of U.S. arms to South Africa as long as apartheid policies were in effect. On August 2, Stevenson announced the decision to the Security Council and cast the American vote for a resolution calling on all states to cease "the sale and shipments of arms and ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa."[76]

Despite this vote, the ACOA and other groups continued to push for full sanctions against South Africa. In September, the ACOA launched yet another petition drive aimed at influencing the policies of the United States mission to the United Nations during the General Assembly.[77] The "Petition to President Kennedy" was signed by A. Philip Randolph and Donald Harrington, co-chairmen of the ACOA. It called on the president to provide "support for sanctions; for a U.S. embargo on trade with South Africa; and, finally, for suspending American recognition of the Apartheid Government." Two months later, George Houser reported to Roy Wilkins that the petition had been signed by over 5,000 people in the United States. Meanwhile South Africa had taken "measures to wipe out all opposition (and) have turned South Africa into a virtual police state, are forcing the opponents of apartheid underground, and pushing them into a position in which they have no legal methods of protest."[78]

In July 1964, the South African Government sentenced Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and other leaders of the liberation movements to life in prison with hard

labor under the "Sabotage Act." Like other draconian measures, these sentences were met with outrage in the anti-apartheid community. On 17 July 1964, hundreds of African Americans led by Joseph Walker, an editor for the Local 1199, the Drug and Hospital Employees Union, picketed the South African Consulate in a demonstration reminiscent of the Council on African Affairs in 1952.[79] The demonstration included members of the CORE, the NAACP and SNCC. Walker and 11 other demonstrators including Joe Brown, vice president, New York City chapter, Negro American Labor Council, and Doris Turner, vice president, Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Employees Union staged a sit-in at the South African Consulate and were arrested.[80] The Nation of Islam's Muhammad Speaks published excerpts of Mandela's statements "Why I Planned Sabotage in South Africa."[81] The newspaper, which had been started by Malcolm X in 1960, remained the premier source of information about African nationalist and anti-colonial forces during the late 1960s and early 1970s. [82]

The ANLCA also convened foreign policy conferences in 1964 and 1967 that featured African nationalists and the foreign policy community in Washington D.C. It was clear, however, that the civil rights groups were losing ground both in government circles and in the black community where a new generation of leaders was emerging. In 1964, a decade before the formation of TransAfrica, an ANLCA conference called for the formation of a permanent African American lobby to influence US foreign policy toward Africa. The conference, held at Howard University between September 24 and 27, 1964, recognized "the evolution of United States' policy toward South

Africa in past years, but called for bold initiatives and a more dynamic approach in the immediate future."[83] The resolution argued:

> Although U.S. foreign policy has formally opposed apartheid and racial oppression in South Africa, it must move beyond this. The unwillingness of the government of the United States to support any concrete proposals for economic, financial and related sanctions against South Africa government is a major obstacle to the efforts of the United Nations and independent African states to solve the South African problem.[84]

The ANLCA's call for sanctions was echoed at the International Conference on Economic Sanctions Against South Africa held in London from April 14 to 17, 1964. The conference stemmed from discussions in 1963 about the need for an international dialogue on the problems associated with the implementation of the UN General Assembly's vote for global economic sanctions in 1962. The London-based Anti-Apartheid Movement and South African exiles, some of whom were members of the ANC, took the initiative and set up a preparatory committee under the direction of Ronald Segal, a close associate of ANC president Oliver Tambo, who had fled in exile after the Sharpeville Massacre. A London *Observer* reporter covering the conference wrote, "The financial support for the conference is provided mainly by African governments."[85] Seven African and Asian nations acted as patrons of the conference: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Presidents Ben Bella of Algeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Prime Ministers Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia.

In a report on the conference sent to ACOA members, George Houser and Collin Gonze wrote that the conference was organized by a steering committee that included members of the Africa Bureau and the African National Congress.[86] The Pan Africanist Congress also supported the conference. Over 200 people attended it from 40 countries. The attendance list included 28 official national delegations and 16 unofficial ones. Official delegations came mainly from Africa, Asia and communist countries like China, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Poland. Participants from the United States included five representatives from the ACOA, one from AMSAC, two from the NAACP, one from SNCC and one from the National Council of Churches. The key leadership for the conference came from the nonaligned countries. The chairman was Mongo Slim, foreign minister of Tunisia. The commission included Tom Mboya, Kenya minister of justice, Nsilo Swai, minister of development in Tanganyika, and Rev. Ambrose Reeves, former Anglican bishop of Johannesburg.

The conference found that South Africa was vulnerable to sanctions because it imported 38 percent of its chemicals, 43 percent of transport and engineering equipment and 52 percent of petroleum and cola products. In addition, South African agriculture, private transport and mobile defense were totally dependent on oil, most of which was imported. They also found that world trade and payments would not suffer greatly from the cessation of South Africa in gold sales. Exports were estimated at only one percent and loss from investment revenue would not exceed $70 million. West Germany and Japan would lose even less than the U.S. The industrialized

countries, therefore, could not plead economic hardship. A second group of discussants at the conference found that South Africa was engaged in a race war as the liberation movements had turned to violence after being denied any legal means of struggle. This group also found that the fighting in South Africa was likely to spread to the neighboring countries thus plunging southern Africa into war. A third group under the chairmanship of Tom Mboya discussed the legal implications of sanctions. The group heard six papers and concluded that it was necessary to establish that the situation in South Africa constituted a threat to peace in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter that would then require the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions as an alternative to military action. The legal committee also argued that the main obstacle to the imposition of sanctions was the reluctance of the U.S. and Britain. The committee also recognized that policing sanctions was a difficult undertaking in southern Africa because the South and South African coastlines were 2,500 miles long and would require a naval blockade similar to the U.S. blockade of Cuba in 1962.

In the final analysis, however, Houser and Gonze concluded that while the conference was "interesting and stimulating" it was doubtful whether its resolutions would have any impact on the policies of the UK, US and France --the three countries that continued to oppose international sanctions at the Security Council. They also criticized the conference for failing to involve representatives of groups such as churches, civil rights organizations, labor unions and activists. A proposal that a permanent organization be formed to continue the work of the conference failed to gain support. Instead the participants asked the OAU to consider establishing a

permanent anti-apartheid agency and agreed to send the conference's resolutions to the United Nations.

In the United States, the ACOA, NAACP, ANLCA and other groups formed a Consultative Council on South Africa to coordinate lobbying efforts.[87] On October 29, 1964 John O Killens of the CCSA wrote to Dr. John Marshall asking the NAACP to join 30 other organizations in sponsoring a major conference on South Africa and U.S. foreign policy called "South African Crisis and American Action." The CCSA planned to start the conference on the fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre (Sunday March 21, 1965). On 20 January 1965 Houser reported that the program would include a presentation by Oliver Tambo, the deputy president of the ANC who was based in Dar es Salaam.[88] Houser wrote to Wilkins on behalf of the planning committee to ask him if he could be one of the main speakers at the opening meeting of the conference on March 21. The proposed topic was "to relate in any way you see fit the civil rights struggle here with the struggle in South Africa." James Farmer of CORE was the chairman and commentator for the evening. On the same day, John Morsell, Wilkins's assistant confirmed the NAACP's acceptance of the invitation to sponsor the conference and promised to send a check for $100.[89]

During the meeting, Gladstone Ntlabati said that Sharpeville had marked a milestone in the South African struggle because the liberation movements had decided to turn to armed struggle. According to Ntlabati, "Realizing all channels of peaceful protest had been closed to us by banning our political organizations, the African

National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, some of the Africans, together with the whites, embarked on violent forms of struggle." Ntlabati detailed how every act of nonviolence was met with state violence.

In 1966, the ACOA launched a "Committee of Conscience Against South African Apartheid" to coordinate a campaign against banks that provided South Africa with loans. The campaign focused on urging individuals and organizations to withdraw accounts from Chase Manhattan and First National City banks because of their close relations with South Africa. ACOA and the University Christian Movement stepped in to expand the divestment movement started by students on a smaller scale. In a 7 December 1966 press release A. Philip Randolph reported that Chase Manhattan, First National and eight other US banks had granted loans worth $23 million and $40 million in revolving credit to South Africa. Randolph argued that "this substantial financial involvement has not only enabled the perpetuation of the particular apartheid regime in South Africa, but also its pivotal role in the continuation of a complex of American corporate involvement in the country."[90] Randolph reported that 23 million would be withdrawn from the banks by December 9. Although the banks disputed the validity of these figures, Randolph argued that the movement had received "withdrawal pledges" that included large sums such as a $15 million account and a $6.5 million account and smaller ones of $200,000, $65,000, $40,000 and smaller individual accounts in the thousands. He argued that the confusion may have stemmed from the fact that "some of the withdrawals connected with the campaign have occurred without informing the banks of the specific reasons for withdrawal and

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[1]Martin Luther King Jr. "Let My People Go," Speech at Human Rights Day rally, December 10, 1965. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00553.

[2]Carlos Cooks. Black Nationalism From Garvey to Malcolm. 46.

[3]Cooks, 48.

[4]Carlos Cooks, speech on the "Buy Black" campaign, 1955, in William Van Deburg. (ed.) Modern Black Nationalism From Marcus Garvey to Louis Farrakhan. (New York: NYU Press, 1997) 85.

[5]Cooks, 86.

[6]Malcolm X. The Autobiography of Malcolm X. (New York: Grove Press, 1964) 218.

[7]Malcolm X Speaks, 8.

[8]Autobiography, 174.

[9]Autobiography, 174.

[10]Autobiography, 182

[11]The Christian Century LXXIV no15 (10 April 1957) King Papers, Boston University. In contrast to white liberals in the AAI, King did not withdraw from the liberation support movement after the ANC adopted armed struggle in 1960. Instead, King de-emphasized non-violence and highlighted the differences between the situation of Blacks in the United States and South Africa.

[12]Branch

[13]Baldwin, 8-10.

[14]Martin Luther King Jr. "The Birth Of A New Nation" (April 7 1957)

[15]Lewis V. Baldwin Toward the Beloved Community Martin Luther King Jr. and South Africa (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1995) 14-16.

[16]The Christian Century LXXIV no15 (10 April 1957) King Papers, Boston University. In contrast to white liberals in the AAI, King did not withdraw from the liberation support movement after the ANC adopted armed struggle in 1960. Instead, King de-emphasized non-violence and highlighted the differences between the situation of Blacks in the United States and South Africa.

[17]King would change his position in the early sixties when armed struggle emerged throughout the southern African region.

[18]On December 5, 1956, the South African Government had arrested almost all anti-apartheid leaders in the country and charged them with treason under the infamous Suppression of Communism Act.

[19]Letter to Thurgood Marshall, August 15, 1957. NAACP Papers, Box III J1. Misc. American Committee on Africa.

[20]ACOA Letter to Thurgood Marshall, August 15, 1957. NAACP papers Box III J1Misc. American Committee on Africa.

[21]Baldwin, 52-53.

[22]South Africa Defense Fund press release, April 4, 1957. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00002.

[23]Africa News, April 16, 1957. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00005.

[24]"Report on Declaration of Conscience Campaign," ACOA Papers Part II, Reel 11, Frame 00759.

[25]Christian Science Monitor December 13, 1957. ACOA Papers Part II, Reel 10 Frame 00663.

[26]CSM, ibid.

[27]"Report on Declaration of Conscience Campaign," ACOA Papers Part II, Reel 11, Frame 00761.

[28]Quoted in St Clair Drake, "Diaspora Studies and Pan Africanism," in Joseph Harris, Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora. (Washington: Howard University Press, 1982.) 350.

[29]ACOA letter to Roy Wilkins. 16 March 1959. NAACP Papers Part 24 Reel 27 Frame 00372

[30]George Houser to Roy Wilkins. 9 January 1959. NAACP Papers Part 24 Reel 27 Frame 00325.

[31]John Morsell to George Houser. 13 January 1959. NAACP Papers Part 24 Reel 27 Frame 00324

[32]John Morsell to George Houser. 13 January 1959. NAACP Papers Part 24 Reel 27 Frame 00324.

[33]"Americans Protest Racial Injustice in U.S. South and in South Africa" ACOA Papers Part II Reel 10, Frame 00674.

[34]Africa Today, May 1960, 6

[35]Africa Freedom Day flyer. ACOA Papers Part II, Reel 7, Frame 00750.

[36]"Freedom Now," Speech by Kenneth Kaunda of the Northern Rhodesia United Independence Party at the annual observance of Africa Freedom Day in New York, April 13. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 6 Frame 00561.

[37]"Rising Tide of Color," *Crisis* May 1960.

[38]"Oliver Tambo, Top South Africa, Refused U.S. Visa," ACOA press release, Saturday, June 4, 1960. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frames 00759-60.

[39]"American Conference Urges Comprehensive Boycott of South Africa," ACOA press release, June 1, 1960. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 11, Frame 00373.

[40]New York Harold Tribune, Tuesday, June 7, 1960.

[41]ACOA Papers Part II Reel 6 Frame 00564.

[42]The United States was represented at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference where the colonial powers agreed on the boundaries of their colonial possessions. The U.S. supported this agreement despite the genocidal wars it required before the boundaries were set at the end of the first world war.

[43]Arthur Schelsinger Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. (New York: Premier Books, 1965) 508-509.

[44]Carlos Cooks, "Lumumba Foils Colonialist Plot to Partition the Congo," in Robert Harris et. al. (eds.) Carlos Cooks and Black Nationalism From Garvey to Malcolm. (Dover, Massachusetts: The Majority Press, 1992).

[45]Information that emerged later showed that the CIA had made elaborate plans to infect Lumumba with a fatal disease. A CIA scientist was sent to Congo with an astonishing array of biological weapons including tuberculosis, anthrax and smallpox. *Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975)

[46]"NAACP on UN Melee," *Crisis* March 1961. p. 163.

[47]ACOA Papers, Reel 11, Frame 00345-347.

[48]ACOA Papers, Reel 11, Frame 00346

[49]ACOA Papers, Reel 11, Frame 00347

[50]ACOA Papers, Reel 11, Frame 00349

[51]ACOA Papers, Reel 11, Frame 00383

[52]Freedomways, Volume 1, No 3, Fall, 1961. pg. 1

[53]John A. Marshall. "Meaning of Black Nationalism," *Crisis* February 1962. p. 69.
[54]A. Philip Randolph Papers, reel 3, frame 593.

[55]George M. Houser, "Summary of meeting held on May 16 on Afro-American Leadership Conference on American Policy on Africa." NAACP Papers Part 24: Reel 27, Frame 00387.

[56]"Call to The American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa," NAACP Papers Part 24: Reel 27, Frame 00391.

[57]ibid.

[58]American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, Summary of the meeting held on June 15, 1962. 27 June 1962. NAACP Papers Part 24: Reel 27, Frame 00392.

[59]Participant List for ANLCA, National Urban League Papers, II, 1, Box 2, Folder "ANLCA, 1962."

[60]"Negro Leaders Call U.S. Parley on Africa," *Washington Evening Star*, Oct. 22, 1962.

[61]"Negro Leaders Call U.S. Parley on Africa," *Washington Evening Star*, Oct. 22, 1962.

[62]ibid.

[63]"Our Conference on Africa," *Washington Afro-American*, September 8, 1962. pg. 4.

[64]"Africa Policy Conference," *Washington Post* September 11, 1962. pg. A12

[65]Roy Wilkins, speech at the ANLCA, November 23, 1962. NAACP Papers Part 24: Reel 28, Frame 00477.

[66]"U.S. Negroes Link Aid to Sub -Sahran African nations With Rights Struggle," *New York Times,* Sunday, 25 November 1962.

[67]"Leading Negroes Agree on Goals Arden House Session Asks South Africa Sanctions," *New York Times* 26 November 1962. NAACP Papers Part 24 Reel 28, Frame 00487.

[68]ibid.

[69]"JFK, 'Big Six' Meet; Discuss Africa and Coloured Americans," Baltimore Afro-American, 29 Dec. 1962, 14. Taylor Branch, *Parting The Waters*, 684.

[70]Schlesinger, 535.

[71]"Appeal for Action Against Apartheid by Martin Luther King Jr. and Chief Albert Luthuli, December 10, 1962." http://www.undp.org.za/docs/apartheid/undocs.html. Selected Documents 1946-1994.

[72] Muhammad Speaks 12-14

[73]St. Clair Drake, "Diaspora Studies and Pan Africanism," in Joseph Harris, Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora. (Washington: Howard University Press, 1982.) 377.

[74]Foreign Affairs, October 1962.

[75]Schlesinger, 535.

[76]Schlesinger, 537.

[77]ACOA call letter. 27 September 1963. NAACP Papers Reel 27 Frame 00404.

[78]Houser to Wilkins, 5 November 1963. NAACP Papers Reel 27 Frame 00403

[79]"A New Kind Of Demonstration Against Nazi South Africa," Muhammad Speaks July 17, 1964. 11. The NOI's Muhammad Speaks erroneously reported that this demonstration was unprecedented.

[80]Muhammad Speaks 11.

[81]Muhammad Speaks 12-14.

[82]Run by a group of ex-communists and fellow travelers who had escaped the witch hunts of the 1950s by working for the NOI, Muhammad Speaks developed a formidable reputation in the coverage of international affairs. For years the paper published Charles Howard's incisive commentaries on the United Nations and developments in Africa.

[83]"Resolution of Conference in Washington, September 24-27, 1964," ANC archives, www.anc.org/ANLCA

[84]ANLCA 1964, ANC Archives

[85]"Sanctions Win World Backing," *Observer* 4 March 1964. ACOA Papers Reel 11, Frame 00429.

[86]George Houser and Collin Gonze. "Report On The London Conference On Economic Sanctions Against South Africa," ACOA Papers Reel 11, Frame 00414

[87]John O. Killens, letter to Dr. John Marshall of the NAACP. 29 October 1964.

[88]George Houser to Roy Wilkins. 20 January 1965. NAACP Papers Part 24 Reel 27 Frame 00411.

[89]John A. Morsell to George Houser, 20 january 1965. NAACP Papers Part 24 Reel 27 Frame 00410.

[90]A. Philip Randolph. "Statement on Progress of bank Campaign," 7 December 1966. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 11, Frame 01028.

[91]A. Philip Randolph. "Statement on Progress of bank Campaign," 7 December 1966. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 11, Frame 01029.

CHAPTER 5

"BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY": BLACK POWER AND PAN AFRICANISM

> If South Africa is guilty of violating the human rights of Africans here on the mother continent, then America is guilty of worse violations of the 22 million Africans on the American continent. And if South African racism is not a domestic issue, then American racism is not a domestic issue.
>
> Malcolm X, address to the Organization of African Unity's Heads of State Summit, July 17, 1964[1]

In 1964 Malcolm X made two triumphant tours of African countries where he addressed the Organization of African Unity's Heads of State Summit; met with individual leaders; and spoke at numerous universities. Malcolm's worldview was transformed by his visits to Africa. Like Paul and Eslanda Robeson, W.E.B. Du Bois and other African Americans, he was deeply influenced by African nationalist leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, Ahmed Ben Bella, Gammar Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah. During his third tour of African countries, he became the first African American to address African heads of state at the Organization of African Unity meeting where he called for a strengthening of ties between Africans and African Americans.[2] He called on the OAU to raise the issue of African American oppression at the United Nations

and link it to the campaign against apartheid in South Africa. In his address to the African heads of state on 17 July 1964, Malcolm said:

> America is worse than South Africa, because not only is America racist, but she is also deceitful and hypocritical. South Africa preaches segregation and practices segregation. She, at least practices what she preaches. America preaches integration and practices segregation. South Africa is like a vicious wolf, openly hostile towards black humanity. But America is cunning like a fox, friendly and smiling, but even more vicious and deadly than a wolf. If South Africa is guilty of violating the human rights of Africans here on the mother continent, then America is guilty of worse violations of the 22 million Africans on the American continent. And if South African racism is not a domestic issue, then American racism is not a domestic issue.[3]

He went on to argue that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was part of a "propaganda maneuver ... to keep the African nations from condemning (U.S.) racist practices before the United Nations, as you are now doing as regards the same practices in South Africa." During this speech, he laid out the plan for the OAAU saying he intended to "internationalize" the black freedom struggle in America by "placing it at the level of human rights." This theme of internationalization of the freedom struggle is reminiscent of W.E.B. Du Bois's efforts to get the U.N. Human Rights Commission to consider the issue of racial discrimination in the United States. Just as the radical Civil Rights Congress had also addressed the UN commission on the issue without results.[4] Malcolm X, however, had a more powerful platform through the OAU and would no doubt have succeeded in his quest had he lived longer. By 1964 he was already being accused of influencing African heads of state to link the issue of the Congo with racial strife in Mississippi. In an answer to a question about his role at the United Nations, Malcolm said:

> I have never taken responsibility or credit, as you might say, for the stance taken by African nations. The African nations today are represented by intelligent statesmen. And it was only a matter of time before they would have to see that they would have to intervene in behalf of 22 million black Americans who are their brothers and sisters.[5]

Nevertheless, Malcolm X had lobbied African nations to raise the issue of racial discrimination at the United Nations and was instrumental in reestablishing relations between African nationalists and Black American nationalists. Like Du Bois and Robeson, Malcolm insisted that the African American struggle was an international one. "The Afro-American problem is not a Negro problem, or an American problem, but a human problem, a problem for humanity."[6] Malcolm's internationalization of the black freedom movement was among the most long-lasting legacies of the former NOI minister. This revolutionary internationalist perspective attracted a number of talented young activists associated with SNCC and the MFDP. Like Malcolm, the new generation of black activists was impatient with the old tactics. To them, the appeals, marches, sit-ins and declarations had exhausted their potential. The urban rebellions in the northern cities were demonstrating a level of frustration that shocked the moderate civil rights leaders. Free from the restraints of the NOI and eager to make connections with the movement, Malcolm began to reach out to movement activists, particularly to the young workers in SNCC and its affiliates in the colleges and universities. Sonia Sanchez, who was a member of New York CORE during the early 1960s, recalls that when she first saw Malcolm on television he scared her. She had been advised to keep away from Malcolm because he was a violent racist. After hearing him speak at a Harlem rally, however, she changed her mind, and, like

many of her agemates, became a Malcomite.[7] In 1962, Howard University students who were members of an affiliate of SNCC called the Nonviolent Action Group, invited Malcolm X to debate Bayard Rustin. The debate had a major impact on some of these students. Cleveland Sellers, for instance, says that SNCC workers listened to tapes of Malcolm's speeches regularly after discovering him during the debate.[8]

This new circle of close associates and members of the OAAU included Maya Angelou who had returned to the U.S. from Africa and was interested in helping Malcolm build an international organization. This "linkage" issue reached many who were outside the nationalist and Muslim circles. This interest brought them closer to civil rights leaders who had formed the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa in 1962. As we saw in chapter three, this organization had close relations with the Kennedy Administration, held several conferences on African issues and supported sanctions against South Africa. Yet at the same time, Malcolm's insistence on linking racism in the United States and South Africa and his militant stand on race relations was anathema to the white liberals who controlled other anti-apartheid organizations like the American Committee on Africa and the African Studies Association. On the Apartheid question, Malcolm pointed to the strategic location of African Americans in the United States and advised anti-apartheid activists to focus on the United States government:

> 22 million Afro-Americans in America can become for Africa a great positive force--while in turn the African nations could and should exert positive force at diplomatic levels against racial discrimination. All of Africa unites in opposition to South Africa's apartheid, and to the oppression in the Portuguese

territories. But you waste your time if you don't realize that Verwoerd and Salazar, and Britain and France, never could last a day if it were not for United States support. So until you expose the man in Washington, D.C. you haven't accomplished anything.[9]

Thus, in the last two years of his life, Malcolm X gravitated towards a politically activist pan-Africanism. Indeed, he named his organization the Organization of Afro-American Unity in honor of the Organization of African Unity and stressed the need to develop ties between Africans and African Americans through study and pilgrimages to the continent. For example, the OAAU's preamble states: "We Afro-American people will launch a cultural revolution which will provide the means for restoring our identity that we might rejoin our brothers and sisters on the African continent, culturally, psychologically, economically and share with them the sweet fruits of freedom from oppression and independence of racist governments."[10] The OAAU urged African American to restore communications with Africa and stressed the need for black Americans to "travel to Africa, the Caribbean and to other places where our culture has not been completely crushed by brutality and ruthlessness." Reflecting an enduring nationalist concern, the unity program rejects the term "Negro" as "degrading in the eyes of informed and self-respecting persons of African heritage. ... We accept the use of Afro-American, African, and Black Man."[11]

This focus on Africa and pride in being African represented reinvigorated Pan Africanist sentiment in the United States. The new generation of African Americans took Malcolm's advice and built a series of organizations and initiatives that were critical for the evolution of the African American constituency for South Africa. This

new generation of Black American activists was characterized by several Malcolmite perspectives including a rejection of the name "Negro"; a strong identification with Africa; support for armed revolution in Africa and elsewhere; and a Pan Africanist perspective. Malcolm had a direct impact on members of SNCC and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). After the MFDP challenge to the Democratic Party in 1964, entertainer Harry Belafonte, a principal fund-raiser for SNCC and SCLC, raised funds for SNCC members to travel to Africa. Belafonte thought that the activists should visit Guinea because:

> I was most taken by the young spirit of the country, which had just recently gained its independence from France, and in those early years the clear-sightedness of its leader Sekou Toure held great promise for Africa's future.[12]

Bob and Donna Moses, John Lewis, Jim Forman, Prathia Hall, Julian Bond, Ruby Doris Robinson, Bill Hansen, Donald Harris, Matthew Jones, and Fannie Lou Hamer left for Guinea on September 11, 1964. The trip had a major impact on the SNCC workers. According to John Lewis:

> For the first time you saw a group of black men and women in charge. Growing up in the southern parts of America we had been talking and speaking a great deal about one man one vote. In Guinea, in Ghana, in East Africa, in Zambia, we saw people making it real, making it happen.[13]

In Nairobi, Kenya, the group ran into Malcolm X by chance and spent two days discussing strategy and the independence process in Africa. Lewis describes this meeting as "one of the most moving meetings that I ever had with Malcolm." The group spent two days with Malcolm X discussing the political process in African and the United States.

On December 20, 1964, representatives of SNCC and MFDP invited Malcolm to speak at one of their rallies at the Williams Institutional CME Church in Harlem. During his speech, Malcolm briefed them on his journey to Africa, the formation of the OAAU and urged them to emulate Kenya's Land and Freedom Army ("Mau Mau") which had won independence through guerrilla warfare:

> They will go down in history as the greatest African patriots and freedom fighters the continent ever knew, and they will be given credit for bringing about independence of many of the existing independent states on the continent right now. ... What we need In Mississippi we need a Mau Mau. In Alabama we need a Mau Mau. In Georgia we need a Mau Mau. Right here in Harlem, in New York City, we need a Mau Mau.[14]

Malcolm X also invited Fannie Lou Hamer and the SNCC Freedom Singers to attend a meeting of the Organization of Afro-American Unity that evening. Speaking to a group of SNCC teen-agers later that month, Malcolm said the greatest accomplishment of the struggles of 1964 was "the successful linking together of our problem with the African problem, or making our problem a world problem. ... It is important for you to know that when you are in Mississippi, you're not alone. As long as you think you're alone, then you take a stand as if you're a minority or as if you're outnumbered, and that kind of stand will never enable you to win a battle." On February 4, 1965, SNCC again invited Malcolm X to speak in Selma at a mass meeting. Cleveland Sellers, a SNCC staffer who had heard Malcolm X debate Bayard Rustin at Howard University in 1962, said SNCC had invited Malcolm to speak

because they wanted the young people to hear leaders who were not as popular with the press. According to Sellers:

> We had Malcolm talk to them about the world struggle and how black people fit into that struggle. ... Malcolm talked about the fact that people in the South should not see their struggle as independence and separate from what he was trying to do in New York. And that our struggle was not separate from Kenya and Liberia and Angola and Southwest Africa and places like that.[15]

By 1964, Martin Luther King Jr. had begun to rethink his position on the efficacy of non-violence in a country like South Africa. At an address in London on December 7, 1964, King compared the struggles against segregation in South Africa and the United States and suggested for the first time that nonviolence may not be a suitable tactic in the South African case.

> Clearly there is much in Mississippi and Alabama to remind South Africans of their country, yet even in Mississippi we can organize to register Negro voters, we can speak to the press, we can in short organize the people in nonviolent action. But in South Africa even the mildest form of nonviolent resistance meets with years of imprisonment, and leaders over many years have been restricted and silenced and imprisoned. We can understand, how in that situation, people felt so desperate that they turned to other methods, such as sabotage.[16]

In this landmark speech, King went on to warn of "the dangers of a race war" if the situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate. He called the United States and the United Kingdom to accept a "unique responsibility" which came with an opportunity to join African nations "in the one form of nonviolent action that could bring freedom and justice to South Africa ... in a massive movement for economic

sanctions."[17] Like Malcolm X, he argued that the West was the key to overthrowing apartheid.

> If the U.K. and the U.S. decided tomorrow morning not to buy South African goods, not to buy S.A. gold, to put an embargo on oil; if our investors and capitalists would withdraw their support for racial tyranny, then apartheid would be brought to an end.[18]

King also served notice to the American Government that the Civil Rights Movement was flexing its muscles in the foreign policy arena. Referring to the ANLCA conference of 1964, King said: "Though we in the civil rights movement still have a long and difficult struggle in our own country, ... we are recognizing our power as voters; already we have made our feelings clear to the president; increasingly we intend to influence American policy in the U.N. and towards South Africa."

On December 10, 1964 King received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway. In a moving speech that recounted the struggles of black people for freedom, King called Albert Luthuli one of the "pilots" of the freedom movement and South Africa the "most brutal expression of man's inhumanity to man."

> So you honor the dedicated pilots of our struggle who have sat at the controls as the freedom movement soared into orbit. You honor, once again, Chief (Albert) Luthuli of South Africa, whose struggles with and for his people, are still met with the most brutal expression of man's inhumanity to man.[19]

On December 10, 1965, Martin Luther King Jr. took time off from the civil rights drive in Alabama to give a major address on Africa at a Human Rights Day rally

in New York City. In a letter inviting the press to the rally, the ACOA said: "Dr. Martin Luther King will be the principal speaker at a benefit Rally for the South African political prisoners on Human Rights Day, Dec. 10. It will be Dr. King's first major speech on Africa."[20] The rally also featured Ambassador Achkbar Marof of Guinea, Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, and Robert Resha, an exiled South African leader. During his keynote address titled "Let My People Go" in honor of ANC President Albert Luthuli, King said, "The struggle for freedom forms one long front crossing oceans and mountains. The brotherhood of man is not confined within a narrow, limited circle of select people." Sounding like Malcolm X, King invoked the "rape of Africa" during the slave trade: "We have an obligation of atonement that is not canceled by the passage of time" he said, calling on the West to atone by joining an international sanctions movement:

> To list the extensive economic relations of the great powers with South Africa is to suggest a potent nonviolent path. The international potential of nonviolence has never been employed. Nonviolence has been practiced within national borders in India and the United States and in regions of Africa with spectacular success. The time has come to fully utilize nonviolence through a massive international boycott which would involve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany and Japan. Millions of people can personally give expression to their abhorrence of the world's worst racism through such a far-flung boycott.[21]

King also argued that there was a "special relationship" between the black Americans and Africa. He said that the "civil rights movement in the United States has derived immense inspiration from the successful struggles of those Africans who have attained freedom in their own nations. The fact that black men govern states, are

building democratic institutions, sit in world tribunals, and participate in global decision-making gives every Negro a needed sense of dignity."

This speech by King was hailed as the most articulate explication of the link between the civil rights movement and the international anti-apartheid movement. King's new radicalism was noted by the ACOA, which praised him for raising thousands of dollars for the prisoners in South Africa, but noted that "King did not, as he had done in London, exhort South Africans to resist apartheid nonviolently." [22]

King's new radicalism dovetailed with the frustration of the student movement and the radicalization of youths in the northern ghettos. The SCLC's initial attempt to use nonviolent direct action tactics in a northern city, Chicago, had been met with violent unrest and an upsurge in racism worthy of Mississippi, and younger, more militant African Americans began to assert that their struggle was connected to that of other people of African descent around the world.

Among the younger generation of SNCC activists associated with Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture) there was a definite turn toward Black Nationalism and Pan Africanism. This turn toward "Black Power" or militant black nationalism emerged in the mid-sixties when student activists became disillusioned with the pace of change and adopted more radical tactics. This evolution of SNCC is evident in the election of Stokely Carmichael as chairman in 1966. South Africa was very much on the agenda of the students. On 29 March 1966, for instance, SNCC workers held a sit-

in at the South African Embassy in Washington shouting slogans like "Death to Apartheid." Later SNCC and CORE activists took over the office of the US delegation to the United Nations in New York. The group's leader, Stokely Carmichael, called on the United States to comply with the General Assembly's anti-apartheid resolutions, impose full economic sanctions, sever diplomatic ties and support the black liberation movement in South Africa.[23]

This new perspective was outlined in Black Power conferences held in 1966 (Washington DC.), 1967 (Newark, NJ.), 1968 (Philadelphia, Pa.) and an international meeting held in Bermuda in 1969. These conferences outlined a new ideology of Black Nationalism or "black power" that led to the rejection of integration, the expulsion of whites and the adoption of a self-determination strategy. A 1966 SNCC position paper, for instance, called for an "all Black project" and "coalition politics." This strategy was designed to ensure that Black communities were first organized internally before joining forces with other progressive forces in the society. Like Malcolm X's OAAU, SNCC leaders argued (in the Black Power period) that it was not racist to exclude whites if one were willing to work with them in egalitarian coalitions.

> If we are to proceed toward true liberation, we must cut ourselves off from white people. We must form our own institutions, credit unions, co-ops, political parties, write our own histories.[24]

The articulation of the Black Power position was to have a significant impact on the development of the liberation struggle in the United States. Black Power advocates articulated a sophisticated political strategy based on the "interest group" or

"ethnic group" model of U.S. politics. This Black Power strategy called for Black control of institutions that serve the community. In Black Power The Politics of Liberation Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton argued:

> Black Power means, for example, that in Lowndes County, Alabama, a black sheriff can end police brutality. A black tax assessor and tax collector and county board of revenue can lay, collect, and channel tax monies for the building of better roads and schools serving black people. In areas such as Lowndes, where Black people have a majority, they will attempt to use power to gain control. This is what they seek, control. When Black people lack a majority, Black Power means proper representation and sharing of control.[25]

This strategy of Black power had a dramatic impact on black politics in the 1970s. It led to the election of hundreds of city, state and national representatives. In the anti-apartheid movement it also led to the confrontations between Black militants and white liberals over strategy and representation of Blacks in leadership positions. According to the ACOA's George Houser:

> The period of focus on southern Africa coincided with a new situation in the civil rights movement had in the development of black consciousness among the more active elements in the black community. The mood in the black community made it increasingly difficult for white or interracial organizations to work closely with black organizations."[26]

This emergence of "black consciousness" was closely related to black America's new internationalism. By 1966, for instance, SNCC had declared itself an anti-imperialist organization and created an international affairs division with James Forman as the director.[27] In June 1967 Forman sponsored another resolution that urged SNCC to declare itself a "human rights organization working for the liberation not

only of black people in the United States but of all oppressed peoples, especially those in Africa, Asia and Latin America." According to Forman: "To have achieved the realization that our fight was against racism, capitalism and imperialism represented a major victory in itself."

As director of international affairs, Forman focused on forging stronger ties between African liberation movements and the freedom struggle in the United States. On his first trip back to Africa after the 1964 SNCC trip sponsored by Harry Belafonte, Forman revisits the issue of skilled black Americans emigrating to the newly independent African countries to contribute to their development. En-route to a United Nations Seminar on Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania scheduled for July 24 to August 10, 1967, Forman writes in his diary: "Should we as a colonized people remain in a sick and decaying country that is doomed for total collapse? The question is a serious one. Frankly, I say no, we should leave! We should return to Africa. We should use our skills where they are wanted."[28] The problem with this perspective, however, was that there were millions of unskilled African Americans who might not be welcome in Africa. Forman reflects on the dilemma that black leaders had faced for centuries --leave for Africa or organize the masses in America. Ever since his first visit to Africa in 1964, Forman had resolved the dilemma by considering his work with SNCC and the movement as a training ground for his eventual emigration. "My work with SNCC had been predicated on many assumptions, but one of them has been the necessity for some of us to stay in the United States and struggle from within. I elected to do this after serious self-

examination covering a period of more than four years, during which time I tried to prepare myself for the day when I would help join the African and Afro-American struggle. The indivisible link had always been there, but at this time in my life I have the opportunity to forge stronger links."[29]

Forman and Howard Moore Jr., SNCC's legal advisor, had been invited by the United Nations to present SNCC's views on the international anti-apartheid movement. Although SNCC had no illusions about the ability of the United Nations to bring freedom to Africans and African Americans, Forman argued that: "like the late Malcolm X, we believed that pressure upon the United Nations could be useful nevertheless in shaping public opinion." Forman and Moore (helped by St. Clair Drake) prepared a SNCC position paper titled "The Indivisible Struggle Against Racism, Colonialism and Apartheid." Forman says they strove to make the paper as political as possible, "to show the direct connection between American oppression of blacks in Africa and of blacks in the United States."[30] When Farmer and Moore arrived in Dar es Salaam, they were conscious of their position as representatives of black America. The last black American to visit had been James Farmer of CORE in 1965. Farmer had insulted the Tanzanians by arriving in Zanzibar and immediately entering a US Embassy limousine instead of one provided by the Tanzanian government. Farmer's behavior was not surprising, however, because his trip had been sponsored by the State Department and the ANLCA and as it turned out later, the CIA. As a result of Farmer's insensitivity, the SNCC representatives found themselves having to deflect negative feelings about "Negroes" by urging the Africans not to

assume every black American was a friend. They argued that they should be judged by their actions alone. Nevertheless Forman considered Dar es Salaam "the most beautiful city I have ever seen and the island off its shore ... the closest thing to paradise on earth." Just one year before Forman's visit Tanzania had resolved to develop a system of African Socialism through collectivization and nationalization of key industries. Discussion of the Arusha Declaration deeply influenced the SNCC representatives. According to Forman: "The freedom with which people talked of socialism, armed struggle, the liberation of Africa, was a liberation itself for Howard and me, coming as we did from the repressive atmosphere of the United States. ... As we listened and exchanged ideas I could feel a growing passion for revolutionary ideas." Thus like Garvey, Robeson, Du Bois, King and Malcolm, Forman was transformed and radicalized by his visit to Africa and his discussions with African nationalists.

In his historic address to the UN Seminar on Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa in Lusaka, Zambia on 27 July 1967, Forman put aside his prepared statement to address the urban rebellions that had erupted in Newark, Detroit and Springfield. Pointing out that the disturbances in American cities were not "riots" but "rebellions against forced enslavement of a people who had been wrenched from the African continent," Forman called on the participants of the seminar to support the cause of black freedom in the United States. He urged them to support SNCC Chairman H. Rap Brown, a symbol of resistance in the summer of 1967 who

had been singled out as a scapegoat by the US Government. Returning to his prepared remarks, Forman said:

> We see the worldwide fight against racism as indivisible. Southern Africa, as a stronghold of the Herrenvolk mentality has high priority in the struggle. To win the battle there is to hasten the victory in the U.S.A. SNCC is dedicated to a joint struggle of all who fight for Human Rights in Africa and in the USA. We also come to assert that we consider ourselves and other black people in the United States a colonized people; a colony within the United States in many ways similar to colonies outside the boundaries of the United States and other European nations. ... We have accepted our responsibility for the attack on the American front.[31]

In its statement and position in general SNCC was in line with the OAU Liberation Committee's multi-pronged strategy of internal armed struggle and external sanctions. Forman reiterated that his organization supported the campaign for international sanctions against Rhodesia; the condemnation of Portuguese colonialism; independence for South West Africa; and armed struggle in southern Africa.

Although SNCC's presentation at the UN seminar on apartheid was a milestone in the anti-apartheid struggle, the organization itself was in decline. Its anti-imperialist stance aggravated relations between SNCC activists and white and Jewish liberals who were traditional allies of the civil rights movement. Relations with whites deteriorated further after SNCC published a pamphlet that was anti-Israel. The pamphlet included a series of articles and cartoons that indicated support for the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The most lasting impact of this anti-imperialism, however, was to strengthen the ties between African liberation movements and the black freedom movement in the United States.

In an essay published in *The Black Scholar* in 1969, Stokely Carmichael, the former leader of SNCC and the Black Panther Party, argued that "the only position for Black men is Pan Africanism." Invoking Malcolm X, he advocated a program that included seeking a "land base" in Africa and teaching Black people everywhere that they are "first of all and finally Africans."[32] Like Malcolm X, Carmichael argued: "One of the most important things we must now begin to do, is to call ourselves 'African.'" He called on Black people everywhere to fight for the unification of the African continent.

> So you start in Ghana for the unification of Africa and you recognize, if you are intelligent, that South Africa is not going to be removed by talk. It is not going to be removed by talk. It is not going to be removed by Britain, by the U.N., or by anybody. Nor is it going to be removed by a handful of guerrillas. It is only going to be removed by the entire black world standing up against it, because when in fact the final confrontation over South Africa for example takes place, the black man will see that he is not just fighting whites in South Africa. He is fighting all of Europe, because all of Europe is going to actively defend South Africa.[33]

In 1969, Camichael's focus on a "land base" and Pan Africanism led him to emigrate to Guinea where he became Kwame Nkrumah's personal secretary and an organizer for the All African People's Revolutionary Party. Like many leaders in the African diaspora, Carmichael concluded that: "Real black power requires a land base. The only place where we have a material base for power is in Africa."

Carmichael's emigration to Guinea disappointed activists but it was symptomatic of the despair black activists felt after the assassination of Malcolm in

1965, Martin in 1968 and Robert Kennedy in '68. Former SNCC worker Cleveland Sellers, for instance, said in a recent interview with Charlie Cobb of *Africa News Service* that he fought with Carmichael about going back to Africa. "I thought we needed someone here to talk about the connectedness. But SNCC was dying. The FBI was tracking him everywhere ad we had all gone ten years with no break." Courtland Cox argued that after Carmicheal's trip to Africa "he realized that a lot of forces you were up against were global. And being in Africa with Nkrumah and Sekou Toure allowed him to function at that level."[34]

[1]"An Appeal to African Heads of State," Malcolm X Speaks 75-76.

[2]The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Grove Press, 1964) 343-364.

[3]Malcolm X Speaks, "An Appeal to African Heads of State," 75-76.

[4]See Gerald Horne, *Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-56* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988) and Charles Martin, "Internationalizing the American Dilemma: The Civil Rights Congress and the 1951 Genocide Petition tot he United Nations ," Journal of American Ethnic Studies Summer 1997 v. 16 #4 p. 35-50

[5]From interview, Station WBAI-FM, January 28, 1965. In Malcolm X Speaks, 218.

[6]Malcolm X Speaks, 99.

[7] Harry Hampton and Steve Fayer. Voices of Freedom An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement From the 1950s Through the 1980s. (New York: Bantam Books, 1990) 252-256

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[9]Malcolm X, 354.

[10]Malcolm X "Basic Unity Program," OAAU, in William Van Deburg. Black Nationalism from Marcus Garvey to Louis Farrakhan. (New York: NYU Press, 1997) 108.

[11]Unity Program, 115.

[12]Harry Hampton and Steve Fayer. Voices of Freedom An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement From the 1950s Through the 1980s. (New York: Bantam Books, 1990) 204.

[13] Hampton, Voice of Freedom, pp. 206-207

[14]Malcolm X Speaks, 106.

[15]Voices of Freedom, 220.

[16]Address by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in London, 7 December 1964. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00545.

[17]King, London speech, ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00546

[18]King, London speech, ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00546

[19]Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10 1964)

[20]"Note to Editors" December 6, 1965. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00547.

[21]Martin Luther King Jr. "Let My People Go," Speech at Human Rights Day rally, December 10, 1965. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00553.

[22]"Human Rights Day in new York," ACOA press release. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00555.

[23]*New York Times* 23 July 1966 p. 4.

[24]Van Deburg, 122.

[25]Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton. Black Power The Politics of Liberation. (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) 46.

[26]George Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge: The Story of the American Committee on Africa," ISSUE Vol.. Vi 2/3, 1976. 22.

[27]James Forman. The Making of Black Revolutionaries. (Washington D.C.: Open Hand, 1985.) pg. 480.

[28]Forman, 481.

[29]Forman, 482.

[30]Forman, 483

[31]Forman, 489

[32]Van Deburg, 209

[33]Van Deburg

[34]Charlie Cobb. "From Stokely Carmichael to Kwame Ture," *African News Online* April 1996.

CHAPTER 6

"IT'S NATION TIME":

PAN AFRICANISM AND AFRICAN LIBERATION

> Basically when we speak of Pan African Nationalism, we mean simply the knowledge that we are an African people, despite our slavery of colonization by Europeans or dispersal throughout the countries of the world. *Pan Africanism is thus the global expression of Black Nationalism.* ...All black people are Africans, and that as Africans, we are bound together Racially, Historically, Culturally, Politically and Emotionally.
>
> Ideological Statement of the Congress
> of African Peoples, September 1970

During the 1970s, the anti-apartheid movement was rejuvenated by what Ronald Walters calls the "new" or "modern" Pan Africanist movements that emerged in the Diaspora (Walters, 1993). Walters argues that the independence of African countries led to a reevaluation of blackness in the United States. African American youth began to explore their cultural heritage in Africa and to adopt a Black/Pan African identity. This new generation was influenced by the African consciousness of Malcolm X and the Black Power movement. Malcolm X had visited many independent African states where he became the first African American to address African heads of state at an Organization of African Unity meeting.[1] He called on Africans to take on the African American cause at the United Nations and told black Americans to join Africans in their fight for freedom. By 1967, SNCC and the Black

Panthers had become anti-imperialist and Third Worldist.[2] Stokely Carmichael, for instance, emphasized the African dimension of SNCC and defined the Black Power movement as a part of the Pan African struggle for liberation. Bob Moses attended OAU meetings in 1965 and 1966. Cleveland Sellers also attended OAU meetings and was invited to organize the Sixth Pan African Congress.[3]

In the academic arena, the turn to Black Power led to a confrontation with liberal white-led organizations like the African Studies Association. In 1969 Black activists, scholars and students disrupted sessions at the ASA convention to underscore their demand for proper representation on the association's board. The group also wanted the ASA to take a more public and radical stand on apartheid and the situation in southern Africa. When the ASA rejected their demands, the Black Africanists formed a separate organization called the African Heritage Studies Association.[4] Led by John Henrik Clarke, the AHSA adopted a radical, anti-apartheid and national liberation struggle position from the outset.

Thus Africans and African Americans were reestablishing radical ties that had been severed by anti-communism in the United States. The theories and activities of African revolutionaries like Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Agostino Neto, Nelson Mandela and Eduardo Mondlane heavily influenced African American activists (Walters, 1993). In 1962 Amilcar Cabral addressed the United Nations and then met with African Americans where he discussed his ideas on revolutionary nationalism. Julius Nyerere's African Socialism was also a major influence leading to support for

the armed struggle in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique; the study of Kiswahili by African Americans and the formation of Maulana Karenga's Kwanzaa movement also reflected this trend (Walters, 1993).

In September 1970 Imamu Amiri Baraka convened the Congress of African Peoples which he linked to the long tradition of Pan African congresses going back to the London conference of 1900.[5] Baraka was one of the new black nationalists who were redefining Black identity in the Diaspora. As one of the founders of the Black Arts Movement, Baraka was a product of the 1970s Black Nationalism when playwrights, novelists, songwriters and artists reflected the rediscovery of Africa and radical political critique.[6] The Congress of African Peoples was an expression of this Pan African sensibility in the Diaspora. It included a remarkably diverse group of African American radicals, liberals and nationalists. Among the speakers were Guinea's Ambassador to the United Nations El Hajj Aboulaye Toure, Whitney Young, Louis Farrakhan, Julian Bond, Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary, Breadbasket's Rev. Jesse Jackson, Imari Obadele from the Republic of New Africa, Ralph Abernathy of SCLC and Kenneth Gibson newly elected mayor of Newark (Baraka, .

The theme of the congress was "Unity Without Uniformity" bringing together activists and legislators of disparate ideological orientations. The participants were divided into eleven workshops discussing technology, economics, education, communications and politics. An "ideological statement" adopted by the delegates on 6 September asserted that "All black people are Africans, and that as Africans, we are

bound together Racially, Historically, Culturally, Politically and Emotionally." The statement focused on the need to develop a program to ensure unified action in the Pan African world. To achieve this unity the ideological statement outlined the "Four Ends of Black Power": (1) self-determination and the development of alternative political and economic institutions; (2) self-sufficiency through cooperative economics (UJAMAA); (3) self-respect by building a global revolutionary culture and; (4) and acceptance of the need for self-defense.[7]

Thus the CAP manifested a new kind of Diasporic Pan Africanism that was nationalist rather than the traditional liberal/reformist posture that had been adopted by the four earlier congresses organized by Du Bois. As Baraka indicated in his introduction to the proceedings, the coordinating committee of CAP wanted to move beyond the "radical" perspectives influenced by Marxism in search of an African perspective influenced by Julius Nyerere's theory of UJAMAA, a form of cooperative economics based on the traditional of collective ownership and work patterns of some African ethnic groups.

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This radicalization of black politics was fueled by the right turn in national politics that had led to the election of Richard Nixon on an anti-civil rights, anti-welfare, "law and order" platform that used code words to delineate its anti-black message. Nixon had mastered the "white backlash" politics perfected during George Wallace's campaigns for governor of Alabama in the 1960s. Backlash politics had

elected Ronald Reagan Governor of California in 1966 partly because of his strong reaction to the Watts rebellion of 1965 and his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 1966, Congress rejected a civil rights bill for the first time in years. The GOP had displaced forty-seven Democrats in the House and three in the Senate. In 1967, the House refused to seat Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. for payroll irregularities that his colleagues got away with regularly (similar allegations would lead to the demise of Charles Diggs in the late-1970s).

Nixon rode the backlash into the White House in 1968. He was openly against desegregation of housing and schools and promised to oppose integration and appoint conservatives to the Supreme Court. During his presidency, Nixon exploited white resentment at the gains of the civil rights years and fears of black rebellion. As he had promised, he sought to stop school busing; nominated conservatives to the Supreme Court; lobbied against fair housing and the renewal of the Voting Rights Act; slashed funds for anti-poverty programs; and fired officials who were pro-integration. The hard line against African American representatives was demonstrated in December 1969 when President Nixon refused to meet with members of the Congressional Black Caucus after the slaying of Chicago Black Panther Party leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark.[8]

In retaliation, Black Caucus members boycotted the president's State of the Union address in January 1971. They finally met with the president in March. By then, the relationship between the Black Caucus and the Nixon administration had deteriorated beyond repair.

It is in the area of foreign relations, however, that Nixon's support for white supremacy was most evident. Secret documents discovered in 1975 show that the Nixon administration reviewed its southern Africa policy and concluded that "the whites are here (southern Africa) to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."[9] The NSC review produced National Security Memorandum 39 (1969) a historically significant document that is critical for understanding US policies toward southern Africa. On April 10, while Diggs's hearing was still in progress, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote to the secretary of defense and the director of the CIA informing them that the president had ordered a "comprehensive review of US policy toward southern Africa."[10] The plan was to consider background and future of area; alternative views of US interest; and strategies and policy options available to the United States. On 15 August 1969, the NSC released the report "in response to NSSM 39." The NSC report argued that "Racial oppression by minority regimes and black African opposition to it" posed two problems for US interests in the area: (1) US interests in the white states affected its credibility in Africa; and (2) the prospect of increased violence, "growing out of black insurgency," could jeopardize US interests. The document shows the difficulty the US government had in balancing its desire to continue working with the white regimes in southern Africa while maintaining relations with the rest of the continent. The recommendation was that the US "balance its economic, scientific, and strategic interests in the white states with the political interests dissociating the US from white regimes and their repressive racial policies."[11] Although the NSC agreed that US

interests in the region were not vital, they recognized that the government wanted to keep the Soviet Union and China from gaining influence with African states. They made five policy recommendations for consideration by Nixon and Kissinger. Cohen and El-Khawas conclude:

> What finally is glaringly obvious throughout NSSM 39 is the complete lack of awareness or concern over the aspirations or fate of the nonwhite people in southern Africa. Although "stability" very profitably serves the interests of US corporations, the impact of the exploitative colonial and apartheid systems on Africans' experience does not fall within the NSC's "framework of analysis."[12]

Cohen and El-Khawas argue that the main outlines of Nixon's policy toward white supremacist regimes in southern Africa were formulated at a meeting to discuss NSSM 39's recommendations. They contend that Nixon settled on option two, which stated that:

> The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our policies toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial assistance to black states help draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change.[13]

This option was similar to Kissinger's theory that the African liberation movements were communist "stooges" because of their reliance on weapons from China, Cuba and the Soviet Union. As a result, the Nixon-Kissinger policy toward southern Africa was based on a condemnation of apartheid in international forums while continuing to build economic and military ties with colonial powers like

Portugal and with white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. This approach was evident in President Nixon's decision to keep open a consulate in Salisbury despite the sanctions in place against the renegade regime of Ian Smith.

By 1970, it had become clear that the Nixon administration would maintain the status quo in southern Africa. In line with NSSM 39's recommendations, Nixon relaxed sanctions against Rhodesia and approved legislation allowing the importation of Rhodesian chrome. This measure violated the UN call for sanctions against the UDI regime and brought the regime under fire from both African Americans and African states. Nixon also continued to provide military assistance to Portugal despite African opposition based on the assumption that US aid would release other Portuguese resources for use against liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique.[14] They also argued that Portugal had used NATO equipment to attack civilians in southern Africa. The Africans argued that the US had sacrificed the principle of self-determination for the sake of maintaining its rights to the Azores base, which was no longer necessary for refueling airplanes.

At the United Nations, the US shifted to openly supporting South Africa in Security Council deliberations. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, the US frequently abstained on votes about colonial issues. After 1969, however, the US often aligned itself with South Africa and Portugal in votes against decolonization. On November 22, 1969, for instance, the *New York Times* reported that the United States had voted against a resolution condemning apartheid "for the first time in years."[15] In a change of

rhetoric and policy the US suddenly insisted that South Africa was not a threat to international peace and did not warrant sanctions. In the 1972 General Assembly the US voted negatively on seven out of eight resolutions on southern Africa. On 30 October 1974 the US, France and Britain vetoed a Security Council resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations. A month later the US cast the only vote against a more stringent arms embargo.

The Congressional Black Caucus and Apartheid

Despite the right turn in national politics, the legal victories of the civil rights movement directly benefited the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to the election of hundreds of African American officials at city, state and national levels who became key allies of the anti-apartheid movement by giving activists access to the decision-makers at the local and federal levels.[16] Charles C. Diggs, D-Michigan, was first elected to Congress in 1954 and made apartheid one of his top policy concerns from the outset. He was the founding chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, and became the first black chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1969. Diggs and the Black Caucus led many congressional inquiries into U.S. southern Africa policy that gave anti-apartheid activists the opportunity to address Congress on the issue. Diggs served on the Foreign Relations Committee for over 20 years where he became the expert on Africa and established relations with the leaders of newly independent African states. Nicknamed "Mr. Africa" by colleagues, Diggs became apartheid's most powerful opponent in the

US Congress. *Reuters* correspondent Raymond Hearst wrote that Diggs had turned his position in the FRC into "the main channel for anti-apartheid pressures."

Charles C. Diggs Jr. was born in 1922 in Detroit to a wealthy and politically powerful family. His father was a mortician and real estate developer who operated the House of Diggs. In 1936, Charles Diggs Sr. became Michigan's first black state senator after a grassroots campaign that registered more than 12,000 new black voters for the Democratic Party. Diggs Jr. attended the University of Michigan and Fisk University and served in the Army Air Forces during the second world war. After the war, he attended Wayne State University and Detroit College of Law before following his father into business and politics. In 1951, he was elected to his father's old seat in the Michigan State Senate serving till 1954 when he won the first of thirteen terms as the representative of Michigan's 13th District in Congress. In 1955, Diggs was assigned to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs where he became a leading spokesman for civil rights and desegregation of schools and public transport facilities. Diggs also served on the Foreign Affairs Committee where he became an authority on Africa and an advocate for aid to the emerging nations. By 1969, he had risen to the chairmanship of the House Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Africa.

One of Digg's tactics was to challenge South Africa's racist policies by visiting the country himself. On 5 August 1969 a cabinet meeting chaired by the prime minister of South Africa threatened to bar an official delegation of the House Subcommittee on Africa unless two black delegates, Diggs and Reid, agree to do

nothing, by word or deed, to interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa. Diggs and Reid were also prohibited from addressing any public meeting. The white members of the delegation, on the other hand, Congressmen Burke of Florida and Wolff of New York were given unrestricted visas. In an address to Congress, Diggs said: "I find it deplorable that officials at the highest level of government should limit our freedom on the unfounded belief that the mission's intent is to interfere in the internal affairs of their country."[17] Given the restrictions, Diggs and the delegation decided to skip South Africa and South West Africa on their three-week tour that included Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi and Tanzania. The purpose of the visit was (1) to get firsthand information on economic development and future prospects in black-ruled countries; and (2) to survey the prospects for peace in white-minority ruled countries; (3) hold discussion with leaders of the freedom movements in the region; and (4) evaluate the role of US aid programs, information services and Peace Corps. programs.

In a report on the mission, Diggs and Wolff argued for a new US policy on southern Africa that recognized the legitimacy of the African liberation movements saying, "time and history is on the side of the revolutionary forces." They argued that US self-interest in South Africa "is dramatized by the presence in our midst of over 22 million black citizens who are increasingly identifying with their cultural heritage and who are on the threshold of linking up with the goals of African liberation movements."[18] The representatives argued that the internationalization of the struggle of African Americans would lead to support from their traditional allies in the labor

movement, on the campuses, among the churches, and other liberal elements. This could give impetus to Africanists, foreign policy organizations and former Peace Corps. volunteers. "The activation of this kind of constituency is much nearer than many policy-makers realize."

This prediction proved true at least in the case of church support for the anti-apartheid cause. On May 24 clergy and students had protested at a hearing in New York City where church groups were meeting with bank executives from Chase Manhattan, First National Bank and Morgan Guarantee Trust to discuss divestment.[19] As a result of the meeting, the US Pentecostal Episcopal Church notified the three banks that it would withdraw $2 million dollars if they continued to give South Africa loans as members of a 106-bank consortium. The decision was seen as an "historic moment in the awakening of Christian conscience against apartheid."[20] On 2 July the *Times* again reported that the United Church of Christ's General Synod had recommended that the church withdraw finds form any US company doing business with South Africa. The UCC also agreed to fund a newly created Committee for Racial Justice with $500,000 in 1970 and $600,000 in 1971. The 15-member committee was made up of black churchmen and had decision making powers in the disbursement of funds. The real coup for anti-apartheid forces came in 4 September 1970, however, when the World Council of Churches announced that it would give $200,000 to guerrilla movements in southern Africa.[21] Prime Minister John Vorster was shocked. South African bishops threatened to withdraw from the WCC. Even Progressive Party "liberal" Helen Suzman said the WCC action was "ill advised."

Towards A Black Foreign Policy Agenda

On 31 January 1972, the Congressional Black Caucus, other black elected officials and civil rights leaders announced plans to hold the first National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana between March 10-12.[22] The idea for the convention had first been broached at the Congress of African Peoples conference in Atlanta in 1970 that had been attended by over 2000 black people of different ideological perspectives. CBC chairman Diggs said the convention was expecting 4,000 delegates "to identify and ratify a national black political agenda for 1972 and beyond." Diggs, Mayor Hatcher of Gary, and Imamu Amiri Baraka of the Congress of African People were elected co-chairmen of the convention. The convention's motto was "Unity Without Uniformity" and its purpose was to debate and ratify the National Black Political Agenda. The Agenda decried US cities as "crime haunted dying grounds" where youth and adults alike faced "permanent unemployment." The courts were biased and the schools unable or unwilling to educate black children. Arguing that the Democratic Party had failed to deliver its promise to its black constituency, the Agenda called for the establishment of an independent black politics including: black congressional representation in proportion to the size of the black community; a bill of rights for black prisoners; community control of schools in black neighborhoods; a system of national health insurance covering individuals "from birth to death"; a guaranteed minimum annual income; and the elimination of capital punishment.[23]

Apartheid featured prominently among the resolutions but was upstaged in media reports by a resolution supporting the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. A survey of the participants showed however that Pan Africanist sentiment was strong.[24] The survey showed that respondents were anxious to maintain contact with other black communities around the world. They considered the adoption of the black agenda as the most important step taken by the delegates.

The condemnation of Israel as an expansionist nation, however, became a major issue because of the long-standing alliance between Jews and Blacks in the Democratic Party. Many Black elected officials and organizations that accepted funds from Jewish agencies found it difficult to support a hard line on Israel. On May 16 the strain in the Black Agenda alliance began to show as the NAACP announced that it was withdrawing its association with the National Black Political Convention "because of difference in ideology."[25] A press release and letter from NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins to convention co-chairmen Rep. Diggs, Mayor Hatcher and Amiri Baraka stressed that the NACCP could not support "separatist" positions endorsed by the convention and that it found the resolutions on Israel and busing "repugnant to basic principles." Baraka denounced the withdrawal as an "irresponsible act" and said he had written to Roy Wilkins asking him to reconsider. The *Times* also reported that sources close to Diggs had said that the Israel and busing planks adopted at Gary had already been amended to make them more acceptable to elected officials and national organizations. On May 19, the convention released the National Black Agenda and was addressed by representatives of the three candidates

for president. On June 1, however, the Congressional Black Caucus released its own Black Bill of Rights that was presented as an amendment to the Black Agenda.[26] The main difference between the two agendas was that the Bill of Rights did not mention the state of Israel. This disagreement over foreign policy weakened the impact of the Black Agenda on the national level where candidates for the presidency and media were able to downplay its other demands.

On 26 May the Congressional Black Caucus sponsored the "African-American National Conference on Africa" that bought together activists, legislators and African diplomats.[27] Speakers at the conference recommended that black Americans and Africans form an alliance to fight white supremacist regimes in southern Africa and that volunteers be organized to join African liberation movements. They called for a boycott of companies doing business in South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia and urged all black athletes, singers and entertainers not to perform in the region. The conference also urged the US government to stop providing aid to the white-minority regimes and instead increase assistance to newly independent African countries. Speakers included E. Zhuwrara of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and Owusu Sadauki of Malcolm X Liberation University.

This conference was followed by a massive demonstration through the streets of Washington DC on 27 May to protest the treatment of black South Africans and US relations with South Africa.[28] Organized by the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, the march was a spectacular demonstration of the strong anti-apartheid

and Pan African consciousness in the black community. Estimates of marchers range from 8-10,000 (New York Times), to 30,000 (Sadauki, interview with author). Organizers said the purpose of the march was to emphasize the widespread opposition to apartheid among black Americans, to protest the growth of economic political and military contacts between South Africa and the United States and to call for the withdrawal of US corporations from South Africa.

The demonstrators marched to the South African Embassy where speakers read out a list of charges against countries considered responsible for oppressing black people in Africa. Rev. Doug Moore of the Black United Front said South Africa was guilty of war crimes against Africans and was plotting to usurp more of Africa's land and mineral wealth. He condemned West Germany and Israel for helping South Africa develop nuclear weapons. The marchers then proceeded to the Washington Monument where 15 former State Department officials read a statement denouncing Nixon for his pro-apartheid policies. A joint statement by two under secretaries of state and twelve ambassadors of the Kennedy-Johnson era said increased contacts between the United States officials and the South African government created a sense of collaboration and was an obstacle to the cause of African independence.

The ALD marches were a key expression of this new Pan African sensibility in the Diaspora during the 1970s but the celebration of African Liberation Day was initiated at the Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana, in 1958 when eight heads of state declared April 15 "Africa Liberation Day" and called on

Africans and people of African descent around the world to set aside the day for rededication to the anti-colonial and ant-apartheid struggles in Africa. Between 1959 and 1963, ALD was celebrated in South Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Britain, China the United States and the Soviet Union. In the United States, several nationalists groups in Harlem and the ACOA regularly held separate Africa Liberation Day celebrations throughout the late 1950s and 1960s (see chapter two). After the formation of the Organization of African Unity on 25 May 1963, ALD commemorations were moved to that date. In the United States, it is only in the 1970s that ALD becomes a "national" holiday for the anti-apartheid community. By this time, the liberation struggles were raging throughout southern Africa and black consciousness pervaded the African American community.

During the 1970s, some of the largest ALD demonstrations were coordinated by the African Liberation Day Steering Committee and organized by Howard Fuller (Owusu Sadauki), head of the Malcolm X Liberation University in Greensboro, North Carolina and others, in 1971. According to Fuller, he and other nationalists created the committee to organize events to commemorate May 25 of each year as Africa Liberation Day.[29] Fuller had visited Dar-es-Salaam in 1970 as the head of Malcolm X University where he met leaders of the liberation movements in southern Africa and was invited to visit liberated zones in Mozambique by leaders of FRELIMO, a guerrilla movement fighting against Portuguese colonialism. After spending a month touring the liberated areas in Mozambique, Fuller returned to Tanzania where he was advised by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere that the best place for him to fight for African

liberation was in the United States. After returning from southern Africa, Fuller was determined to raise the consciousness of black Americans. He and associates Abdul Alkalimat and Amiri Baraka decided to focus on Africa Liberation Day celebrations as an ongoing project of education.[30]

In 1972, a steering committee made up of Sadauki, Alkalimat, Baraka and representatives of 38 other black organizations planned Africa Liberation Day marches across the nation. ALSC documents claim that over 65,000 people marched in demonstrations in cities like Washington, New York and San Francisco. Marches were also held in the Caribbean and Toronto, Canada. "These marches were the largest organized by black people since the days of Marcus Garvey," Abe Ford of the Boston ALSC wrote in a press statement.[31] The Washington march drew thousands of people from around the northeast. Ford says, for instance, that the Boston area sent ten busloads of demonstrators to DC.

In June 1972, the National African Liberation Support Committee was formed to plan the next Africa Liberation Day celebrations. The committee was composed of representatives of 22 state chapters. The organization announced that it was decentralizing in order to build a broad base among black people throughout the country. The plan was to hold 22 simultaneous demonstrations in black communities in cities like San Francisco, New Haven, Las Vegas, Washington, New York, Newark, Raleigh, and Atlanta. "In addition it has been decided that these demonstrations should be held within the African communities, directed at black people rather than at white

people." The theme for 1973 was "There is no peace without honor --war continues on the African continent and against African people in the U.S.A." The ALSC also launched a United African Appeal for funds to support liberation movements. Funds raised through this campaign were to be sent to PAIGC in Guinea Bissau, FRELIMO in Mozambique, UNITA in Angola, and ZANU-ZAPU in Zimbabwe.

The growing polarization in the movement was demonstrated in September when members of the Congressional Black Caucus and the NAACP boycotted the second International Congress of African People.[32] On September 4, the *New York Times* reported that 2,500 attending the Congress had cheered Amiri Baraka's call for a global political alliance for the liberation of black people. Baraka had called for a strong national black political party that could join similar parties around the world in an effort to oppose white supremacy and "balkanization." Baraka said the purpose of the conference was to plan for strong black parties that put candidates in office, make alliances and "fight wars where necessary." Speakers at the four-day congress included Howard Fuller (Owusu Sadauki) of Malcolm X University, Roy Innis of the CORE, I. Sukumu of the National Involvement Association, J. Waller of the Pan African National Organization, author C.L.R. James and several African political leaders.

By the time the Sixth Pan African Conference was held in Dar es Salaam in 1974 the political scenery in both Africa and the diaspora had changed considerably since the fifth conference in 1945. The freedom fighters of the 1940s had fulfilled the

pledge made at the historic 1945 conference to free Africa from colonialism by armed struggle if necessary. The majority of Africans and African Americans had finally attained the franchise. Even the Portuguese Empire in southern Africa had collapsed under pressure from African guerrilla armies in Angola and Mozambique. These changes on the African continent and in the Diaspora led to the eruption of tensions over the meaning of pan-Africanism and the place of Western ideologies in the movement.

The conference was marked by controversy from the outset. Unlike the Fifth Pan African Congress held in London in 1945, African American activists were intimately involved in the organizing phase of the Six PAC. Courtland Cox was named International Secretary General of the congress and Sylvia Hill a chief organizer of the North America Secretariat. One of the major issues was the composition of national delegations because some countries in Africa and the Caribbean had attained independence and had established alliances with their former colonial powers in Europe. Given the anti-imperialist history of the Pan African movement, some in the non-governmental community began to question the direction and motivations of Sixth PAC. The question of the US delegation also came up. Would it also be a government delegation? In a letter sent to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Courtland Cox, a group of African American activists composed of Ronald Walters, Amiri Baraka, Jim Turner and Owusu Sadauki asked the Sixth PAC organizers to clarify whether the conference would include delegations from opposition political parties in independent Africa and the Caribbean, liberation

movements not recognized by the OAU and black freedom movements in the Diaspora.[33] Given these tensions, and, in particular, the announcement from Guyana that it was sending an official government delegation, C.L.R. James announced that he was boycotting the conference although the international secretariat had used his name and prestige in its campaign.

Finally Six PAC did get under way although it was marked by the ideological struggle that was raging in the Black world at the time. This was the struggle between "black nationalism" and "socialism" that had split the ALSC meeting in May. Some Black delegates from the Diaspora were opposed to the inclusion of "whites" from Cuba and North Africa. The conference was also marred by struggles between the Black Nationalist/Pan Africanist and Marxist camps.[34] Nevertheless, progressive African delegations, radical liberation movements and some members of the US delegation seized control of the conference mid-way. Both Nyerere and Sekou Toure criticized the "cultural nationalists" for "skin color" politics and essentially backed the socialists. Eventually the progressive faction won out. The General Political Statement released by Sixth PAC was generally progressive. It called for an end to colonialism and neocolonialism and defining Pan Africanism as the struggle for the establishment of African socialism.[35]

In contrast to Baraka, Bai Kisogie agreed that victory had gone to the "internationalists" but warned that it was a “phyrric" victory because this nonracial version of Pan Africanism had "emptied" the movement of all content. Indeed, he

argued that the congress had been called to "liquidate" the concept of Pan Africanism. "Sixth PAC ends up with a virtual denial of the existence of the African world," Kisogie wrote. He argued that "Sixth PAC went too far" in craving for respectability and racial transcendentalism noting that the resolution to include language against race consciousness was introduced and seconded by delegates from Libya and Algeria.[36]

These tensions over the racial content of Pan Africanism had been simmering since the series of meetings that led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. These meetings included leaders from both Black African and Arab states, making it clear that the anti-colonial movement had downplayed its racial content in the interests of continental unity. The problem with this redefinition of Pan Africanism was that Blacks in the Diaspora were still faced with majority white populations and racist political and economic systems that necessitated racial solidarity as a defense mechanism. At the First African Diaspora Studies Institute held at Howard University in 1979, for example, St. Clair Drake argued that Sixth PAC faced problems that Kwame Nkrumah never had to deal with. As Drake put it: "Delegates from the Diaspora felt that the conference had downgraded its racial responsibilities too much when it passed a resolution criticizing skin color politics and seated white delegates from Cuba."[37] Drake suggested that the movement had split into "continental Pan Africanism" which had an explicit political content, and "racial Pan Africanism" which was still dominant in the diaspora. Racial pan-Africanism found expression in cultural forums like the Festival of African and Black Art (FESTAC) held in Nigeria in 1978 where participants did not have to choose between

left wing and right-wing dictatorships on the continent. Decolonization had removed the fairly clear racial divide that had characterized the anti-colonial struggle. Drake traces the point of divergence to the First Conference of Independent African States in 1958 when more than half of the eight states represented --Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia-- did not consider themselves black; Ethiopia was also ambivalent about her blackness leaving only Ghana and Liberia as indubitably Black. This situation led to the redefinition of "African" in geographic terms as anyone, regardless of race or color, who believed in one man, one vote and political social and economic equality.[38]

Black Athletes And The Sports Boycott

Meanwhile, the international cultural and sports boycott against South Africa was gaining steam and widespread publicity in the mainstream US press. In 1964 black American athletes joined an international effort to expel South Africa from the Tokyo Olympics. The campaign began in South Africa with an organization called South African Non-Racial Committee for Open Olympic Sports (SAN-ROC) which was established in Durban, South Africa in October 1962 to seek accreditation from the International Olympic Committee as an alternative to the whites-only teams presented by the South African Olympic Committee. In 1963 SAN-ROC and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement appealed to the IOC to demand that South Africa "declare formally that it understands and submits to the spirit of the Olympic Charter before December 1963," or withdraw from the 1964 Olympics. South Africa refused and was expelled from the 1964 games in Tokyo, Japan. In retaliation, the South

African authorities arrested Dennis Brutus, leader of SAN-ROC, and jailed him in Robben Island. In 1966, Brutus left South Africa on an "exit permit" that prohibited him from returning. He played a major role in the campaign to exclude South Africa from the Mexico Olympics of 1968, which also drew the attention of African American athletes. South Africa had campaigned hard to be included in the 1968 games and even offered concessions at the IOC's meeting in Teheran in 1967. The IOC briefly accepted South Africa's concessions in February 1968 but recanted after the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, speaking for 32 African countries, called for a boycott of the Mexico Olympics if South Africa participated.

Tennis star Arthur Ashe tormented the leaders of apartheid South Africa and their supporters in the International Lawn Tennis Federation throughout the 1970s. In 1969, when Ashe was the top ranked male tennis player in the world, he and his lawyer tried to find out whether he could play in the South African Open of 1969. Soon after, Owen Williams of the South African Open in Johannesburg informed Ashe and his lawyers that any application for a visa would be turned down. Ashe made the issue public at the International Tennis Players Association meeting in London during the summer of 1969. The head of the South African Lawn Tennis Union, Alf Chambers, immediately said that Ashe had never applied to play in the South African Open of 1969 because he had not formally applied for a visa. Thus Ashe decided to utilize every possible avenue to get a visa for the South Africa Open of March 1970.

Meanwhile anti-apartheid activists were picketing the 1969 US Open because it had chosen a South African, Owen Williams, as tournament chairman. The activists, a contingent from Harlem and another from Chicago, vowed to disrupt the tournament unless Williams was dismissed. On August 29 , the *New York Times* reported that Ashe had refused to discuss boycotting the US Open with anti-apartheid activists.[39] Ashe pleaded with the activists to tone down their protest and vowed to join them if nothing had changed in nine months. According to Ashe, "I personally knew that if I wanted to maximize my chances of getting a 'yes' on the visa, I would have to get them (activists) to cool it. I pleaded with them and told them to give me 9 months, that is all I asked, and that timing was all important." With the support of Williams and Alstair Martin, president of the US Lawn Tennis Association, the South African Lawn Tennis Association approved Ashe's application to play in the South African Open of 1970.[40] The next day, July 29, Ashe announced that he planned to test South African policies toward black athletes by applying for a visa based on the invitation by the SA Lawn Tennis Association. On December 3, 1969, South Africa's Sports Minister Waring criticized the tennis association for approving Ashe's application and vowed that Ashe would never be permitted to compete in South Africa. Waring claimed that Ashe had made disparaging and hostile statements against South Africa and that his application for a visa was politically motivated. Ashe met Secretary of State Rogers on December 7 where he raised the issue of South Africa. As a result, when Ashe applied for a visa on December 15, the State Department asked the South African ambassador in Washington and its foreign minister in Pretoria to approve Ashe's visa.[41] US Ambassador Roundtree met with Prime Minister Vorster who promised to discuss the

issue at the next cabinet meeting in January. On January 22, Ashe was told by UPI in Sydney, Australia that he would probably be denied the visa because of an answer he gave to a question by an aide of the Prime Minister of Australia. On January 27, Vorster informed Roundtree that the cabinet had decided to deny Ashe a visa because of his statements against the system of apartheid. In particular, the prime minister argued that Ashe's desire to compete in South Africa was inconsistent with his campaign to have South Africa excluded from the 1968 Olympic Games.

On 28 January 1970 the South African government announced that it had denied Arthur Ashe a visa to compete in the South African Open.[42] In a press statement released on 28 January the South African Government said it had refused Ashe a visa because he had been involved in a movement to prevent South Africa's participation in the Olympic Games in 1968 and had made anti-apartheid statements like: "South Africa is a very bigoted country, the most bigoted country in the world."[43] According to the statement: "Had Mr. Ashe been going to South Africa as a member of a United States team to play in a Davis Cup tie a visa would have been granted to him. But the South African authorities are not prepared to admit him, as a private individual, to play in the South African Open."

The decision led to revulsion around the world sparking a movement that would culminate in South Africa's expulsion from the Davis Cup and the ILTF (although it was readmitted later) and finally the International Olympic Association four months later. In the United States, Congressman Diggs, chairman of the House

Subcommittee on Africa, convened a hearing to discuss "The Foreign Policy Implications of Racial Exclusion in Granting Visas." Witnesses at the hearing included Arthur Ashe, US tennis champion; James Bouton, member of the Houston Astros baseball team; Dennis Brutus, president of the South African Non-Racial Committee for Open Olympic Sports; Oliver S. Crosby, director for southern Africa, Department of State; George Gowan, general counsel-designate, U.S. Lawn Tennis Association, David Sattersfield III, US Congressman from Virginia; and Frederick Smith, Department of State.[44] Diggs said the committee was concerned about racism and South African policies in sport and the implications for US foreign policy. He argued that: "One cannot separate the question of the denial of a visa to an Arthur Ashe from the political questions that are generally involved and which have implications for the United States."[45] Diggs said he was convinced that the issue of sport provided the "clearest insights" into the true nature of apartheid and the way in which it was applied. He said it was clear that Ashe "was denied entrance solely because he is black because there have been other athletes that have been critical of South Africa policy and still have been permitted to come into the country and therefore this arbitrary action reinforces our contention that something should be done."

During the Congressional hearing, Ashe said he stood by his statements against South Africa and refused to retract them. He said many white athletes had criticized South Africa and were still allowed to compete there. "I know of no nonwhite athlete from any part of the world who has ever been to South Africa on an independent basis," Ashe said. "I conclude the only reason they gave me a 'No' in light of all I did

beforehand was because I happened to be nonwhite." He said he was convinced that the International Lawn Tennis Federation and the Davis Cup nations would exclude South Africa because of the decision. The United States, as the champion nation, had called an extraordinary meeting to change the rules so that the host nation can exclude any national team that broke the ILTF's rule against racial discrimination. Ashe said he expected South Africa to be excluded from the Davis Cup competition in March and at the ILTF meeting in July. "I think my case constitutes a very clear-cut violation of international rules, ... I bent over backwards to secure a 'yes' and they still said 'no.' So I think the international federation has no recourse this time." Ashe said he felt that "black athletes must use every public resource at their command to try to right things that are obviously wrong, especially in their particular areas of responsibility."

George Gowen, general counsel-designate, U.S Lawn Tennis Association also testified that the USLTA had supported Ashe's application for a visa to play in South Africa. On learning of the denial, USLTA President Alistair Martin issued a public statement in which he condemned the decision and accused South Africa of racial discrimination. Gowen said the "USLTA at the meeting of the Davis Cup of nations to be held this march will undoubtedly vote to exclude the South African team from Davis Cup competition. It is felt that South Africa, by its won conduct has precluded itself from further Davis Cup competition."[46]

In a demonstration of the growing collaboration between black Americans and South African exiles, Dennis Brutus, president of the South African Nonracial

Committee for Olympic Sports, argued that the United States should "respond similarly by barring South African citizens from entering the US for purposes of sport, until the position of South Africa is changed." Brutus, a South African exile, left his homeland on an "exit permit" in 1966 after having served a term in prison for opposing apartheid in sport. He was a leading figure in the movement that led to the exclusion of South Africa from the Olympic Games in Mexico in 1968. Brutus argued that the United States should exclude South African athletes based on the 1968 UN resolution calling on all nations to break off sports relations with South Africa. Brutus said he was making his recommendation as the president of SAN-ROC that was established in Durban, South Africa, in October 1962. He pointed out that South Africa had been excluded from the Tokyo Games on 1964 and the Mexico Games of 1968 and been expelled from international bodies controlling table tennis, soccer, weightlifting, boxing, fencing and judo. Brutus referred to Jackie Robinson's support for the exclusion of South African athletes. Robinson had sent a telegram to the hearing stating: "I heartily congratulate the committee on its investigation into the South African racial policies. I support the action and strongly urge the State Department to bar white South Africans from participating in American professional events enabling them to win thousands of dollars to be spent in that racist country."[47] Brutus said there had been an eight-year campaign to get the ILTF to expel South Africa but the effort had been blocked because South Africa, a founding member, and its western allies controlled the commanding votes in the federation while 20 countries had no vote at all. Brutus said the lack of legislative initiative had led to unconstitutional protest and civil disobedience at sports arenas around the world. In

1964 students in Norway had invaded tennis courts and disrupted a match where a South African was playing. Bags of flour were thrown on the court in Bristol, England where an all-white team of South Africans was playing. Brutus said there was direct evidence of the interference of the South African Government in the administration of sport, thus making the rejection a political as well as racial issue.

Both Ashe and Gowen were against the exclusion of individual South African athletes from competing in the United States. Ashe said: "my moral conscience tells me that the United States should not stoop to the low level of the South Africans' stated policy of racial discrimination because in effect I would be condoning the premise that two wrongs make a right."[48] He also said that several of the players were friends of his and he would not want them to suffer the same indignities. Gowen said members of the USLTA "do not believe that South African players as individuals should be excluded from tournaments in this country. We do not subscribe to the theory that two wrongs make a right."

Oliver S. Crosby, director for southern Africa, department of state, reviewed the case and said the state department regretted the behavior of the South Africans but that there was a limit "to our ability to bring the South African authorities to a reasonable stance on such matters, as one of the attributes of national sovereignty is the right of a state to determine for itself who shall be allowed to enter its territory." Asked whether the United States could reciprocate in kind by denying visas to South African athletes like golfer Gary Player who had recently been granted permission to

compete in the United States, Crosby said the United States regretted the actions of the South African government but did not "think it is in our interests to emulate them in such matters." Diggs pointed out that there had been violent anti-apartheid protests in England during a tour of South African rugby players and that protests were planned in the United States if the athletes visited. Given this scenario, Diggs asked, would the State Department consider denying visas to the athletes as a threat to public safety? Fredrick Smith of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs agreed that a visa could be denied if the entrance of certain people was considered a threat. This provision of the statute, however, was usually reserved for threats to national security. Corsby said he thought denying a visa to South African golfer Gary Player would be counterproductive because it would not change South Africa's policies toward black athletes. Diggs countered that the focus on South African policy was interesting in this case because South Africans were mad about sports and were growing resentful of the restrictions being placed on their participation in international competitions. He also argued that the denial of a visa to a prominent athlete like Arthur Ashe and the lack of action from the US government was an insult to 30 million black Americans and would harm relations between the US and independent African states. Diggs also warned that African nations were becoming very critical of pious pronouncements on apartheid that were never implemented.

Jim Bouton, a member of the Houston Astros baseball team told the hearing that in 1968, he had gone to Mexico City on behalf of the American Committee on Africa "to inform American officials about the problems of racism in South Africa."

Bouton said he found that American officials, from the president of the American Olympic Association to the assistant swimming association representative, "were actually angry that anyone should want to do something about the problem in South Africa." When he discussed the issue with them they suggested he must be a communist and communists were duping civil rights activists. Bouton said he noticed the Communist countries and nonwhite nations were supporting African calls for racial equality in South Africa while the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia supported apartheid policies. Bouton also said he thought white athletes in the United States had a more enlightened attitude toward South Africa. "They seemed to be entirely divorced from the feelings of the officials," he said. "It was a whole new breed, a whole new school of people. You had a small handful of officials that had their own view, and the athletes, themselves, had an entirely different view. If they had put it to a vote, there would have been no question that South Africa wouldn't have been admitted to the games at all."

On March 26, protesters disrupted a National Airlines golf tournament featuring South African players H. Heninig and Gary Player. Although the club had hired armed guards, the golfers had to be escorted out of the club by police.[49] On May 16 the *New York Times* announced in a page one story that South Africa had made history yet again by becoming the first nation to be expelled from the IOC since its founding in 1896.[50] The sport boycotts continued to spread, reaching another milestone with the cancellation of a cricket match in England, South Africa's main supporter, on May 23.[51] On May 27 the *New York Times* claimed in an editorial that

the international sports community was more effective in fighting apartheid than the political community.[52] In a defiant speech in parliament on June 1, however, Prime Minister Vorster said South Africa would not give up apartheid for acceptance in the international sporting community. Vorster vowed that communists and Afro-Asian nations would not succeed in blackmailing South Africa to give up its traditions.[53] On October 26 Arthur Ashe said in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that he had no interest in playing tennis in South Africa and announced that he would give up tennis to oppose apartheid.[54]

By August 1972 the South Africans had backed away from their isolationist position on apartheid sport and were trying to lure black athletes and entertainers to appear in South Africa. On August 21, 1972, anti-apartheid activists learned that South Africa had offered former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali $800,000 to fight another black American, Al Jones in an exhibition match in Johannesburg.[55] After discussing the issue with a representative of the OAU in New York, Ali's manager, Herbert Muhammad of the NOI, said they would not sign the contract. On September 9, however, *The Johannesburg Star* reported that Ali would fight Al Jones at Ellis Park in Johannesburg on November 18.[56] The report indicated that the promoters, Reliable NE Promoters planned segregated seating for a multiracial audience of 80,000 at the Ellis Park rugby ground. In the United States, activists were dismayed by the news of the upcoming fight. *The New York Voice* of September 22 reported that "many persons are shocked the their decision, particularly Ali's, to fight in the racist, white supremacist African country. Ali is a member of the Black Muslims who stress

complete separation from Whites."[57] The article noted that many Black community groups were outraged when they learned of Ali's decision. The Black Concern, led by Louise Meriwether said, "this is particularly distressing in view of the solidarity exhibited by American and Caribbean Black athletes in support of their African brothers during the recent Olympics in Munich." Dennis Brutus said SAN-ROC was very concerned about Ali's decision and they "hope he would reconsider." Brutus said Ali was held in high regard in Africa where he was admired not only for his boxing prowess but also for his courage in standing up to racism. "If he agrees to fight under conditions dictated by a White racist minority which treats Blacks as subhuman, he will be doing great damage both to his own image and to the cause of Black liberation." The paper also reported that two Black Americans (Roy Wilkins and Ertha Kitt) had traveled to South Africa that year and lived as "honorary whites." A Black group invited Wilkins while Kitt performed before segregated audiences.

On September 26, Louise Meriwether and Dr. John Henrik Clarke of Black Concern, launched a campaign to stop Ali from fighting in South Africa.[58] Black Concern confirmed that Muhammad Ali had signed the contract to fight Al Jones in Johannesburg on November 18. Representatives of the OAU had met with Herbert Muhammad twice, on August 18 and September 19, to try to dissuade Ali from going to South Africa. Black Concern said it supported the position of the OAU to continue the sports and cultural boycott and sanctions against South Africa until apartheid was abolished. The organization urged members of the public to put pressure on the Nation of Islam to stop the fight. On October 1, Black Concern again announced that the fight

had been canceled. The group said that Ali's attorney, Robert Arum, had said he was canceling the fight because of problems with the promoters.[59] On October 4, the *New York Post* reported that the "fight between Muhammad Ali and Doug Jones has been canceled in the face of heavy opposition from African nations and black organizations in this country."[60] In a page one story the *Amsterdam News* of October 6 reported that the black community, which had been readying itself for massive protests against the fight, had been informed that the bout was off.[61] The report quoted Ambassador Mamadou Moctar Thaim, of the OAU who said "if such a renowned black world figure like Ali agrees to fight in sport-crazy South Africa, he would be providing the white racist government with the most effective propaganda weapon for breaking its isolation."

Nevertheless the sports boycott against South Africa continued to gather supporters around the world. This was true even in the Davis Cup competition where South Africa was a founding member and had significant support. In 1976, US Davis Cup officials had even proposed sanctions against countries that refused to play South Africans following Mexico's refusal to play South Africa in 1975 and 1976. A meeting of the international Davis Cup organization voted down the US resolution leading to the withdrawal of the US Tennis Association from the Davis Cup. Britain and France also announced that they would be withdrawing from the 1977 competitions in support of the US position.[62]

Taking Aim at Corporations

"In South Africa, to be photographed by Polaroid is instant slavery," Caroline Hunter, PRWU Founder

Frustrated by the pro-apartheid direction of the United States foreign policy, African American workers, legislators, students and activists directed their attention toward US corporations with investments in South Africa in a series of actions against Polaroid, Shell, Gulf Oil, General Motors and Ford Motor Co. The most dramatic manifestation of this strategy was the campaign against Polaroid Corporation by black workers in Boston who demanded that the company close its plants in South Africa because its products were being used to enforce racist identification ("pass") regulations. The Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Union (PRWU) campaign was launched in October 1970 by Ken Williams, a design photographer, and Caroline Hunter, a 24-year-old research chemist turned radical who was the founder of the PRWU.[63] The union argued that Polaroid Corporation was participating in the oppression of millions of Africans because Polaroid cameras were being used to take pictures that were identification cards called "pass books." These passbooks had been used to restrict the movement of Africans and had sparked numerous protests and government crackdowns. After trying to influence Polaroid policies through internal channels and failing, the PRWM held a rally on 8 October where they presented Polaroid with three demands: (1) that Polaroid announce a policy of complete disengagement from South Africa; (2) that the management announce its policy to all

employees in the United States and South Africa; and (3) that Polaroid "donate the profits earned in South Africa to the recognized African liberation movements."[64]

Polaroid responded by firing two black members of the PRWM committee and releasing a statement that it "abhorred" apartheid. The company created a committee of black and white workers to study the question.[65] The committee sent four members of their group (2 black, 2 white) to South Africa to gather information first hand and to talk to black South Africans. The group returned with the recommendation that the company stop sales of Polaroid products to the government of South Africa. It was criticized for interviewing South African workers without seeking the perspectives of members of the liberation movements. As George Houser put it in a critical article: "how honest an answer could four foreign visitors get from people in a country riddled with police informers and undercover agents, a country where the penalty for treason is a long prison term or death?"[66] On January 13, 1971, Polaroid bought full-page advertisements in seven major newspapers throughout the United States, as well as 20 black weeklies, to announce its decision to continue doing business in South Africa. In the advertisements, Polaroid described an "experimental program" where it would raise the salaries of nonwhite employees and commit a portion of its profits to support black education. The PRWM (and the Boston Globe) dismissed Polaroid's gestures as a public relations ploy designed to protect the company's assets in South Africa.

On February 3 members of the PRWM addressed the UN Special Committee on Apartheid. In their statements, the Caroline Hunter and Ken Williams called for an

international boycott of Polaroid products and a ban on the purchase of Polaroid products by the United Nations and its agencies. They also called for the formation of other grassroots organizations by workers at United States companies doing business in South Africa. Hunter said the PRWM would "press an international boycott until Polaroid is forced out of South Africa or South Africa is liberated in the name of Black South Africa." George Houser, who also addressed the meeting as a representative of the ACOA, said that the Polaroid experiment was a danger because it could be seen as a substitute for the sanctions program supported by the United Nations. "The Polaroid position offers the rationale business is looking for. Its protest against apartheid is only verbal. But it is a setback in the campaign to stop support for apartheid and must be challenged." Houser said the ACOA supported the boycott of Polaroid products. Following their statements, the three answered questions from the multinational committee members. Asked what the union would do if its demands were not met, Hunter said they were approaching large organizations that had Polaroid stock seeking divestment and were working with student and church groups. Williams said a large meeting had been held in the Roxbury section of Boston where people had been asked to "act as guerrillas in their own neighborhoods," and demand that store owners not restock Polaroid products.

The PRWM also organized a protest rally in Cambridge on March 22, the 10th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre which had been designated by the United Nations as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The group lobbied Congress where a newly elected Ron Dellums was asked by

Congressional Black Caucus Chairman Charles Diggs to work with the PRWU in their efforts to get the Polaroid Corporation to stop doing business in South Africa.[67] Dellums and John Conyers met the Polaroid workers and promised to "take up their cause within Congress; we also promised to use our good offices to bring their case for sanctions against South Africa inside the system in any other way we could."[68] Dellums, Conyers and the CBC raised the issue of sanctions against South Africa with President Nixon shortly thereafter, "It was clear that Nixon was not going to act, however, so we knew we would have to proceed legislatively." Dellums's office then drafted and introduced the first sanctions resolution to the House that was co-sponsored by John Conyers.[69] Although it would be a decade before Congress would approve sanctions against South Africa, the issue had been raised in Congress and the resolution provided activists with an organizing tool in the struggle for anti-apartheid legislation in both local and national government.

On July 5, Caroline Hunter went to London where she spoke at the British Anti-Apartheid Movement's annual African Freedom Day Rally. The British press welcomed Hunter with a flurry of articles on the US anti-apartheid movement. On July 21, 1971 *The Guardian* of London reported that the British Anti-Apartheid Movement was following the lead of the movement in the United States. "Although Britain is by far and away South Africa's largest investor and has three times more investment there than has the United States, American churches and American citizens have been much more active so far in challenging big business support for apartheid."[70] The reporter argued that the US movement was stronger because:

> There (US) it has not been just stockholders who have objected but workers too. Militant black employees are now making life hard for IBM, Dodge, Ford, Chrysler and General Electric. But the lead came from Polaroid in Boston, where a successful boycott was mounted on the issue that the corporation sold identity cards that the South Africans used to administer the country's pass laws.

The article reported that General Motors had been left "bruised and battered" by attacks from the Episcopal Church and the Project on Corporate Responsibility. GM had appointed Rev. Leon Sullivan a director after a lesser skirmish with anti-apartheid forces in 1970. At the 1971 meeting however, Sullivan "bit the hand that paid him" and became the first GM director to vote against management at an annual meeting. In an "impassioned speech" Sullivan had said that while he was encouraged by the company's efforts to improve opportunities for blacks in the US, apartheid was still being underwritten by US industry.[71] The vote was a consolation to the board, however, as the Episcopal church's motion that GM pull out of South Africa won only 1.29 percent of the 230 million shares voted.

At the conference "Britain and South Africa --Partnership in Imperialism," Hunter said: "In South Africa, to be photographed by Polaroid is instant slavery" because a Polaroid computerized passbook identity system could trace identities within two minutes."[72] Warning that apartheid "US Style" was spreading around the world, Hunter argued that the world was approaching a period of "technological fascism." Hunter called for an international boycott of Polaroid products until the company's sales to South Africa had been terminated. She said that Polaroid had

admitted that 20 percent of all pictures taken for passbooks was taken with their equipment. "These passbooks are apartheid's number one tool to enforce its repressive laws against blacks," Hunter said. She said that in the first quarter of 1971, Polaroid lost $4 million in sales due to the boycott. Abdul Minty, secretary of the British AAM thanked Hunter and assured her that "her struggle and initiative had given the world a visible target which we can attack." Minty served notice that the British interests of Polaroid Corporation would be the target of a new campaign by the AAM. Minty claimed that South African police were being trained in Britain. Hunter visited Polaroid's factories in Britain and attempted to talk to workers. At one factory she was told "You can't see or talk to workers here. They're happy and docile. We pay them a little more than the unions, and give them a bonus. They don't need a union. They're happy."[73] Hunter reported that none of the Polaroid plants in England or the United States had unions.

Congressman Diggs and the CBC put the spotlight on the role of US corporations in South Africa with a series of hearings in 1971. In May the House Subcommittee on Africa convened a hearing on "US Business Involvement in Southern Africa" to which Diggs invited the heads of corporations to discuss their companies' policies and investments in South Africa. Thomas Wyman, a Polaroid Corporation vice president testified that his company was seeking ways to improve the status of black employees in South Africa. Other heads of corporations refused to appear at the hearings which nevertheless produced a stream of reports and interviews

with experts and government officials on the economic ties between the United States and South Africa.

On February 25, 1971, black legislators urged the Nixon administration to take a stronger stand against white regimes in southern Africa.[74] Testifying before a subcommittee on Africa hearing, former ambassador Franklin H. Williams said the US "should take every possible step short of war" to end apartheid. He urged the US to recall its ambassador to South Africa; revoke the special sugar quota for South Africa; and deny visas to South Africa athletes like Gary Player until US athletes like Arthur Ashe are allowed to play in South Africa. Widemar Neilson of the African American Institute charged that Black Americans were fed up with resolutions and "pious discourse." Neilson urged the US to revoke the sugar quota which he said poured millions of dollars a year into the hands of the white power structure in South Africa. Neilson also argued that the US should take action against Portugal as an example to other white supremacist state in the region. Nixon administration officials argued that sanctions against whites would openly make things worse for the black majority. In a version of the "states rights" discourse, Assistant Secretary of State Newsome said that the solution must "ultimately be worked out by the peoples concerned."

In late-1971 Diggs suddenly received word that his application for a visa to visit South Africa and Namibia had been approved. Diggs had sought a visa for a "fact-finding" tour of South Africa for years. In August 1971 he arrived at Johannesburg's Jan Smuts Airport and learned that the South African government had

reneged on a promise to allow him unrestricted rights to travel around the country and the territory of South West Africa. Diggs vowed to cancel the trip and return to the United States but changed his mind after visiting the black township of Soweto where he was given a hero's welcome. According to Caroline DuBose, Diggs's press secretary at the time, the South African press claimed that Diggs was "high-handed" because he chose to spend time meeting with black laborers instead of mixing with the elite. Diggs visited several businesses owned by US companies in South Africa where he was appalled at segregated facilities for black workers. After heated exchanges with white executives from General Motors and Ford Motor Co., Diggs returned to the United States where he held a press conference denouncing the activities of US corporations in South Africa. His office sent questionnaires to 300 US firms operating in South Africa asking them to provide his committee with information on salaries, facilities and promotion of black workers in South Africa. According to DuBose, the questionnaire "sent a cold chill through the business community." Diggs also decided to hold hearings on US business practices in South Africa.

In 1971, President Nixon selected Charles Diggs to serve as a full delegate to the United Nations General Assembly under US Permanent Representative to the UN George Bush. In December, Diggs caused a sensation by becoming the first delegate of the United States to the United Nations to resign during a General Assembly. In an impassioned speech, Diggs told the UN he could not support his government's decision to resume the sale of arms to Portugal and South Africa and to break UN sanctions by purchasing chrome from Rhodesia. Diggs's speech was greeted with a

standing ovation in the General Assembly. Diggs's outburst was sparked by the signing of an executive agreement between the United States and Portugal that authorized the US Export-Import Bank to extend credit/loans to Portugal worth $436 million in exchange for the renewal of US leases on the Azores base in Portugal. The funding was four times the amount Portugal had received between 1946 and 1971 and was a five-year accord retroactive to 1969. This agreement marked a significant shift in US policy and directly defied United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia. African leaders opposed the aid because it opened up other resources for use in Portugal's colonial wars in southern Africa. They pointed out that NATO equipment had been used to kill African civilians in Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, the Nixon administration relaxed guidelines on "dual purpose equipment" allowing Portugal to acquire two Boeing 707s and two 747s for use as military transport planes in southern Africa. The US also supported Portugal in acquiring twelve Bell helicopters through a financing agreement with the US Export Import Bank. On October 15, 1971, the United States had voted to permit importation of Rhodesian chrome despite a mandatory UN embargo against the white supremacist regime of Ian Smith.[75] The deal was widely interpreted as strengthening Smith's position in talks with the United Kingdom from which it had declared independence on November 11, 1965. The US had also entered into an agreement that had allowed South Africa resume selling gold to the IMF; entered a series of abstentions and negative votes on UN motions condemning apartheid, Rhodesia and Portugal; and refused to lobby hard against the Byrd amendment that allowed the importation of chrome from Rhodesia. These policy

changes were carried out despite vigorous protests from church, civil rights and academic groups.

In September 1973 the *New York Times* reported that Polaroid's year-old experiment to counter South Africa's discriminatory job and wage restrictions had been "successfully" emulated by other US-owned companies in South Africa.[76] Polaroid and other US-owned firms like IBM, Gillette, Pfizer, Pepsi-Cola, General Electric, Mobil and Ford Motor Co. were paying black workers one quarter or less of what they paid whites for comparable work but they claimed that they were paying more than the minimums set under apartheid laws. The companies said they were "working within the system" and providing at least token resistance to racial separation laws. Although the better-paying and skilled positions were reserved for whites, company executives said labor shortages were leading to more flexibility in labor restrictions. Polaroid managing director H. M. Hirsch claimed that the company had raised the pay of its black workers by 52 percent in the previous two years. He also said that the company's policies were not charity but based on good business sense and foresight. By November 1977, however, Polaroid announced the failure of its experiment and that it was pulling out of South Africa.[77] According to George Houser of the ACOA, Polaroid's withdrawal from South Africa seven years after launching an "experiment" aimed at alleviating the effects of apartheid by raising wages for black employees and providing job training, had failed. The experiment came apart after anti-apartheid activists told Polaroid that its affiliate in South Africa had been selling film for passbooks to the South African government in violation of

agreements reached in 1971. Five days later, Polaroid released a statement saying it was shocked by the revelations and was taking steps to sever relations with its South African affiliate. Houser argued that Polaroid had pulled out of South Africa because circumstances in the region had changed since 1971. Anti-apartheid groups had provided solid evidence that its distributor was supplying film to the South African government; Angloa and Mozambique had attained independence; the business climate in South Africa was unhealthy; and the armed struggle in Rhodesia and Southwest Africa had escalated considerably. More importantly the student uprising of 1976 had demonstrated the new generation's determination to win freedom by any means necessary. Despite Polaroid's position, Houser did not think that other US corporations would follow suit. Instead, he reported that in 1977, over 50 companies had agreed to comply with six principles drawn up by Leon Sullivan, a General Motors Board member. South Africa had welcomed Sullivan's principles which, like the Polaroid Experiment, posed little threat to the system of apartheid but could be used as leverage in international relations.

[1]Randall Robinson of TransAfrica was to address the OAU meting in 1981 on the anti-apartheid movement in the United States.

[2]Deburg Willaim. Modern Black Nationalism. New York: New York University Press, 1997, pg. 203-204.

[3]Walters, Ronald. Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora A Study of Modern Afrocentric Movements. DC.: Howard University Press, 1995. pg. 59-65.

[4] Professor Williard Johnson, personal interview, May 2000.

[5]Imamu Amiri Baraka. ed. African Congress A Documentary of the First Modern Pan-African Congress. (New York: William Morrow, 1972) vii.

[6]This cultural aspect of the Black Power generation is explored in Ronald Walters's Pan Africanism and the African Diaspora. and in William Van Deburg's New Day in Babylon The Black Power Movement and American Culture. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[7]African Congress, 107-111

[8] Hampton, H. and Fayer, S. (eds) Voices of Freedom An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement form the 1950s through the 1980s. New York: Bantam, 1990. Pp. 511-539.

[9] Henry Kissinger, "National Security Memorandum 39," letter to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director of CIA. 10 April 1969. In The Kissinger Study, 37.

[10]Henry Kissinger, "National Security Memorandum 39," letter to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director of CIA. 10 April 1969. In The Kissinger Study, 37.

[11]Kissinger study, 10.

[12]Kissinger study, 11.

[13]Kissinger study, 66.

[14]Charles C. Diggs and Lester L. Wolff. "Report of Special Study Mission to Southern Africa, Aug. 10-30, 9169. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969) pgs. 4-5.

[15]*New York Times* 17 November 1969. pg. 25.

[16]African American representatives in Congress increased in number from six in 1966 to thirteen in the 1969 to thirty-nine in 1992. By 1970 the number of Black elected officials increased to 1,490 and by 1991 there were 7,490 black elected officials nationwide Black Elected Officials a National Roster, 1985 (Washington DC: Joint Center for Political Studies), Table 1, pg. 11

[17]Charles C. Diggs, speech on the floor of the House of Representatives 7 August 1969. Diggs and Wolff, Appendix A, pg. 38.

[18]Diggs and Wolff, 3.

[19]*New York Times* 24 May 1969. pg. 25.

[20]*New York Times* 25 May 1969. pg. 67.

[21]*New York Times* 5 September 1970. pg. 24.

[22]*New York Times* 31 January 1972. pg. 70.

[23]Hampton and Fayer, Voices of Freedom, 566.

[24]*New York Times, 19* March 1972.

[25]*New York Times*, 17 May 1972. pg. 9.

[26]*New York Times*, 2 June 1972. pg. 22.

[27]*New York Times* 27 may 1972. pg. 3.

[28]*New York Times* 28 May 1972. pg. 3.

[29]Howard Fuller (Owusu Sadauki), interview with author, October, 1999.

[30] Interview with Alkalimat.

[31]Abe Ford. "Boston African Liberation Support Committee Press Statement," March 21, 1973.

[32]*New York Times* 4 September 1972. pg. 5.

[33]Imamu Amiri Baraka. "Some Questions About Sixth PAC," The Black Scholar October 1974: 44.

[34]See C.L.R. James. "Attacks on the Sixth Pan African Congress," Race Today October 1974: 282-283; See also E. Ofari "A critical view of the Pan African

Congress," The Black Scholar July-August: 12-15; Howard Fuller. "Notes form a Sixth Pan Africaists's journals," Black World October 1974: 70-88; Lerone Bennett. "Pan Africanism at the Crossroads," Ebony September 1974: 148-160.

[35]Abdul Alkalimat, telephone interview, April 2000.

[36]Bai Kisogie. "State Exhibitionism and Ideological Glamour," Transition No. 46 1974: 6-12.

[37] St. Clair Drake. "Diaspora studies and Pan Africanism," in Joseph Harris ed. Global Dimension of the African Diaspora. (Washington: Howard University Press, 1982) 341-404.

[38]St. Clair Drake. "Diaspora studies and Pan Africanism," in Joseph Harris ed. Global Dimension of the African Diaspora. (Washington: Howard University Press, 1982) 341-404.

[39]*New York Times* 29 August 1969. pg. 32.

[40]*New York Times* 29 July 1969. pg. 31.

[41]Statement by Oliver S. Crosby, director for southern Africa, department of state at a hearing on the refusal to grant Arthur Ashe a South African visa. Charles C. Diggs. "Foreign Policy Implications of Racial Exclusion in Granting Visas Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Ninety First Congress Second Session. Wednesday, February 4, 1970. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1970) 2-3

[42]*New York Times* 29 January 1970. pg. 1.

[43]Statement included in the record. Diggs, Visas, pg. 20.

[44]Charles C. Diggs. "Foreign Policy Implications of Racial Exclusion in Granting Visas Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Ninety First Congress Second Session. Wednesday, February 4, 1970. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1970)

[45]Diggs, Visas, 2.

[46]Diggs, Visas, 27.

[47]Diggs, visas, 31.

[48]Diggs, visas, 25.

[49]*New York Times* 10 April 1970. pg. 29.

[50]*New York Times* 16 May 1970. pg. 1.

[51]*New York Times* 24 May 1970. pg. 19.

[52]*New York Times* 27 May 1970. pg. 46.

[53]*New York Times* 2 June 1970. pg. 49.

[54]*New York Times* 27 October 1970. pg. 60.

[55] Ali, Jones to Fight Daylight bout," *The Johannesburg Star* 9 September 1972. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00890.

[56]"Ali, Jones to Fight Daylight bout," *The Johannesburg Star* 9 September 1972. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00890.

[57]"Ali Scheduled to Fight in Apartheid South Africa," *The New York Voice,"* 22 September 1972. pg. 1.

[58]Black Concern Newsletter. 26 September 1972. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00886.

[59]Black Concern Newsletter. 1 October 1972. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00888.

[60]"Why Ali's S. Africa Fight if Off," *New York Post* 4 October 1972.

[61]"Ali to So. Africa: now it's no go," *Amsterdam news* 6 October 1972. pg. 1. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00898

[62]*New York Times* 2 July 1976. pg. 1

[63]Polaroid "An Experiment in South Africa" 1971.

[64]Caroline Hunter, address to the UN Committee Against Apartheid, 3 February 1971. ACOA Papers part 2 Reel 6 Frame 00139.

[65]Polaroid Corporation, "A Report on South Africa" 30 December 1971. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 6 Frame 0087.

[66]George Houser, "The Polaroid Approach to South Africa," *The Christian Century*, 24 February 1971. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 6 Frame 00106.

[67]Ron Dellums. Lying Down With Lions. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000) 122.

[68]Dellums, 123.

[69]Dellums, 123.

[70]"White Mammon Burden," *The Guardian* (London, England) Friday July 2, 1971.

[71]ibid.

[72]"Firm Accused by Opponents of Apartheid," *The Guardian*, Monday 5 July 1971. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 24 Frame 01070.

[73]Caroline Hunter, "International Support PRWM in London," ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 24 Fame 01067.

[74]*New York Times* 25 February 1971. pg. 12.

[75]*New York Times* October 15, 1971. pg. 2.

[76]*New York Times* 4 September 1973. pg. 49.

[77]George Houser. "Polaroid's Dramatic Withdrawal From South Africa," The Christian Century. April 12, 1978. 2. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 6 Frame 00107.

CHAPTER 7

TRANSAFRICA

> We condemn the role played by the United States and other foreign corporations and banks, which by their presence and activities collectively have participated in the oppression of Blacks and have undergirded the repressive white minority governments of Southern Africa. ...We commit ourselves to mobilizing Black Americans and others of good will to formulate and support a progressive U.S. policy toward Africa. And we state our opposition to those Blacks who work directly or indirectly to support white minority regimes in Southern Africa.
>
> African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa, September 24-25, 1976

On 16 June 1976 the brutality of the South Africa State again shocked the world with a massacre of unarmed school children protesting against the imposition of Afrikaans as the language of instruction in black schools. On June 16 12,000 black primary and secondary school students in Soweto boycotted classes and staged a march to oppose the apartheid regime's language policy. The students and their parents felt that the use of Afrikaans would limit the students' ability to grasp math and science and limit their opportunities because the language was only spoken in South Africa. They also found it insulting to be forced to use the language of the oppressor. During the demonstrations, police fired 300 rounds into the crowd of students. By the end of the day there were 54 dead and 300 wounded. The next day students returned to

the streets, overturning vehicles and setting fire to school buildings. The skirmishes continued through July and August.

On August 4 and 5 the students tried to march from Soweto to Johannesburg to demand the release of youths detained after the initial rebellion of June 16.[1] On August 5, South African police killed three students and dispersed 5,000 demonstrators in Soweto.[2] Thousands of workers had stayed home in response to student demands for a boycott. The *Times* reported a 25% to 75% "absenteeism" rate in the workforce. The next day, South African police again opened fire on students in Soweto. The official toll from three days of rioting was four dead and thirty wounded. By September the rebellions had spread to Kimberly where crowds reportedly stoned buses and cars on September 8.[3] Cape Town police also reportedly opened fire on demonstrators protesting the closing of a high school for "coloureds." New flashpoints emerged at funerals as the skirmishes between the police and students continued. By Oct. 24, the *New York Times* was reporting that the official death toll had risen to 377 in the four months since the Soweto uprising began.[4] Black groups disputed these numbers, however, arguing that the police had killed over 400 in Soweto alone and that the total death toll at that point was closer to 700.[5]

Yet again the South African government responded to the protests with widespread arrests and detentions of black people. Over 2,400 were detained under security laws between June 1976 and September 1977. After the murder of Steve Biko in September 1977, the government banned most Black Consciousness organizations

including the South African Students' Organization (SASO) and the Christian Institute headed by Byers Naude. Officials also banned the most widely read black newspaper, *The World,* and detained its editor, Percy Quboza. The bannings failed to destroy the resistance, however, as new opposition groups like the Congress of South African Students, AZAPO, the Soweto Civic Association, and other associations emerged. At the same time over 6,000 youths left the country. Many joined ANC schools in Tanzania and guerrilla training camps Angola.

Anti-apartheid organizations around the world renewed calls for cultural, economic and political sanctions against apartheid. In July, the OAU released a statement during its annual Heads of State conference deploring the violence in South Africa and calling for renewed resistance. "The only effective guarantee for the African people of South Africa against the repetition of the massacre in Soweto is the launching of the armed struggle for the seizure of power by the people," the report said.[6] African Americans formed new groups and reorganized old ones to respond to the outrage. One such group was Blacks in Solidarity with South African Liberation (BISSAL) formed in Harlem to organize support for liberation movements. BISSAL was unique in that it was led by entertainers like Dick Gregory. In one of its first actions, BISSAL called for a demonstration on September 11 to condemn the slaughter of children in South Africa.[7] The group planned to march from Harlem to mid-town Manhattan to protest the complicity of US corporations and their counterparts in the oppression of "Black, Puerto Rican and other working class peoples in the Western hemisphere, and the role of those same corporations in

supporting and maintaining oppression in South Africa." On September 15 the *New York Amsterdam News* reported that 400 chanting Africans and African Americans had marched from Harlem to downtown Manhattan. Among the marchers were many students and Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton and Criminal Court Judge William Booth. Booth, president of the ACOA, had visited Namibia and was able to provide a first hand report. On September 21, BISSAL organized a "drum rally" for South African Liberation in front of the United Nations building to coincide with the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. "The percussionists will dramatize BISSAL's demand for expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations by symbolically drumming that country out of the world body."[8]

As the armed struggle in southern Africa continued to escalate, African American activists and scholars increased their efforts to change US foreign policy toward the white minority regimes. Encouraged by Diggs and the CBC, this legislative focus would lead to the formation of the longest-lasting lobby for Africa and the Caribbean called TransAfrica. Formed and staffed by mainly middle-class professional and academics with experience in Washington politics, TransAfrica was a liberal version of the Council on African Affairs. As we shall see in the next chapter, TransAfrica would succeed where the CAA had failed because of the high level of black consciousness, the presence of a critical mass of African Americans in Congress, and the mobilization of black leadership on the question of South Africa.

According to Willard Johnson, the impetus for the formation of TransAfrica came from the sustained mobilization of African American groups through the 1960s and early 70s combined with the dramatic success of the armed struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau and the intensification of the struggle in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.[9] The revolutionary movements in southern Africa had a major impact on African American activists who were influenced by the ideas put forth by theorists like Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral. This resurgence in Pan Africanist thought manifested itself in the decision by African and African American scholars to secede from the African Studies Association in 1969 and create the African Heritage Studies Association. Black scholars had become increasingly frustrated with the elitism of the ASA. They wanted the organization to engage directly with foreign policy instead of assuming the more traditional role of organizing conferences and scholarly debates.[10] This group of scholars and activists including Johnson, Ronald Walters, Herschelle Challenor and James Turner had met in Puerto Rico on 12 February 1972 where they had decided to focus their efforts on the struggle against white supremacy in southern Africa. This group of scholars then formed the political action committee of the AHSA that sought an alliance with the African Liberation Day Support Committee in an effort to defeat the Byrd Amendment that had allowed the importation of Rhodesian chrome into the United States despite United Nations sanctions. After failing to convince Owusu Sadauki to support a drive to repeal the amendment, the group decided to back the formation of an African American lobby for Africa and the

Caribbean. The plan was to create an organizational base through which African American activists could mobilize public opinion and influence Congress.

These forces came together for the Black Leadership Conference on Southern Africa convened by the Congressional Black Caucus on September 24-25 1976 in Washington D.C. The meeting was attended by representatives of over 30 black groups including the churches, fraternities, unions, the NAACP, AFRICARE, PUSH, Black Economic Research Council, AHSA, National Council of Negro Women, and members of the Black Caucus. The conference on Southern Africa supported armed struggle in southern Africa and criticized the U.S. for supporting white minority rule in southern Africa. It also endorsed an "African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa" that called for one-man-one-vote democracy for the people of Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia. The ten-point manifesto expressed solidarity with Africans protesting racism in southern Africa and warned that the intransigence of white settlers in the region had created "explosive environments which threaten world peace and raise the specter of an internationalized anti-colonial war which could have an ominous impact on race relations in America and abroad."[11]

The conference challenged the religious community, labor unions, media and civil society in general to force the government to uphold its commitments to international peace and security and to "understand that appeasement of South Africa can only invite an escalated war that will exacerbate racial tensions in the United States." Finally the conference resolved to establish a black foreign policy advocacy

organization that was eventually called TransAfrica under the leadership of Randall Robinson.[12] Robinson, who had been on Congressman Digg's staff, became the executive director of TransAfrica with Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary, Indiana, the chairman of the board. TransAfrica was incorporated in Washington, DC. on July 1, 1977 but the organization did not start operating until the spring of 1978.

TransAfrica would become the most important lobby for Africa and the Caribbean ever created by African Americans. The emergence of TransAfrica marked a turning point in the anti-apartheid movement. It signaled the coming of age of African Americans in foreign policy. Like the Council on African Affairs, TransAfrica combined educational and direct-action techniques to influence foreign policy. Unlike the leftist CAA, however, African American liberals led TransAfrica although it included some declared leftists like Congressman Ronald Dellums of Berkeley, California.

In his recent autobiography Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica and founder of the Free South Africa Movement, ascribed his involvement in the movement to his commitment to "to liberate the black world."[13] His commitment to Pan-African liberation is motivated by a feeling of "kinship" based on a shared history and experience of racial discrimination.[14] Robinson writes that his race consciousness emerged in segregated Virginia where he saw his community receiving second-class treatment. He argues that being treated as a second-class citizen shaped his decisions and creative energies as an adult (pg. 19). This race

consciousness led him to retreat "behind the race wall" in a struggle against the white supremacist system. This struggle is what he calls "defending the spirit" the title of his book (pg. 20).

> I am obsessively black. Race is an overarching aspect of my identity. America has made me this way. Or, more accurately, white America has made me this way. ...I can no more distinguish the beleaguered black self in me from my public advocacy than can untold white American policy makers disengage their racist assumptions from the decades of multifaceted U.S. support for apartheid in South Africa.[15]

Thus his motivation in the antiapartheid movement was a feeling of race kinship and the conviction that the United States was propping up the racist regime in South Africa. For Robinson, the plight of black people in the world is very similar: "I could see no real distinction between my American experience and the painful lot of Haitians, South Africans, Mozambicans, Angolans, Zairians and Afro-Brazilians."[16] He argues that apartheid was the creation of racist Boers and "kindred spirits" of American investors, lenders, diplomats, and presidents. Robinson describes how he became aware of the role of the United States in Africa while a student at Harvard Law School. Like other African-American activists he was conscientized by the new black literature and a pan-African sensibility that sparked what he calls a "racial affinity" with other black people. Echoing other African American internationalists he claims that African Americans must get involved in foreign policy on behalf of the "black world." He argues that African Americans have a "responsibility" to influence U.S. policies in the Caribbean and Africa.

In 1959, Robinson went to Norfolk State College where he participated in sit ins at local lunch counters. He served in the Army for three years and then finished his degree in sociology at Virginia Union University in 1967 and a law degree at Harvard Law School in 1970. At Harvard, he got involved in anti-apartheid activities with the Southern Africa Relief Fund and then spent a year in Tanzania as a Ford fellow. Like Malcolm X, Howard Fuller and Kwame Ture, Robinson was deeply influenced by his visit to Tanzania, which housed the headquarters of several southern African liberation movements in exile. When he returned to the United States in 1972 Robinson joined Chris Neta, a South African student, James Winston and thirty-six black undergraduates in taking over Massachusetts Hall, Harvard's oldest building and the office of the president on April 21, 1972. The students demanded that Harvard divest its $300 million investment in Gulf Oil, a major investor in Angola and South Africa.[17] This action sparked a nationwide wave of strikes at historically black and white colleges. In 1975 Robinson went to Washington to work for Rep. William L. Clay (D-Mo) as an assistant before joining Congressman Diggs's staff where he immersed himself in foreign policy activity. Robinson's pan-African perspective recalls African American activists from Martin Delany, to Alexander Crummell, to W.E.B. Du Bois who urged African Americans to challenge their government's anti-black activities abroad.

Before officially launching the organization, Robinson, the executive director and Richard Hatcher, the chairman of the board of directors, spent a year raising funds and building a membership base in the African American community. The goal was to

raise $200,000 for the organization's first year of operations --an ambitious goal because TransAfrica had decided not to accept donations from foreign governments or from companies doing business in South Africa. By the time TransAfrica was officially launched on 20 May 1978, Robinson was confident that they would reach the goal of $200,000. TransAfrica was launched at a Washington DC conference that featured speeches by prominent African American politicians and entertainers. In a position paper released for the conference, TransAfrica called on the United States to stop using African nations as "pawns" in cold war struggles with the Soviet Union and instead focus on majority rule, restructuring trade relations and economic aid.[18] Hatcher, who had been mayor of Gary, Indiana, for a decade, argued that there was a "direct relationship" in the circumstances of Africans and African Americans and that the liberation of South Africa would make it possible for African Americans and black South Africans to build business relationships based on South Africa's rich mineral resources. Hatcher also said that "shutout and distortions" in media coverage was one of the greatest obstacles that the US anti-apartheid movement had to overcome.

From the outset TransAfrica argued that the plan was to go beyond the traditional Africanist community and build a mass base. To build this base Robinson targeted the black church, an institution with a long history in the civil rights and anti-apartheid movements. According to Robinson, the black church "is a sustaining institution in black America" with a captive audience receptive to "moral issues" like majority rule in South Africa.[19] TransAfrica also sought ties with representatives of African nations in the United States. Robinson had invited ambassadors of Nigeria and

Zambia to the press conference and received public support from Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda who told the National Press Club that African Americans should form a sophisticated lobby for Africa.

Meanwhile the newly elected Democratic President Jimmy Carter appointed an African-American civil rights leader, Andrew Young, as the US Ambassador to the United Nations. Despite this appointment and Carter's human rights rhetoric, however, there was little substantive change in US policy toward the white regimes of southern Africa during his tenure. The Carter administration continued opposing mandatory economic sanctions at the United Nations and maintained the traditional "hands off" policy toward private investment. At a press conference to discuss his appointment as Ambassador to the UN on January 14, 1977, Young said he was prepared to veto any resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa although he was an African American.[20] He even argued that expulsion would not help break down apartheid barriers. Instead he suggested that South African businessmen and US corporations in South Africa could become instruments of change.

By March, however, Young's denunciations of South Africa had become harsher. At a special UN meeting to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Young said that as long as apartheid is practiced "days without violence will be no more than intervals in which tensions will grow."[21] Young also presided at the opening of the UN Security Council debate on apartheid that was expected to be the test of the Carter administration's policy. In May, Young held a

discussion with US ambassadors to Africa in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast, where he outlined the new policy toward South Africa that would include the withdrawal of the US military attaché from South Africa; tightening up visa requirements for South Africans; severing links between U.S. and South African intelligence; and curtailing Export-Import Bank credits to the Pretoria government.[22] On May 14 media reports indicated that Vice President Walter Mondale was planning to confront South African Prime Minister John Vorster with a tough new policy opposing apartheid at an upcoming meeting in Vienna. In a page one article titled "US Toughens Stand on South Africa" *The Washington Post* reported that Mondale was planning to brief Vorster on the new policy which would resemble the steps discussed by Andrew Young. The report indicated that the policy change was the result of discussions involving President Carter, Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Young and other senior diplomats. On May 16, however, *The Post* reported that Mondale had downplayed the change in policy while on an official trip to Lisbon.[23] Mondale told reporters that he was approaching Vorster "with a constructive frame of mind. We hope for success." This reversal, which was a snub to Young, also indicated the ambivalence of the Carter administration on the issue of apartheid. As an editorial in *The Washington Post* titled "A Mixed-up Africa Policy" indicated, the Carter administration seemed to have a two-pronged Africa policy with Mondale working the "white side of the street" and Young working the "black side."[24] Mondale reported tentative success in his meeting with Vorster but encountered fundamental disagreement on the issue of apartheid. Young had also met resistance at a decolonization conference where he had reportedly suggested that nonviolent tactics

used in the US civil rights movement could overcome apartheid. The Africans, however, were skeptical. They argued that unlike the United States where blacks were a minority, in southern Africa there was black majority with few white allies and colonial governments that were not restrained by democratic structures or ideals.

Young's remarks in Africa created a wave of resentment in the US media. A front-page *New York Times* article on 27 May, for instance, claimed that Young had "irritated" African revolutionaries by advocating a negotiated solution in Rhodesia and Southwest Africa and also irritated the South African government by urging economic boycotts by the black majority.[25] Young also raised hackles by claiming that the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia "might not be bad," if they could stop the killing. According to the *Times* this position was "in sharp contrast to statements of Vice President Mondale and the State Department." The media attacks against Young continued as he prepared to attend a United Nations anti-apartheid conference in Lagos, Nigeria. Editorials in US newspapers urged Young to support Israel, which had withdrawn from the conference because of the possibility that Zionism would be equated with racism and apartheid. In an editorial on August 21, the *New York Times* urged Young to "expose the hypocrisy that often surrounds discussion of apartheid." The editorial defended Israel for selling arms to South Africa ostensibly because many countries in the West were also breaking the arms embargo. At the Lagos conference, Young announced a possible breakthrough in talks between the liberation movements and the government of Rhodesia.[26] Young said he and President Kenneth Kaunda had agreed to organize a meeting between the British Foreign Secretary David Owen,

Young, and leaders of five African countries surrounding Rhodesia to work out a plan for majority rule by as early as 1978.

In April 1978 Young and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance embarked on a four-day "shuttle diplomacy" tour of the "front-line" states, Rhodesia and South Africa in an effort to find a settlement to the Rhodesian war. Before the trip, media reports announced that Vance would seek South Africa's help in getting white minority leaders in Rhodesia to negotiate with black liberation movements. On April 14 Vance and British Foreign Secretary David Owen met with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, the leader of the front-line states and supporter of the Patriotic Front of guerrilla groups led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. Both Britain and the US had expressed concern about the growing presence of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia and the possibility that they would replace the West in the southern African region if no settlement was reached in Rhodesia. The two western leaders were seeking Nyerere's support for an Anglo-American plan for peace talks between the Patriotic Front and leaders of the white minority and their black allies: Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Rev. Ndabaningi Sitole and Chief Joseph Chiray. Mainstream media coverage of Vance's diplomatic maneuvers was firmly on the side of Smith and his "moderate" allies. The *Washington Post*, for instance, consistently referred to the Patroitic Front as "Soviet-backed" while the illegitimate government of Ian Smith was referred to as a "multiracial government" and its black supporters as "moderates."[27]

Anti-apartheid groups denounced the Carter administration's decision to meet with South African officials. The activists felt that move gave legitimacy to the racist regime and its allies in Rhodesia and put the power of the US behind a dubious scheme cooked up to keep Ian Smith's white minority government in power. Carter and Young came under fire at two Africa Liberation Day marches in May organized by the All African People's Revolutionary Party and the National Coalition to Support African Liberation Day. The AAPRP march, which was held on May 13, was led former SNCC worker Stokely Carmichael and former Black Panther Party leader Booby Seale and featured a contingent of Palestinian Liberation Organization supporters. Speakers at this march attacked the Carter administration's policies in Africa and demanded that the United States impose comprehensive economic and political sanctions on South Africa and support African liberation movements. *The Washington Post*, however, focused on the presence of PLO supporters and the rivalry between the AAPRP and the ALSC, which planned another ALD march on May 20. An article by Juan Williams on May 14, for instance, observed that "quoted Bob Brown, described as "an organizer" for the AAPRP, stating that "We are together in the struggle against Israel and Rhodesia, Zionism and racism and for an Arab and African revolution. Williams then states: "The rest of Brown's speech and much of Carmichael's talk to the crowd were directed against another African Liberation Day march planned for next Saturday by the African Liberation Day Support Committee." According to the article the differences between the two organizations was over the question of identity. The AAPRP believed that "black people in the United States are not Americans. They are Africans." The group claimed the rally was part of a party

building effort "so black people here will return to their homeland (Africa) and reclaim their land." Members of the NCSALD, however, considered themselves Americans. At a march on May 20, the group's chairman, Nelson Johnson, argued that his organization was concerned with "the day to day struggles in this country" in addition to issues in Africa.[28] Organizers said that the largest contingent of marchers came from New York City although busloads also came from Baltimore, Detroit Pittsburgh and Boston. The Carter administration was severely criticized for its southern Africa policy. As they neared the White House organizers on loud speakers shouted: "Carter is a double-talking hypocrite of the worst kind," "Jimmy Carter, you damn peanut farmer," and "Carter, Carter, Cut the Jive, Cut the Ties to Apartheid."[29]

Although media reports provided a superficial analysis of the conflicts that were keeping the nationalist groups apart, there is no doubt that the ideological strife had led to the marginalization of the initially promising mobilization of black nationalists by the ALSC. Nevertheless, the nationalists were able to draw thousands of activists to annual African Liberation Day marches for most of the 1970s. In the two major ALD marches held in 1978, for instance, media reports indicated that there were at least 5,000 demonstrators at the AAPRP rally on May 13 and at least 3,000 who turned up for the rival march organized by the NCSALD seven days later. This ability to mobilize large numbers of demonstrators in behalf of African liberation movements remained in sharp contrast to white-led organizations like the ACOA and WOA which focused on distribution of information but showed little interest in grassroots organizing until the Free South Africa Movement of the mid-1980s.[30] The

nationalists were also able to organize the black masses in contrast to the newly formed TransAfrica, which was a middle-class organization that focused on lobbying Congress and worked closely with black legislators and Democratic Party liberals. TransAfrica's leaders would later form the FSAM as a direct action arm of the movement.

TransAfrica's honeymoon with the Carter administration ended in late 1978 when twenty seven US Senators invited leaders of the white minority Rhodesian government to visit the United States in defiance of UN sanctions.[31] The invitation split the State Department where Assistant Secretary of States Richard Moose urged the administration to reject the Rhodesians' visa applications while supporters claimed that the whites should be granted a visa because Joshua Nkomo, an African nationalist leader, had been allowed to visit the United States. Nevertheless Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa visited the United States in violation of UN sanctions. TransAfrica petitioned the Carter administration to push for enforcement of United Nations sanctions even after Rhodesia held "multiracial" elections on 20 April 1979. "No election setting aside 28 percent of the parliamentary seats for 4 percent of the population (whites) solely on the basis of race can be characterized as free elections," TransAfrica wrote in a letter to President Carter signed by 185 black leaders including Harry Belafonte, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, and William Lucy, president of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists.[32] The letter urged Carter not to "legitimate a fraud" by voting to ease sanctions against Rhodesia after the elections. TransAfrica launched a major effort to persuade President Carter to maintain sanctions

despite the appointment of a government led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The groups bombarded the Carter administration with letters, petitions, appearances before congressional committees and speeches, making the Rhodesian sanctions issue a test of Carter's commitment to human rights.

Less than a month after the sham elections, the US Senate voted to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.[33] African American leaders were outraged. In May, TransAfrica increased the pressure on Carter, warning of a "backlash" if sanctions were lifted. "If he does (lift sanctions) he is not going back to the White House," Robinson told a thousand people at TransAfrica's second fund-raising dinner on 30 May.[34] Richard Hatcher, Mayor of Gary, Indiana and chairman of the board of TransAfrica warned Carter that "Support for either one of those regimes is a blow to black America. We will not tolerate .. one more hostile act against black people." Andrew Young, who was still US ambassador to the UN, said he was not discouraged by the Senate vote arguing that Carter would not lift sanctions.[35] On June 7 Carter announced that he would maintain sanctions against Rhodesia.[36] At a June 19 press conference TransAfrica praised Carter for keeping sanctions in place but threatened retaliation against Senators who voted to lift sanctions. "We want to make it clear that the black leadership is committed to respond to those in Congress who would embrace what is nothing more than a racist solution to the problems of Rhodesia," Robinson said in statement released to the press.[37]

The struggle over Rhodesian sanctions raised TransAfrica's profile in the African American community and the national media. It demonstrated Robinson's understanding of the foreign policy process and his ability to reframe the discourse through media events. This media savvy was demonstrated again in the choice of Harry Belafonte, the legendary entertainer and political activist, as the vice-chairman of TransAfrica's board of directors. During the 1960s, Belafonte was a fund-raiser for SNCC and other militant black organizations. As we saw in chapter three, it was Belafonte who encouraged SNCC activists to visit newly independent African countries and funded an important SNCC tour of Africa in 1964 that had a radical effect on the individuals involved and the movement as a whole. At a fund-raiser for TransAfrica on 20 August 1979, Belafonte praised the new organization for its work to maintain sanctions against Rhodesia. "If TransAfrica is successful in its task, there's a lot black people can do to turn this nation around ... we must build and carry forth a platform of influence so they can't get away with the mischief they would like to continue to perpetuate in southern Africa and in the West Indies."[38] Belafonte also used the occasion to blast the Carter administration for removing Andrew Young from his position as UN ambassador for meeting with Palestinian leaders. "I feel terribly uneasy about what happened to Andrew Young ... it's safe to say this country has done itself a great injury not having Andrew Young at the helm of the United Nations." The demise of Andrew Young demonstrated the African American community's relative lack of clout in foreign policy when compared to the Jewish lobby. Nevertheless a group of civil rights and political leaders sought a meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to discuss the issue. An angry Robinson told the press before the meeting

that African American comprised 12 percent of the population and had a duty to participate in the formulation of foreign policy. "Foreign policy is not made in a vacuum ... There's a core in the country that is largely WASP that sees itself as standard America. They say 'We are American and we make foreign policy.' (but) ... We are as authentically American as they. It's ridiculous to ask what black Americans are doing getting involved in foreign policy, as if it were made on the moon."[39]

By 1980 anti-apartheid sentiment was widespread in the African American community and quickly spreading to white students and religious groups. In addition to TransAfrica in Washington, nationalist oriented groups in New York City, Boston and Seattle continued to use direct action to force companies doing business with South Africa to withdraw. It is these groups that provided the basis for the emergence of a black-led coalition of anti-apartheid movements to push for US sanctions in the 1980s. On 2 March 1980 the National Black Agenda for the 1980s adopted by more than 1,000 leaders representing 300 organizations urged the United States to "sever all economic, diplomatic, political and cultural relations with South Africa. These measures should include a ban on new investment by United States companies, a program of tax penalties designed to require withdrawal of current investments, a ban on new bank loans to South African borrowers, and termination of all exportation to and importation from South Africa."[40] In September 1980 demonstrators picketed the South African Consulate in New York's Park Avenue where eighty American bankers and business leaders were meeting South Africa's Minister of Finance Owen Horwood. Horwood had called the meeting to discuss a $250 million loan

underwritten by Citibank to "test the credit worthiness" of South Africa at a time when it was engaged in a massive crack down on thousands of rebellious students who had boycotted classes to protest discriminatory education laws. South African police officers had already killed 32 people and detained hundreds. The demonstrators reminded passersby that the same banks that were lending South Africa millions of dollars refused to lend to Black and Latino residents of New York.

(De)Constructive Engagement, 1980-1984

> This (Reagan) is the most anti-black, pro-South African administration since apartheid was installed in 1948.
>
> Randall Robinson, 1982

The 1980s were characterized by a turn to the right in international politics that sparked renewed anti-apartheid struggles around the world. By 1980, conservative governments were in power in Britain, Portugal and Australia. The United States followed suit with the election of Ronald Reagan in a landslide victory on 5 November 1980. Within South Africa, the liberation movements had stepped up resistance efforts. The ANC bombed two Sasol Oil refineries in late 1979 and student and labor unrest continued to destabilize the apartheid regime. Tens of thousands of students had boycotted classes. Workers were on strike in meat packing, auto and rubber industries. Municipal workers struck in Johannesburg. The Botha regime, which had announced "neo-apartheid" reforms in 1979, backed away under pressure from the National Party's hard-liners. In February 1980 Botha told Parliament: "While we must remove unnecessary and hurtful laws, it is the right of my people to protect their schools and churches."[41] He stressed that the main pillars of apartheid --the Mixed Marriages Act,

the Group Areas Act, and the "homelands" policy, would remain in place. This speech was widely interpreted as a retreat to the narrow laager of Afrikanerdom. *Newsweek* warned of a "dangerous new militancy" citing evidence that "dissident blacks have stepped up their terrorist attacks and bombings in recent weeks."[42] *US News and World Report* also reported that "black terrorists had staged attacks on police stations. Labor strife among blacks is on the rise. ... Students shot."[43] The hand-wringing in the mainstream media, however, did not extend to support for sanctions. Instead, the media seemed to support South Africa's decision to place the mostly white army on a war footing. This is evident in an assessment of the liberation movement in South Africa since the Soweto uprising that appeared in a series of articles published in *The London Economist* of 21 June 1980 titled "Neo-apartheid will hold for now." Introducing the series, the magazine's editors dismissed the upsurge in resistance that had forced the Botha regime to declare a state of emergency and announce concessions to anti-apartheid forces. The article claimed that two months of labor and student unrest among South Africa's "colored" population in Cape Town that had led to 42 deaths were confused "outbursts of frustration" with no connection to organized struggle. Instead the editors argued that "non-white resistance to the white government today is still pitifully mute. ... Debilitated by exile, banning, arrest, and factionalism, black South Africa is still far from posing a coherent threat to the white government. Nor can it expect much support from front-line states who are now heavily dependent on South African assistance in rebuilding economies ravaged by the twin plagues of war and socialism."[44] *The Economist* arrogantly dismissed the ANC's sabotage campaign although its guerrillas had penetrated the interior of South Africa and

bombed two oil refineries. This growing consensus on the "stability" of white supremacy in South Africa dovetailed conveniently with the perspective in both the newly elected Conservative Party government led by Margaret Thatcher in Britain and in the Reagan camp in the United States.

Even before Ronald Reagan was elected president, there were reports that he would reverse the arms embargo and tone down the Carter administration's criticism of South Africa. "I'm frightened at the prospect of Ronald Reagan," TransAfrica's Randall Robinson said at his organization's third annual dinner attended by over 1,000 civil rights and political leaders on June 1, 1980.[45] Robinson's apprehension was well placed. On 12 June, candidate Reagan's foreign policy adviser John Churba said in Johannesburg that, if elected, Reagan would order a "fundamental re-evaluation" of South Africa policy and end the arms embargo.[46] Churba, who was an Air Force intelligence officer during the Ford administration, charged the Carter administration with "criminal neglect" for failing to recognize US interests in South Africa as a supplier of strategic minerals. He said he would urge Reagan to end the arms embargo, set up a Navy presence at the Simstown base and provide South Africa with helicopters and other arms to guard the Cape sea route. Churba had been invited to South Africa by the foreign ministry and was introduced at the conference by a South African government official. The American's views were given wide attention in the South African news media that emphasized his connection with the Republican candidate in the November election.

Reagan's massive victory on November 5 was interpreted as a victory for apartheid forces in South Africa. As the *Christian Science Monitor* put it the day after Reagan's election: "The desire to limit Soviet influence in Africa will probably be the driving principle behind a Reagan administration's southern Africa policy. And that could translate into a softening of criticism of the white minority government in South Africa, which is vehemently anti-communist."[47] During the campaign, Reagan had opposed Carter's human rights rhetoric arguing that "the South Africans certainly don't need us to tell them how to solve their race problems."[48] British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had been elected on a platform similar to Reagan's in 1979, "sent a particularly warm message of congratulation." *The Christian Science Monitor* noted that Thatcher was "the vanguard of a worldwide trend toward the right, evident in recent elections in Portugal, Australia, and Jamaica, as well as in the United States."[49]

Reagan's choice for Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, had an impeccable background as a cold warrior on the African front. While pursuing a doctorate in African studies at Johns Hopkins University in 1968-69 Crocker worked as an editor of *Africa Report* a CIA-funded magazine published by the African American Institute. In a 1979 article in *Foreign Affairs,* Crocker said of South Africa: "That country is by its nature a part of the West. It is an integral and important element of the Western global economic system. Historically, South Africa is by nature part of us." This open support of South African propaganda that it was part of the West -- and should therefore be provided the protection of NATO alliance

members-- was to become the basis of the Reagan administration's policy in southern Africa.

Soon after being elected, President Reagan told Walter Cronkite of CBS: "We cannot abandon a country that has stood by us in every war we ever fought--a country that is strategically essential to the free world in its production of minerals we must all have?"[50] Reagan's appalling ignorance of the Nationalist Party's support for the Nazis in World War II aside, he indicated that he considered South Africa a wartime ally, a friendly nation and a key supplier of strategic minerals. In March, Reagan administration officials said that Prime Minister P.W. Botha and a leader of one of the black "homelands" would be invited to Washington. The administration also tried to lift a five-year Congressional ban on US support for opposition movements in Angola and suggested a military pact with South Africa to counter the Cuban presence. Reagan's approach to terrorism encouraged South Africa to believe that it could use any means to pre-empt guerrilla attacks. This led to an increase in cross-border attacks throughout the 1980s. Defending Reagan's embrace of South African whites, *The Washington Post* wrote in an editorial "Mr. Reagan is under no obligation to have black Africans write his South Africa policy for him. He does not have to contribute, from his side, as Jimmy Carter seemed to from his, to the debilitating notion that the United States must choose between black and white in Africa. A respect for efforts at peaceful change within South Africa could have a positive fallout here as well as there."[51] The wording of this editorial was very revealing. It articulated what would become the cynical mantra of the Reagan administration--that the United States

"should not choose between black and white" in Africa while providing South African whites with loans, guns and legitimacy in international forums.

The Reagan Doctrine of support for apartheid became clear early in the administration. On March 25 the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, met with South African military officials despite a United Nations arms embargo that prohibited military involvement with South Africa. A week later, the South African military bombed civilian targets in Angola. Anti-apartheid groups immediately called for the resignation of Kirkpatrick for violating international sanctions. At a news conference called by the Congressional Black Caucus, Representative William H. Gray III, Democrat of Pennsylvania, said the meeting was clearly in violation of US policies and that "It has removed any effectiveness Ambassador Kirkpartick might have had at the United Nations." Gray said he found Kirkpartick's claim that she was not aware of the officials' identities "extremely hard to believe." The 18-member CBC said it considered the Reagan administration's actions "a slap in the face of 26 million black Americans" and warned that the rapprochement with South Africa would "isolate us from the peoples, markets and resources of the third world." The CBC representatives also vowed to introduce a resolution opposing President Reagan's plan to invite South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha for an official visit "until that country renounces its policy of apartheid." [52]

Nevertheless the US went ahead with plans to invite Botha and representatives of the illegitimate "Bantustan" regimes created by South Africa. Meanwhile, on April

30 1981, the US vetoed a sanctions resolution at the United Nations Security Council meeting. In May, South Africa's Foreign Minister Pik Botha became the first official from sub-saharan Africa to be invited to the White House by the new U.S administration. The White House visit was followed by two days of talks with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The Haig-Botha talks were a major milestone in US-South Africa relations. On May 17, the Reagan administration formally announced its "constructive engagement" policy just days after the infamous Haig-Botha meeting.[53] The term "constructive engagement" was taken from a winter 1980-81 *Foreign Affairs* article by Crocker shortly before he became Secretary of State for African Affairs. "Constructive engagement" rested on three assumptions that recalled Kissinger's NSSM # 39: (1) that the whites of South Africa were there to stay (2) that the whites were staunch anticommunist allies and part of Western civilization, (3) that the independence of Namibia should be tied to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.[54]

"The new policy sounds good," *The Washington Post* declared in an editorial dated 18 May. Arguing that there was a limit to "US capacity to use negative pressure" to promote change in South Africa, the *Post* opined that "there are stirrings of positive change among the ruling white minority, and it does make sense for this country to see what it can do to strengthen the reformers' hand."[55] Thus with a compliant media cheering on a wrong-headed administration's view that the Nationalist Party was the agent of racial reform in South Africa, the Reagan administration plunged into a full-scale partnership with the racist regime. It increased military and nuclear

collaboration, eased restrictions on the exports of US goods to South African security forces, colluded with South Africa against UN Security Council Resolution 435, and blocked a censure of South Africa for bombing Angola.[56]

According to documents leaked to TransAfrica and subsequently published in newspapers around the world, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker urged Haig to tell Botha that the United States was "ready to open a new chapter in relations with South Africa" and work toward a "future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security interests."[57] *Washington Post* reporter Joe Ritchie, who broke the story on 29 May 1981 after a tip off from Robinson, said US officials had confirmed basic information contained in the leaked papers. The papers suggested that if South Africa were to cooperate on an acceptable settlement on Namibian independence, the US would "work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically."[58] A recurring theme in the papers was the role that South Africa could play in countering Soviet influence in the southern African region. According to Ritchie, the papers provided "some of the clearest documentation yet of how far the United States is willing to go to help the internationally isolated Pretoria government attain some degree of respectability in the world." US officials said the new policy was based on the notion that officials would have more leverage with South Africa if they maintained a working relationship called "constructive engagement."

On returning to South Africa after talks with top US government officials including Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Botha praised the Reagan administration for its "pragmatism" on the Namibia question. "All around I found a much greater grasp and understanding, the ability to look at South Africa in a different light, to see the importance of the Cape route in a clear way, our strategic mineral and other things." Botha said his delegation had assured the United States that it was willing to guarantee access to strategic minerals and naval facilities and protect US investments in South Africa if the US recognized that there were "no shortcut solutions to the exercise of political power in South Africa." The South Africans also asked Washington to review Carter's restrictions on nuclear cooperation and approve licenses for the export of enriched nuclear fuel to South Africa.[59]

The release of these documents brought worldwide condemnation on the Reagan administration. African diplomats said that cooperation with South Africa was out of the question. Nigerian President Shehu Shagari, whose country was the second-largest supplier of oil to the United States, warned Reagan against tilting toward Pretoria or funding UNITA rebels in Angola. Randall Robinson and TransAfrica gained international recognition for the first time. Robinson was invited to address the Organization of African Unity's Heads of State Summit in Nairobi in 1981, becoming the first African American to address the OAU since Malcolm X in 1964.[60] The fiasco also made Robinson *persona non grata* at the State Department, which had contemplated legal action against TransAfrica for releasing "stolen" documents. "Robinson took documents that had been stolen and used them to undermine US

policy at the OAU meeting, and we consider that reprehensible," said Michael Wygant, a spokesman for the State Department's Africa Bureau.[61] After the debacle, Secretary of State Alexander Haig refused to meet any delegation that included Robinson.

In mid-August South African forces launched the largest invasion into Angola since 1975 killing 240 people 60 miles into Angolan territory. The *New York Times* reported on August 30 that South African Army officers had taken foreign journalists on a tour of the area "at the invitation of the Defense Ministry." In response to these renewed killings, the US cast the only veto against a Security Council Resolution condemning South Africa for the invasion. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker also released a statement on August 29 reiterating the cynical "neutrality" of the United States: "In South Africa it is not our task to choose between black and white... The Reagan administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa in order to curry favor elsewhere."[62] Throughout the 1980s the Reagan administration continued to defend South Africa's colonization of Namibia and attacks on Angola and Mozambique on the grounds that it had legitimate security needs created by the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. This linkage of Cuban troops with South African withdrawal gave South Africa yet another weapon in its campaign against Namibian independence.

During his first year in office, Reagan's blatant support for apartheid became a catalyst for the resurgence of the anti-apartheid movement. "People were

embarrassed," said Ronald Walters, a veteran of the anti-apartheid activism who was involved with the African Liberation Support Committee, and a founder of the Rainbow Coalition and TransAfrica. Walters traces the mobilization of white liberals, students and legislators to the racial implications of the Reagan's open support for apartheid.[63] This reaction was the catalyst for the emergence of a black-led coalition of anti-apartheid activists that resembled the civil rights coalition of the 1960s. This change in white liberal perspectives was demonstrated at a fund-raising meeting called by Randall Robinson in 1981 where it was evident that white churches and religious groups like the American Friends Service Committee were committed to working with TransAfrica.[64]

TransAfrica received another boost with the announcement that the World Council of Churches' Program to Combat Racism had included it among 46 in 75 countries that would receive a grant to fight racism in the US and South Africa.[65] TransAfrica received the $27,000 grant to help "mobilize against the Reagan administration's growing partnership with the anti-apartheid regime." Other groups included in the $587,000 grant were the South West Africa Peoples Organization, a guerrilla group that had waged a 15-year war against South African colonization. The ANC and PAC of South Africa also received part of the grant, which brought the WCC's Program to Combat Racism grants to $4.7 million since the program started in 1970. Critics accused the WCC of encouraging violence by funding "terrorist" groups. In August 1981 when The International Salvation Army withdrew its membership from the WCC because of opposition to grants made to Zimbabwe's Patriotic Front.

WCC officials, however, insisted that the grants were made for specific humanitarian projects that were designed to fight racism.[66]

Other evidence of the emergence of a multi-racial movement was the publication of a report titled "South Africa: Time Running Out," in May 1981 that recommended that the United States maintain its arms embargo agreed to in 1977 and extend it to subsidiaries of American corporations in foreign countries that do not observe the embargo.[67] It also called on the US to impose an investment ban although it did not call on US corporations to withdraw their $2 billion in investments in South Africa. The report was based on a two-year study funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and led by Franklin A. Thomas of the Ford Foundation. Thomas put together a commission called the Foreign Policy Study Foundation Inc. made up of leaders of corporations, universities, foundations, labor unions and social workers. The group interviewed US officials and South Africans of all races and put together a 456-page report that was promoted as "the most thorough report as yet on the subject." The report recommended that the United States stockpile industrial minerals and alloys to reduce its dependence on South Africa and urged increased aid and private investment in countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique to counter South Africa's destabilization efforts.

The commission's report did not support comprehensive sanctions, however, and was criticized by the more radical black groups associated with TransAfrica. Robert Browne, an international economist who resigned from the commission in

March 1980, argued that the commission's recommendations were "unlikely to bring about equitable sharing of power within a reasonable time frame." Browne's policy recommendation, which was submitted to the commission but not included in the final report, urged active support for the liberation movements. Browne argued that "violence is an integral and unavoidable feature of the South African scene; that the means by which the minority manages to retain control in South Africa is daily violence; and that violence therefore will be required to overthrow that system." This option would require the United States to provide generous financial and material support to the liberation movements and collaboration with the front-line states. Although Browne recognized that this was unlikely in the short-term, he called on non-governmental organizations to build a constituency for Africa through "an educational campaign to familiarize the public with the nature of the South African situation and why such a policy was the preferred one."[68]

TransAfrica and the Congressional Black Caucus launched a concerted campaign to educate state and local officials and their constituents on strategies for confronting apartheid.[69] In 1980 TransAfrica had contacted over 70 black legislators across the country to inform them about its anti-apartheid activities and provide them with a model divestment bill that they were encouraged to submit. In 1981 the campaign continued with divestment workshops at an annual conference of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators. Follow-up conferences and workshops were held in 1981 and 1983.[70]

TransAfrica's organizing efforts were aided by the Reagan administration's determination to support South Africa. In 1982 the Reagan administration officially announced the termination of the "no-contact with the South African military" policy. Since 1981 South African military intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. van der Westhuisen, the commander of South African forces in Namibia and the chief of the South African Army had visited the United States openly and held talks with top Pentagon and State Department officials.[71] In 1983 Lt. Gen. Johann Coetzee, Chief of South African Security Police, was included in an official delegation to the United States that held secret talks with Reagan administration officials on the topic of Namibia.

On 14 October 1982 the International Monetary Fund and Reagan administration officials announced that they would approve a $1.1 billion loan to South Africa.[72] The *New York Times* reported that the deal would receive approval of treasury department officials despite "strong objections" raised at the UN General Assembly by Democratic Congressmen and human rights groups. The *Times* reported that South Africa had received the loans because the country was in its deepest recession in 50 years and its "foreign reserves were not sufficient to cover one week's imports." The recession had been caused by the plunge in the price of gold and the lack of investor confidence generated by the sustained violence and labor unrest since the Soweto Rebellion of June 1976.

Members of the Congressional Black Caucus and Democratic Party allies announced plans to block the I.M.F. loan to South Africa. The CBC proposed

legislation that would bar the United States from supporting IMF loans to countries that violated human rights. Howard E. Wolpe of Michigan, who was the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, announced plans to call for special hearings during the pre-election recess.[73] On October 21, thirty-five members of Congress warned Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan that: "It is very likely that the question of US participation in the IMF will be raised during the next session of Congress."[74] Nevertheless, the Reagan administration voted for the IMF loan on November 3, approving the largest loan in South African history just as the country was declaring war on students, workers and neighboring countries. Members of the CBC argued that the loan would be perceived as an endorsement of South Africa's policies and viewed by the non-white majority as support for an unjust status quo.[75] About 50 demonstrators marched outside IMF headquarters to protest the fund's plan to lend $1.7 billion to South Africa. Washington D.C. delegate Walter Fauntroy, who led the demonstration, said the CBC had failed to persuade the Reagan administration to delay or oppose the vote. Randall Robinson claimed the loan was "an indirect subsidy of South Africa's military campaigns." The vote by 22 executive directors of the IMF granted the first loan to South Africa since Nixon administration approved a loan in 1975.[76]

The battle over the IMF vote continued into the next year when a House banking subcommittee voted to block US support for IMF loans to South Africa.[77] This vote highlighted the Reagan administration's loss of credibility among Democratic members of Congress. Rep. Stan Lundine (D-NY) said he had come to

support the anti-apartheid position reluctantly. Lundine said the committee had been forced to take the vote because the Reagan administration had refused to grant them an audience on the issue. The House Foreign Relations Committee also approved legislation to restrict US bank loans to South African Government, ban the sale of Krugerrand coins and put official sanctions behind the "Sullivan Principles." The Reagan administration strongly objected to the legislation.[78] These votes won the support of *The New York Times's* liberal commentator Anthony Lewis who wrote "Americans who watch South Africa see no significant measures to improve the legal and political status of the black majority."[79]

As the 1984 elections loomed, African American leaders made it clear apartheid would be an important issue in the campaign. According to Milton Coleman of the *Washington Post*, "Black politicians, civil rights leaders and special interest groups are pitching U.S. policy in the Third World as a potential issue in the 1984 campaign."[80] Coleman cited a "People's Platform" endorsed by civil rights leaders that had called for an African American to seek nomination as the Democratic Party's candidate for president in 1984. The 119-page report criticized US foreign policy as "bellicose, racist and interventionist." In June 1983, *TransAfrica Forum* published a survey of five Democratic presidential candidates who all said they would alter US relations with Africa and extend diplomatic recognition to Cuba.[81] The candidates denounced the Reagan administration's actions in Africa as divisive, ineffective and violent. Senator Hollins of South Carolina said he would support comprehensive

sanctions against South Africa while the others said they would use comprehensive sanctions as a threat and discourage investments.

The Rainbow Coalition

By 1984 apartheid had become a major issue in African American politics. Nevertheless Jesse Jackson, who entered the race for the nomination as the Democratic Party's candidate for president, was able to "blindside" the other candidates with the South Africa issue during nationally televised debates.[82] The news that Jackson would run for the presidency electrified the black community and its supporters. Jackson's plan was to revive the civil rights coalition of the 1960s and ride a wave of discontent into the White House.

The Rainbow Coalition and Jackson's campaigns for nomination in 1984 and 1988 were to have a major impact on the anti-apartheid movement. Jesse Jackson's public statements against South African apartheid date back at least to 1967 when his name begins to appear in major newspapers as a representative of the anti-apartheid position.[83] It is Jackson, more than any other civil-rights leader, who carried King's ideas on foreign policy into the 1970s while transforming them to fit the nationalist tone of the time. He played a prominent role in rethinking the role of African-Americans in politics, addressing many of the key black political conventions of the 1970s including the 1972 Gary Convention where he endorsed the Black Agenda that called for a greater level of black participation in local and foreign politics. He also condemned U.S. government support for white supremacist regimes in Rhodesia,

South Africa and Namibia.[84] Like other anti-apartheid activists Jackson condemned the Nixon administration's southern Africa containment policy encapsulated in National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's National Security Memorandum #39 (NSSM) that recommended closer ties with white supremacist governments in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa.[85] Jackson's Operation PUSH was also a prominent member of the Black Leadership Conference of 1976 that endorsed the "African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa" that led to the formation of TransAfrica, the African-American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean in 1979. The meeting supported armed struggle in southern Africa and criticized the U.S. for "hypocrisy" in its support for South Africa.[86] Thus Jackson was a participant in the rethinking of the role of Africa in African American consciousness. He played a role in the early anti-apartheid movement; providing a concrete link between the civil rights movements in the 1960s and the Pan-Africanist movements of the 1980s.

The emergence of the Rainbow Coalition in 1984 coincided with a violent uprising against apartheid in South Africa itself that brought into American homes pictures of daily clashes between unarmed protesters and armed police, reviving anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States. These images of violence also led to the reinvention of the anti-apartheid struggle as a mass-movement with a national following. It brought together single-issue movements like the peace, environmentalist and feminist movements and created a remarkable consensus on the issue of sanctions against South Africa. Along with Jesse himself, several other key staffers of the coalition provided a direct link to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The chief

foreign policy advisor in the 1984 campaign was Jack O'Dell, former international affairs director of Operation PUSH and long-time civil rights activist who had worked with Martin Luther King on the staff of the SCLC. There was Mary Tate and Ramsey Clark of the World Peace Council. Ronald Walters, then a Howard University professor, also served on the platform committees of 1984 and 1988.

Jackson moved into a more prominent position in the anti-apartheid movement during his campaigns for nomination as the Democratic candidate for president in 1984 and 1988. The Rainbow Coalition took the struggle to a national stage, involving a multi-racial community in a movement that had been mostly identified with African-Americans. His campaign also forced the Democratic Party to take an unprecedented position of condemning the white supremacist regime in its party platforms of 1984 and 1988. Curtina Moreland-Young argues in "A View From The Bottom: A Descriptive Analysis of Jackson Platform Efforts" that platform politics have been an important feature of party politics since the Republican Party issued the first platform in 1832.[87] Moreland-Young, who helped draft the Democratic Party platform in 1984 as a member of the platform committee of the Democratic National Convention, argues that "party platforms have a high incidence of influencing or becoming national plans." She claims that the "language on Africa in the Democratic platform is virtually the Jackson plank." The plank included a commitment to exert "maximum pressure by banning all new loans; prohibiting sale or transfer of computer or nuclear technology; withdrawing landing rights to South African aircraft; increasing sanctions against South Africa until it granted independence to Namibia; and developing trade ties with

the nations of Africa.[88] Moreland-Young contends that the presence of Jackson representatives in the platform committee led to the inclusion of the Africa plank in the Democratic party platform, a significant advance from the 1980 platform where Africa was discussed but did not receive the attention that it got in the 1984 campaign.

[1]*New York Times* 7 Aug. 1976. pg. 1

[2]*New York Times* 6 Aug. 1976. pg. 1

[3]*New York Times* 9 September 1976. pg. 3

[4]*New York Times* 24 October 1976. pg. 4.

[5]*New York Times* 26 November 1976. pg. 2.

[6]Quoted in *Amsterdam News* 15 September 1976. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00923.

[7]Press Release. "Support Grows in New York City Area For South African Blacks," Blacks in Solidarity with South African Liberation. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00928.

[8]BISSAL press release 15 September 1976. ACOA Papers Part 2 Reel 17 Frame 00917

[9] Willard Johnson, interview, June 15 2000; See also Williad Johnson. "Getting Over By Reaching Out: Lesson From the Divestment and Krugerrand Campaigns," The Black Scholar Spring 1999 Volume 29, No. 1 pgs. 6-7

[10]Willard Johnson, interview, June 15 2000; See also Williad Johnson. "Getting Over By Reaching Out: Lesson From the Divestment and Krugerrand Campaigns," The Black Scholar Spring 1999 Volume 29, No. 1 pgs. 6-7

[11]"The African American Manifesto on Southern Africa," *Freedomways* No. 4, 1976. Reprinted in Ester Cooper Jackson ed. Freedomways Reader Prophets in Their Own Country. (Boulder: Westview, 2000) 191-198.

[12]Robinson, pg. 96-97.

[13]Robinson, Randall. Defending the Spirit A Black Life in America. New York: Duntton, 1998. pg. 68.

[14]Robinson, pg. xiv..

[15]Robinson pg. xiv.

[16]Robinson, pg. 69.

[17]Robinson, pg. 91.

[18]Harold Hogan, "A Black Political Group Set Up As Africa Lobby," 21 May 1978 *The Washington Post* A18

[19]*The Washington Post* 21 May 1978 A18

[20]*New York Times* 14 January 1977. pg. 2.

[21]*The Washington Post* 22 March 1977. A18.

[22]*The Washington Post* 14 May 1977. A1

[23]*The Washington Post* 16 May 1977. C1.

[24]*The Washington Post* 21 May 1977. A10.

[25]*New York Times* 27 May 1977. pg. 1.

[26]*The Washington Post* 23 August 1977. A1.

[27]Murrey Marder, "Vance Seeks South African Backing for Rhodesia Talks," *The Washington Post* 14 April 1978 A20.

[28]Lawrence Feinberg, "3,000 Marchers Protest U.S.-S. African ties," *The Washington Post* 21 May 1978 C2.

[29]*The Washington Post* 21 May 1978 C2.

[30]Abdul Alkalimat, telephone interview, May 15, 2000

[31]*New York Times* 27 September 1978

[32]"Group Decries Rhodesia Elections, Urges Sanctions," *The Washington post* 21 March 1979 A17

[33]*The Washington Post* 30 May 1979

[34]Jacqueline Trescott, Jacqueline Trescott, Jacqueline Trescott, Jacqueline Trescott, Jacqueline Trescott, "US Lobby Warns of Backlash If Rhodesian Government Approved," 30 May 1979 *The Washington Post* B1

[35]Ironically Young had voted only a week before to allow South Africa to participate in the UN General Assembly.

[36]*The Washington Post* 19 June 1979 A20

[37]Warren Brown, "U.S. Black Leaders Support Continuation of Rhodesian Boycott," *The Washington Post* 19 June 1979 A20

[38]Jacqueline Trescott, "Turning Out for Belafonte," 21 August 1979 *The Washington Post* B8

[39]"Is There Life After Andy?" 16 September 1979 *The Washington Post* A4

[40]Gail Morlan. "We Want Our Chains Removed The South African Divestment Campaign," *The Black Collegian* December 1980/January 1981. pg. 117.

[41]"South Africa: Botha backs Down on Apartheid Reform," *Newsweek* 18 February 1980 pg. 58.

[42]*Newsweek* 18 February 1980 pg. 58.

[43]Robin Knight "Why South Africa's racial split widens," *US News & World Report* 9 June 1980 pg. 55.

[44]"Neo-apartheid will hold for now," *The Economist* 21 June 1980 pg. 12.

[45]2 June 1980 *The Washington Post* D1

[46]*New York Times* 13 June 1980. pg. 14.

[47]"How the World reacts to Reagan's massive victory," *Christian Science Monitor* 6 November 1980. Article by Gary Thatcher reporting from Johannesburg. pg. 6

[48]Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor* 6 November 1980 pg. 6.

[49]"How the World reacts to Reagan's massive victory," *Christian Science Monitor* 6 November 1980. Article by Rushworth M. Kidder reporting from London, pg. 6

[50]Quoted in Elizabeth Schmidt, "'Marching to Pretoria': Reagan's South Africa Policy on the Move," *TransAfrica Forum* Fall 1983 pg. 5.

[51]"A South African Partner," *The Washington Post* 22 March 1981. D6

[52]"Black Legislators Urge the Dismissal of Mrs. Kirkpatrick," *New York Times* 27 March 1981. A8.

[53]*The Washington Post* 18 May 1981. A14

[54]Chester A Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1980/81, p. 327.

[55]*The Washington Post* 18 May 1981. A14

[56]Elizabeth Schmidt, "'Marching to Pretoria': Reagan's South Africa Policy on the Move," *TransAfrica Forum* Fall 1983 pg. 7.

[57]Robinson, pg. 133. *Washington Post*, 29 May 1981.

[58]Joe Ritche, "U.S. Details Ternms for Closer South African Ties," 29 May 1981 *The Washington Post* A21; "Documents link Namibia solution to better US ties to South Africa," *New York Times* 30 May 1980 A4

[59]Ritchie, ibid. A30

[60]Robinson, 136

[61]Jill Nelson, "Apartheid's Imposing Enemy," *Mother Jones* July 1982 pg. 68

[62]*New York Times* 30 August 1981. A1.

[63]Ronald Walters, telephone interview, May 31 2000.

[64]Walters interview 31 May 2000.

[65]*The New York Times* 22 September 1981 A3

[66]*The Washington Post* 17 October 1981 C12

[67]The report was published under the title: *South Africa Time Running Out* (Foreign Policy Study Foundation Inc., Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981). See also Juan de Onis, "Private report recommends U.S. expand embargo on South Africa," *The New York Times* 21 May 1981. A1.

[68]Robert S. Browne, "U.S. Policy Toward Apartheid: Three Option," *TransAfrica Forum* Winter 1986. 5-7

[69]A good case study of local anti-apartheid action in Connecticut is Janice Love, The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement Local Activism in Global Politics. (New York: Preager, 1985)

[70]Love, 45.

[71]Schnidt, 10

[72]Raymond Bonner, "$1.1 million loan to South Africa reportedly to get I.M.F. approval," *The New York Times* 15 October 1982 A1.

[73]*The New York Times* 15 October 1982 A1.

[74]"Members of Congress fight IMF Loan to South Africa," *The Washington Post* 2 November 1982. A1

[75]"Members of Congress fight IMF Loan to South Africa," *The Washington Post* 2 November 1982. A1

[76]4 November 1982 *The Washington Post* A7

[77]"House Panel Bars US Vote for IMF Aid to South Africa," *The Washington Post* 6 May 1983 A1.

[78]Media reports indicated that South Africa had increased its borrowing in the United States to $623 million in 1982. *The New York Times* 8 May 1983 pg. 17.

[79]Anthony Lewis, "The Corge Rises," *The New York Times* 8 May 1983 pg. 17.

[80]Milton Coleman, "5 democratic Candidates Favor Africa, Caribbean Policy Shift," *The Washington Post* A15

[81]*TransAfrica Forum* June 1983.

[82]Ronald Walters, telephone interview, May 31 2000. Walters was Jackson's foreign affairs consultant during the campaign.

[83]A survey of the New York Times Personal Name Index shows references to Rev. Jesse Jackson dating back to 1967 and statements related to South Africa dating back to at least 1969.

[84]Paullette Pierce. "The Roots of the Rainbow Coalition" The Black Scholar, March/April 1988. pg. 2.

[85]Jackson, Henry F. From Congo to Soweto: US Foreign Policy Towards Africa Since 1960. New York: William Marrow, 1982. pgs. 123-126.

[86]Fierce, Mildred C. Selected Black American Leaders and Organizations and South Africa, 1900-1977. Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 17 No. 3, March 1987. pg. 322.

[87]Curtina Moreland-Young. "A View From The Bottom: A Descriptive Analysis of Jackson Platform Efforts," in Barker and Walters. Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989. pg. 149.

[88]Moreland-Young, ibid., pg. 156.

CHAPTER 8

THE FREE SOUTH AFRICA MOVEMENT

> In my 20 years of working on this (anti-apartheid), I have never seen such a ground swell as we are currently seeing. I think one reason is that the level of resistance in South Africa has never been the way it is now. I also think there has never been a point at which the black community and particularly the leadership of the black community has been as mobilized as they currently are on this issue.
>
> Prexy Nesbitt, Chicago union organizer, 1985[1]

On 21 November 1984, four African-American leaders entered the South African consulate in Washington DC and refused to leave until the South African regime dismantled apartheid and released all political prisoners. Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, Congressman Walter Fauntroy, Mary Frances Berry a member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, and Eleanor Holmes Norton, a law professor and former Carter administration official, had been invited to discuss U.S.-South African relations with South African ambassador Bernadus G. Fourie. After presenting their ultimatum to the ambassador, Norton left the room to brief the international press while Robinson, Berry and Fauntroy remained behind and were arrested. After spending a night in jail, the three announced the formation of the Free South Africa Movement and began daily demonstrations outside the embassy. The sit-ins took hold in more than two dozen other cities, including Chicago, New Orleans, Seattle, New York, San Francisco and Cleveland with weekly demonstrations at South African consulates, federal buildings, coin shops that dealt in gold Krugerrand coins, and businesses with South African interests. Hundreds of celebrities including Gloria

Steinem, Harry Belafonte, Amy Carter, Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, Coretta Scott King, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and at least 22 Congressmen were arrested outside the embassy.[2] The movement, which was a coalition of church, student, civil rights and women's groups, also spread to hundreds of college campuses across the country where rallies and sit-ins questioned the investment of university pension funds in companies that do business with South Africa. Hundreds of students were arrested in schools like Harvard, Columbia, UCLA, University of Wisconsin, Northwestern University and the University of Illinois. Over 5,000 people were arrested across the country in a 12-month period.

Coordinated by the FSAM, TransAfrica and the Congressional Black Caucus, this upsurge in anti-apartheid activism influenced Congress to adopt the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over President Ronald Reagan's veto in 1986. Why did the Free South Africa Movement succeed in influencing Congress to impose comprehensive finance and trade sanctions against South Africa the 1986 where 4 decades of anti-apartheid activism in the United States had failed? Besides the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the presence of African Americans in Congress, the Free South Africa Movement stood on the shoulders of the decades of activism on the question at local and national levels.

The catalyst for this resurgence in anti-apartheid activism was the retrenchment of racism on both sides of the Atlantic. In South Africa, a new constitution unveiled on 3 September 1984 gave 800,000 Indians and 2.5 million

"coloreds" their own legislatures while still excluding the 23 million black majority from power. This constitution was rejected emphatically by the black people of South Africa. Residents of Sharpeville met the new constitution with a massive rent strike and sparked demonstrations and rioting that claimed hundreds of lives.[3] Within weeks, the regime had arrested virtually all the black trade union leaders. The United Nations General Assembly deliberated and passed a resolution condemning the arrests. Although the resolution passed unanimously, the United States abstained. Once again the anti-apartheid community was outraged at the decision of the United States government which claimed to oppose apartheid yet continued to protect the regime in international forums. Robinson, who was then the president of TransAfrica, decided to launch a direct action campaign to force the United States to impose sanctions against the apartheid regime.[4]

On 21 November 1984 TransAfrica organized the sit-ins at the South African Embassy. Robinson, Fauntroy and Berry spent the night in jail. The initial reaction to the sit-ins in the national media was muted. *The New York Times* put the article on its national news page (B10) while *The Washington Post* put the story on page one.[5] Both newspapers focused on the most prominent of the three --DC. Congressional Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy -- in their headlines and leads --"Fauntroy Arrested in Embassy," (WP) and "Capital's Delegate Held in Embassy Sit-in," (NYT). The *Post* reported that Secret Service officers removed the demonstrators from the South African Embassy in handcuffs and charged them with unlawful entry of an embassy, "a misdemeanor that can draw a penalty of up to six months in jail and a $100 fine." According to a

statement from the South African Embassy published in the *New York Times*: "Congressman Fauntroy, Mr. Randall Robinson and Miss Berry asked for an appointment with the Ambassador for a discussion on South Africa. After an amicable discussion it came to our notice through the media's telephone inquiries that they intended to stage a sit-in until their demands for the release of labor leaders had been met. Under the circumstances they were asked to leave, which they refused to do. The police were then asked to remove them from the premises. No charges were laid."[6]

"Ours was an act of conscience in response to the repressive action of the South African government with respect to the noble, nonviolent protests of black South Africans over the last few months," Fauntroy told reporters after the anti-apartheid activists were released on November 22. The group announced the formation of the Free South Africa Movement that Fauntroy said would appeal to the conscience of grassroots Americans and move the struggle to "a new level."[7] Fauntroy said this shift in strategy was necessary because efforts to persuade Congress to impose sanctions had failed. Robinson described the goals of the FSAM as threefold: (1) to win the release of all black political prisoners; (2) to lobby for a power-sharing agreement between liberation movements and the South African government, and (3) to compel President Reagan to abandon his "constructive engagement" policy. Robinson also said that demonstrations would be held daily outside the embassy and at South African consulates throughout the country. On 26 November Representative Charles Hayes of Illinois and Rev. Joseph E. Lowery of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference were arrested after refusing to leave the South African

Embassy. To broaden the protest, FSAM issued an appeal to white trade unionists whose interests would also be hurt by "slave labor" in South Africa.

Soon, reporters began to compare the sit ins to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Eight days after the first sit-ins, *The Washington Post* wrote:

> The reelection of Ronald Reagan and concern about increased repression of blacks in South Africa led American black leaders to revive some of their old civil rights protest tactics from the 1960s and apply them to a new civil rights struggle, organizers of recent demonstrations outside the South African Embassy said yesterday.[8]

The article also said that the Free South Africa Movement planned to expand the protests to South Africa's thirteen consulates in the United States. The reporter marveled at the size of the demonstrations. "The anti-apartheid movement, in the space of a few weeks, appears to have galvanized black support like no other social issue since the civil rights movement of 20 years ago." The demonstrators said that among the issues that had re-ignited the movement was Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy that had intensified the exploitation of South Africans. "We saw oppression directly intensified as a result of the reelection of Ronald Reagan," Randall Robinson of TransAfrica told the press: "It was almost pegged to the reelection. All the black township invasions intensified, the killings." The activists said they had started planning the sit-ins after the reelection of Reagan and Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) on November 6. They argued that "slave wages" had made South Africa attractive for US corporations and blamed Reagan for the defeat of the Gray Amendment that would have prevented US companies from investing in South Africa.

Time magazine also compared the anti-apartheid demonstrations to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. "It could have been a scene from the civil rights movement of the 1960s: a large crowd of demonstrators, most of them black, marching in peaceful protest down an avenue in Washington, chanting slogans and carrying signs. But the series of rallies that have been taking place on Embassy Row during the past two weeks are against racism in another country; the apartheid government of South Africa."[9] The FSAM garnered attention in California, where the *San Diego Union-Tribune* reported that crowds were still growing after a week of protests outside the South African Embassy. The paper reported that Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary had joined 250 people in the largest demonstration outside the South Africa Embassy. Those arrested included Yolanda King, daughter of Martin Luther King Jr., and the first white person to be arrested, Gerald McEntee, president of the 1.1 million-member American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. McEntee pledged the support of his union to the movement and said that black trade unionists in South Africa deserved support because they were the "only moderate force for change" left in the country. According to the *Union-Tribune*, "The marches have attracted new protesters daily and held the media's attention in a city where demonstrations are as common as long-winded political speeches. More than three dozen reporters and cameramen were on hand yesterday."

On 27 November, the *Washington Post* upheld the right of Americans to demonstrate against apartheid but argued disingenuously that "No administration's

policy is going to satisfy the American's most seized of the monstrous nature of apartheid." The editorial also equated the Reagan administration's policy with anti-apartheid activity by claiming that both the Reagan administration and anti-apartheid groups were committed to nonviolent change and only disagreed over tactics. The Reagan administration hit a similar note by insisting that its constructive engagement policy was really an anti-apartheid policy and that it was getting results. In it first official reaction to the protests on December 3, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker said the administration had condemned apartheid as morally wrong and insisted that the role of the United States was to ensure that change came about peacefully.[10] Crocker called charges that constructive engagement constituted tacit approval of apartheid "rubbish." Crocker said the administration supported the right of Americans to demonstrate but had decided not to charge the activists in court. Demonstrators had accused the Justice Department of denying them a forum to express their views by first arresting 16 protesters and then dropping all charges. Meanwhile the *New York Times* reported that apartheid had become a major issue in Washington and that Mr. Crocker himself had taken the time to address the issue at his daughter's social studies class at Sidwell Friends School.

The Tutu Factor

Meanwhile, Bishop Desmond Tutu, who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize of 1984 for his anti-apartheid activism, said he wanted a face-to-face meeting with President Reagan to discuss the sanctions issue. Tutu had received a highly unusual standing ovation from members of the bi-partisan House Foreign Relations

subcommittee on Africa after his testimony at a hearing on apartheid.[11] At the hearing, Tutu called Reagan's constructive engagement policy "immoral, evil and totally un-Christian," and accused the United States of being "an accessory before and after the fact" of apartheid. Tutu indicated that he would no longer meet with administration officials below the president and secretary of state because he had failed to persuade Chester Crocker that "constructive engagement has worsened our situation on apartheid."

On December 6 the White House announced that Reagan would meet Bishop Tutu to discuss the administration's policies toward South Africa. During the December 7 meeting Reagan assured Tutu that the United States was against apartheid but rejected calls for sanctions. Some minutes into the meeting, the South African Government announced that it had released 11 prisoners and five others on bail.[12] Reagan immediately took credit for the release saying "I don't think we are being too bold in taking credit for this." He also said there was no evidence that the demonstrations at South African embassies and consulates around the country had secured the release. Reagan said that those who were criticizing US companies for doing business in South Africa were acting out of "ignorance."

After the meeting Tutu said "it was quite clear that we are nowhere nearer to each other than before I entered the White House." He said that the administration's constructive engagement policy had not proven effective and that things had worsened for South Africans. President Reagan disagreed. "I have to disagree with him that the

situation has worsened," said the president. "We have made sizable progress there in expressing our repugnance for apartheid and in persuading the South African Government to make changes. And we are going to continue with that policy." Tutu's Nobel Peace Prize and his meeting with President Reagan raised the visibility of the ongoing anti-apartheid protests to new heights. By the December 7 meeting, 27 protesters had been arrested in Washington. Five days of continuous protests in New York City had brought the arrests of Rep. Charles Rangel, D-Manhattan; Rep. Edolphus Towns, D-Brooklyn; Victor Gotbaum, executive director of District Council 37 of the American Federation of States, County and Municipal Employees, and Jack Sheinken, international secretary of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union. Also arrested for blocking access to the South African consulate at 425 Park Avenue were Haywood Burns, co-chairman of the National Council of Black Lawyers, and Barbara Dudley, president of the National Lawyers Guild.

Meanwhile, Reagan was under pressure from his own party as 35 conservative Republicans warned that they would vote for sanctions if South Africa did not change its policies.[13] The warning was contained in a letter delivered to South African Ambassador Benardus Fourie. "We are looking for an immediate end to violence in South Africa accompanied by a demonstrated sense of urgency about ending apartheid," the letter said. Although the congressmen did not attack the Reagan administration's constructive engagement policies members of the Congressional Black Caucus hailed the move as a significant shift in the mood on Capitol Hill for

tougher policies toward South Africa. Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich) called the letter a "first step in making this a bipartisan or nonpartisan issue."

By mid-December hundreds had been arrested around the country and the movement gaining momentum in colleges and universities. In Washington, New York, Boston, Chicago and other cities, politicians, labor leaders, civil rights activists and students provoked arrest by crossing police lines at South African consulates and companies doing business with South Africa. The increasing pressure for sanctions was evident in the statements of political leaders from both the left and right. On December 9, for instance, Sens. Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana) and Daniel Moynihan (D-New York) appeared on NBC's "Meet The Press" where they both called for stronger action against apartheid. Lugar, who was chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, called on Reagan to denounce apartheid "more sharply and more often." Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) said the US should "have nothing whatever to do with the South African government." Lugar, however, said limiting US investments would have a "minimal effect" on South Africa's policies. Even Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA.) warned, "the United States in the end is not going to be on the side of the current governing force in South Africa."[14] Republican Senators Lugar and Nancy Kassebaum, chairperson of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, sent a letter to Reagan urging him to speak out more forcefully on apartheid. The senators said the US had failed to attack the "evils of apartheid and the human rights violations in clear and understandable manner." The FSAM scored again with the announcement that representatives of 120 US companies operating in South Africa

had agreed to go beyond the Sullivan Principles and improve pay and working conditions for the black employees.[15] Rev. Leon Sullivan, author of the principles, told the *Financial Times* after the meeting: "This is the first time American companies have entered the political arena in South Africa and pushed for an end to apartheid."

On December 11 the pressure began to show as Reagan denounced apartheid calling on Pretoria to "reach out" to its black majority in a speech marking International Human Rights Day. Reagan said his administration wanted South Africa to end forced removal of Africans from their communities, detention without trial and lengthy imprisonment of black leaders.[16] President P.W. Botha remained defiant, ruling out any change in the basic structures of apartheid. "No quiet diplomacy or hard shouting will keep us from seeking the road of justice," Botha said in reference to Reagan's suggestion that South Africa had released 11 detainees because of pressure from the United States. Eight of the detainees were quickly re-arrested and charged with treason for campaigning against the new constitution that disenfranchised 22 million people of African descent.[17]

The New York Times also changed its tune and came close to calling for sanctions by endorsing Rep. Stephen Solarz's bill that would have blocked nearly $400 million in US bank loans to the South African Government.[18] The *Times* also noted that FSAM "protests, more than quiet diplomacy, account for the release in recent days of more than 20 black political detainees. Now the demonstrations appear to have changed Mr. Reagan's tone as well." The reaction from the anti-apartheid community

was skeptical: "President Reagan's moral condemnation of South Africa must be seen as a change in rhetoric and, one hopes, a change in direction. But it's important that the change be taken to its logical conclusion. South Africa can stand one more moral condemnation but it cannot stand diplomatic and economic reinforcement of that condemnation. We didn't just condemn Poland or Cuba, but we put our political and economic muscle behind it. We must do the same thing with South Africa."[19]

Reagan's unusual utterance was seen as a sign that the demonstrations, and the extensive coverage they were receiving worldwide, were having an effect on the administration. *Time* reported on December 24 that "there was widespread suspicion that Reagan was bowing to a wave of anti-apartheid protest that continued to grow ... in the capital and at least 13 other US cities."[20]US officials quickly denied that anything had changed, insisting that Reagan's remarks were "fully consistent" with constructive engagement. The article concluded, however, that the administration "may be right that ... hopes and expectations for reform in South Africa are unrealistic, and that even drastic punitive action, such as pulling all U.S. investment out of South Africa, would be unlikely to change that unpalatable fact. The US can in fact claim some success for helping persuade South Africa to sign recent agreements with its neighbors." *Time* went even further claiming that South African reforms "are more significant than critics care to admit." On the same day, the *US News & World Report* described the exchange between Reagan and Botha as a "careful duel" that "masked a strong determination by leaders of both countries to damage relations as little as

possible." The paper also reported that "Reagan was unlikely to bend to demands from inside and outside Congress that he step up criticism of Pretoria."[21]

Meanwhile Senator William Proximire, a Democrat from Wisconsin, announced that he would introduce legislation to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. Proximire, who was described by the *Financial Times of London* as "a man who is sometimes accused of playing too readily to the gallery of public opinion," said if the Senate were allowed to vote on the sanctions measure it would pass because "there is growing bi-partisan support for action on this matter."[22] The *Financial Times* also noted that the Reagan administration was beginning to respond to the "change of mood" on the issue of apartheid, citing Reagan's meeting with Desmond Tutu and the president's critical remarks on Human Rights Day.

In January, conservative periodicals like *The Wall Street Journal* and *The New Republic* poured scorn on the anti-apartheid activists. Suzanne Garment of the WSJ wrote, "We know some black leaders involved in this South Africa campaign have turned back to an old civil rights-style moral issue because they do not have a pornographer's chance in Iran of succeeding in today's political climate with the newer agenda of quotas and ever expanding social programs." After quoting Garment approvingly, TNR went a step further, telling African Americans to stay out of foreign policy and "turn their attention back home" because "agitation against South Africa is no substitute for the reckoning that American blacks must make with their own political mistakes."[23] Among the "mistakes" mentioned were Jesse Jackson's run for

the presidency and the "wretchedness of black inner-city indigents." Nevertheless, the editorial supported the action of Republicans who had urged Reagan to condemn apartheid more openly while maintaining the conservative position that the United States had little leverage over South Africa. "Indeed language may be our strongest weapon," TNR declared.

Meanwhile Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, embarked on a stormy eight-day tour of South Africa during which he embarrassed the South African government by staging a dramatic protest against the refusal to let him visit Nelson Mandela in a Cape Town prison.[24] He also met Winnie Mandela in the small town of Brandford, where she broke a banning order to meet the US senator. Later, Kennedy demanded that the Reagan administration put an end to its constructive engagement policy and vowed to introduce legislation to disengage the US from the white minority in South Africa. "Only a few extremists in my country still defend the government of South Africa. Patience is running out across the political spectrum. Not only Democrats but Republicans and President Reagan even are speaking out against apartheid."

The South African government denounced Kennedy with two cabinet ministers complaining that Kennedy had reneged on a deal to examine both sides of the "extremely complicated" issue. Gerrit Viljoen, minister for community development and Chris Heunis, minister for constitutional development, said they viewed Kennedy's trip with "amusement, disgust and doubt." Viljoen and Heunis claimed the

ongoing political reform would eventually give Africans some power but that apartheid's "separate development" policies would remain in effect.

Both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* published critical editorials on Kennedy's trip. The *Times* described the trip as "Troublemaking in South Africa" and argued that the trip, and sanctions, was not likely to do any good.[25] The *Post* called Kennedy's tour a "striking media event" but also claimed it would have little effect beyond raising Kennedy's profile. The *Post's* editorials also questioned the ability of the US to change South Africa. It claimed that "constructive engagement" had been the policy of successive governments since the 1960s and that no administration had "much dented events within South Africa in the last 25 years."[26]

Back in the United States, Kennedy met with leaders of the Free South Africa Movement and announced that he would support legislation imposing sanctions on South Africa. He praised the FSAM for bringing the issue of apartheid "home" and declared Reagan's "constructive engagement" policies a failure. He also warned Pretoria that it would be a serious mistake to think the only action against apartheid would be in Congress because many cities, states and colleges were taking their own steps to divest themselves of any business interests in South Africa. Although Kennedy's statements worried US firms in South Africa, none of the 350 companies acknowledged reducing South African holdings because of the pressure for divestment. Many US firms continued to insist that their presence helped black workers because of their voluntary adherence to the Sullivan Principles. "Frankly we

are proud of what we are doing," a Citibank official told *The U.S News & World Report* that added, "Virtually every other American firm in South Africa reacts in similar vein."[27]

On 22 March, the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre, a group of black South Africans near a town called Langa defied a government ban on public gatherings to hold a funeral procession for three people who had been killed by police the previous weekend. As the procession strode towards the white town of Uitenhage, their path was blocked by armed policemen who opened fire, killing 19. On the same day, President Reagan suggested that the "rioting" marchers were to blame for the massacre pointing out that "some of those enforcing the law and using the guns are also black." He added that his administration would not change its policy of "constructive engagement." These statements led to an international outcry. In South Africa, leaders of the United Democratic Front said they were "outraged and disgusted" and refused to meet with Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker who was in South Africa for talks with government officials. "I was not proud of my president last night," Rep. Mickey Leland (D-Texas) and chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus said. Leland called Reagan's comments "racist statements." Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) said it was clear that "the president has a double standard when it comes to people of color."[28]

The Nation published an editorial condemning the massacre at Langa and Reagan's reaction. "To be consistent he might have agreed with Hitler that because Jewish Communists provoked the uprising in the Waswaw ghetto, the crackdown was

justifiable." The editorial also noted the irony of the "reformist" Botha government opening fire on unarmed civilians on the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre. This time around however, the liberation movements responded in kind with the city of Uitenhage paralyzed by a general strike of black workers and guerrillas of the African National Congress clashing with the South African Army in Transvaal. "Sharpeville signaled the end of nonviolent protest; the events of last week may signal the beginning of liberation war."[29]

Rev. Jackson continued to raise the issue of South Africa between his two campaigns for nomination as the Democratic Patry's candidate for president. On 12 March Jackson was arrested at the South African embassy in Washington DC along with his two sons, Jesse Jr., 20, and Jonathan, 19, during a Free South Africa Movement protest rally.[30] On April 20, 1985, at a rally for peace, jobs and justice in Washington DC, Jackson presented "A Moral Appeal to Resist Fascism" that focused on Reagan's embrace of South Africa and the U.S president's visit to a German cemetery where members of the Nazi SS are buried. The speech was a stinging indictment of U.S. foreign policy that was to characterize Jackson's statements in the next few years:

> We learned in 1945 that the logical conclusion of the Third Reich was genocide. In 1985, South Africa is the Fourth Reich, built on race supremacy. The same ethical standards that applied to Hitler's Germany must apply to South Africa; South Africa cannot stand alone. South Africa needs U.S. investment, strategic military planning, university and church credibility, diplomatic support and the conspiracy of Western democratic allies. For the record, South Africa is not standing based on Soviet investment and markets. The credibility of free democracy is jeopardized by the South African

> partnership. We must put ethics over expediency, and as a superpower, we should convene Great Britain, Israel, West Germany, France, Holland, Japan, and Belgium and together move against apartheid and for the people, and maintain our self-respect.[31]

By June 1985, *Time* was reporting that "The issue of divestment has really caught fire" and that "divestment had become a new buzz words social protest on college campuses, at stockholders' meetings and in legislatures across the country."[32] The magazine reported that New York Governor Mario Cuomo gave the movement a big boost by proposing the state's pension fund withdraw over $4 billion invested in companies doing business with South Africa. The governor cited Bishop Tutu's moral authority in calling for divestment and raising the interest of ordinary Americans. In Los Angeles, Mayor Tom Bradley ordered his city's pension fund to sell $700 million in stocks with companies doing business with South Africa. By 1985, six states, Massachusetts, Michigan, Connecticut, Nebraska and Marland and Iowa, had passed some sort of divestment law. Fourteen other states were considering similar laws.

A major breakthrough for anti-apartheid forces came on 5 June 1985 when the House voted overwhelmingly for sanctions legislation sponsored by Representative William Gray of Pennsylvania.[33] The 295 to 127 vote came after the Democratic-controlled House rejected two Republican attempts to delay the vote and a proposal by Rep. Ron Dellums (D-Calif.) to make the measures more stringent.[34] Nearly one-third of the Republicans, 56 members, joined Democrats in approving the sanctions bill. Earlier, a Republican-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee had passed legislation similar to the House measure which banned new loans to and investment in

South Africa, stop the sale of computers and computer parts to the government and halt the importation of gold coins from South Africa. The measure also imposed stiff penalties for violation of sanctions including a $500,000 fine and five years in jail for individuals and $1 million in fines for corporations. Yet questions remained about the efficacy of sanctions. Rep. Newt Gingrich, who was one of 35 conservative congressmen who had urged Reagan to increase his criticism of apartheid, said that the US would lose if it pulls out because other countries would step in to fill the gap. Chester Crocker said sanctions were "a show of impotence." While *The Johannesburg Star* claimed that the threat of sanctions gave the South African government unjustifiable domestic support. Another pro-government newspaper, *The Citizen* stated: "We have news for Congress. It will not force South Africa to do America's bidding."[35]

In mid-July the Senate passed a watered-down version of the House bill by a vote of 80 to 12. The bill proposed to ban new loans to South Africa, stop nuclear trade, prohibit sale of computers to the South African government and deny federal aid to companies that do not follow the Sullivan principles.[36] Although this was a major victory for anti-apartheid forces, they vowed to continue demonstrations until Congress passed comprehensive sanctions. The protests were fueled by images of increasing violence in South Africa's black townships where police had killed 400 youths in less than a year. Demonstrations in the United States kept pace with the escalation of violence in South Africa. The protests outside the South African Embassy on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington DC had continued every weekday

for eight months. By August, DC police had arrested over 3,000 demonstrators in what Stanford University President Donald Kennedy called "chic arrest by appointment." Among the luminaries arrested "by appointment" were 22 US Congressmen, former first daughter Amy Carter, two of Robert Kennedy's children and Coretta Scott King, widow of Martin Luther King. According to Randall Robinson, "Many Americans knew nothing about apartheid before the demonstrations began. Now there is an understanding of South African repression."[37] Even *The New Republic* a conservative magazine that opposed sanctions from start to finish, admitted in August 1985 that "In a period of eight months--late November 1984 to late July 1985--the administration had lost control of American policy toward South Africa, completely and probably irrevocably."

President P.W. Botha dealt Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy yet another blow on 15 August when Botha reneged on his promise to "cross the Rubicon." Instead Botha's speech was a major disappointment. "I am not prepared to lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and suicide," Botha declared. Bishop Desmond Tutu said he was "devastated" by the statement adding, "I think the chances of peaceful change are virtually nil."[38] Botha's intransigence continued into September when he told 4,000 students at the University of Pretoria: "We shall not be stampeded into a situation of panic by irresponsible elements. We shall not be forced to sell out our proud heritage." In the United States, press reports indicated that President Reagan was preparing to match Congress's sanctions bill by an executive order that would forestall a public battle between the

White House and Congress.[39] On 9 September 1985 Reagan signed Executive Order 12532 which banned the sale of US computers to South African government agencies, prohibited nuclear cooperation and banned Krugerrands. Most of these actions were superfluous and clearly designed to save face for the White House and forestall congressional action.

Members of the Congressional Black Caucus reacted with anger at the news of Reagan's duplicity. In three days of panel discussions and hearings at the Black Caucus's 15th annual weekend, CBC Chairman Rep. Mickey Leland of Texas spoke of an increase of racism in the United States and deplored Reagan's attacks on affirmative action. On September 27 members of the CBC led hundreds of demonstrators on a march through downtown Washington that ended in a candlelight vigil to protest apartheid.[40] Jesse Jackson had earlier addressed 1,000 people at George Washington University where he had called for more pressure on the Reagan administration. Jackson urged the Teamsters and International Longshoremen not to unload cargo from South Africa. Randall Robinson said TransAfrica was circulating a Freedom Letter to collect a million signatures to be presented to Bishop Desmond Tutu in Soweto or Zambia. CBC chairman Mickey Leland said the caucus had made apartheid a major theme of the conference to impress upon black politicians the importance of the anti-apartheid movement.

Despite Reagan's executive order of September 1985, his administration continued to provide direct support to South Africa by opposing sanctions at the

United Nations Security Council and also lobbied to repeal the Clark Amendment that had prohibited the United States from providing aid to Union for the Total Independence of Angola, a rebel Angolan group funded primarily by South Africa. On 15 November 1985 the United States and Britain vetoed mandatory sanctions against South Africa during a Security Council meeting. The United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid condemned the vetoes in a statement released after a "strategy session" with 29 international anti-apartheid organizations on 25 and 26 November.[41] The committee called on anti-apartheid and solidarity movement in the United States and the United Kingdom to intensify their campaigns to expose the role of Western powers in "protecting apartheid South Africa in the United Nations Security Council as well as other major opponents of sanctions such as the Federal Republic of Germany." Joseph N. Garba, chairman of the SCAA reported to the UN on 19 December 1985 that the situation in South Africa was desperate. Killings, detentions and torture had intensified. The extent of repression had been hidden from the world by media censorship. The Special Committee called for the immediate release of all political prisoners and the withdrawal of death sentences imposed on six black activists on 12 December 1985.

Meanwhile, Rev. Jesse Jackson continued to play an important role in the movement. On April 4, 1985, he spoke at an anti-apartheid rally at Harvard University commemorating the anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination.[42] On 23 April, Jackson addressed several rallies at universities in the Northeast calling on students to continue their pressure on colleges to divest their funds from companies

that do business with South Africa.[43] He spoke to a group of students participating in a 13-day sit-in at Rutgers University in New Jersey and called on students not involved in the sit-in to "abandon the selfishness and self-centeredness and materialism of Yuppie-ism. Don't gain a degree and lose your soul," he told the students, calling the anti-apartheid movement the "highest calling of our day." He then traveled to Princeton where another sit-in was in progress and attacked the university administration for refusing to divest. "Princeton should be ashamed about this partnership with South Africa," he told a crowd of 2,500.[44] The student divestment campaigns epitomized Jackson's role as an exhorter and a motivational speaker. His appearance at the sit-ins brought much needed attention to the student initiatives while providing moral and spiritual legitimacy to the struggle. Thus although Jackson did not start the movement, he was intimately involved and served as an inspiration and a role model to the young students who participated in the demonstrations.

Jackson was also a regular feature in international anti-apartheid circles. He regularly addressed the United Nations on Namibia, South Africa and the proxy wars in Angola and Mozambique. On Nov. 2, 1985, for instance, Jackson and Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress, led what the media described as the "biggest anti-apartheid rally" in London, England, that police estimated was attended by 30,000 people.[45] In 1986 Jackson was invited to the UN International Seminar for Sanctions against South Africa in Paris, France, were he was a major speaker. During the conference, Jackson held a meeting with African foreign ministers where he was invited to tour the Front-line States.[46] The ministers believed that he

could popularize the issue of sanctions and raise awareness about the impact of apartheid in southern Africa. The tour was billed as a fact-finding mission that would collect information that could be used to influence U.S. policy toward South Africa and build momentum toward the passage of the 1986 sanctions bill. The 18-day, 8-nation tour took Jackson and his delegation to Nigeria, Congo, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe between August 13 and 28, 1986. Participants met with presidents of six Front-line States and with Oliver Tambo, exiled leader of the African National Congress and Sam Nujoma, leader of SWAPO. Karin Stanford argues that Jackson's Africa mission of 1986 helped him gain insight into South Africa's role in the region; open lines of communication to a region often ignored in the United States; establish personal relationships with leaders in the region; issue joint communiqués with each of the leaders; and gain credibility in the region.[47] Upon his return to the United States, however, Jackson was unable to persuade the Reagan administration to abandon its "constructive engagement" policies or meet with leaders of the "front-line states." On Sept. 8, 1986, for instance, he led a rally of 300 people in a Washington DC park across from the White House where he renewed his call for a summit between President Reagan and leaders of the "front-line states." He called South Africa the headquarters of an "evil empire" and spoke of the deaths, imprisonment and torture perpetrated by the apartheid regime in the southern Africa region.[48] Stanford argues that Jackson's efforts played an important role in putting pressure on Congress to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. A modified version of the bill was passed over President Reagan's veto on October 2, 1986 marking the first time that the U.S. Congress supported comprehensive sanctions

against South Africa.However, the key figures in this legislative struggle were Ron Dellums and his colleagues in the Congressional Black Caucus.

[1]Chicago Tribune, ibid., pg. 24C.

[2]*Chicago Tribune,* Oct. 6, 1985. pg. 24C

[3]*Chicago Tribune*, Oct. 6, 1985, pg. 24.

[4]Robinson, pg. 147.

[5]*The New York Times* 22 November 1984 B10; *The Washington Post* 22 November 1984 A1.

[6]*The New York Times* 22 November 1984 B10

[7]*The New York Times* 24 November 1984. A9

[8]*The Washington Post* 29 November 1984. A1

[9]*Time* "Marching Against Apartheid,' *Time* 10 December 1984 v124 p40.

[10]Francis X. Clines, "Administration Defends Its Policy on South Africa As Protest Grow," 4 December 1984 A1

[11]Sandra Evans, "Hill Panel Gives Tutu Rare Ovation," *The Washington Post,* 5 December 1984 A14. "Rep Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) said the standing ovation for Tutu, in violation of committee rules, may be a first."

[12]"Gerald Boyd, "President Rejects Tutu's Plea for Tough Policy on Pretoria," 8 December 1984 *The New York Times* A6

[13]*The Washington post* 6 December 1984 A1

[14]*The Washington Post* 10 December 1984 A8

[15]*Financial Times* (London) 14 December 1984 pg. 4

[16]*The Washington Post* 11 December 1984 A1

[17]*The New York Times* 16 December 1984 pg. 4

[18]*The New York Times* 11 December 1984 A30 Editorial. This endorsement was a little late though, as the bill had already been rejected.

[19]*The Washington Post* 14 December 1984 A23

[20]"Reagan Denounces Apartheid," *Time* 24 December 1984 v124 p22

[21]"U.S. vs. South Africa -- A Careful Duel," *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 December 1984 v97 p7

[22]"U.S. Senator to press for sanctions," *Financial Times* 31 December 1984 A1

[23]"Apartheid's Apologists," *The New Republic* 7 January 1985 v192 p5 Editorial.

[24]*The Los Angeles Times*, 12 January 1985 p22

[25]*The New York Times* 15 January 1985 A18

[26]*The Washington Post* 15 January 1985 A16

[27]*The U.S. News & World Report* 21 January 1985 v98 p40

[28]*The Washington Post* 23 March 1985 A2; *Time* 1 April 1985 v125 p44.

[29]*The Nation* 6 April 1985 v240 p385

[30]*Chicago Tribune*, March 12, 1985

[31]Rev. Jesse Jackson, "A Moral Appeal to Resist Fascism," a speech delivered on April 20, 1985, at the Mobilization for Jobs, Peace, and Justice, Washington, D.C., 1985. Quoted in Magubane, ibid., pg. 224.

[32]*Time* 3 June v125 p25

[33]"House Votes Sanctions Against South Africa," *The Washington Post* 6 June 1985 A1

[34]The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Congress, 1st Session, April 16, May 24, and June 13 1985.

[35]Critics of sanctions quoted in *Time* 17 June 1985 v125 p32

[36]US Policy Towards South Africa. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Congress, 1st Session, April 24, May 2 and 22 1985 p. 36

[37]*Time* 5 August 1985 v126 p33

[38]*Time* 26 August 1985 v126 p27

[39]*Time* 16 September 1985 v126 p42

[40]*The Washington Post* 28 September 1985. A6

[41]*UN Chronicle,* Feb. 1986 v23 p31(1)

[42]*Washington Post*, April 3, 1985. pg. A9.

[43]*Chicago Tribune,* April 25, 1985, pg. 16

[44]ibid., pg. 16

[45]*Washington Post*, November 3, 1985, pg. A24.

[46]Stanford, Karin L. Beyond The Boundaries Reverend Jesse Jackson in International Affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. pg. 148

[47]Stanford, ibid., pg. 156.

[48]*Washington Post*, Sept. 8, 1986. pg. A17.

CHAPTER 9

RACE FOR SANCTIONS

> During ... my first year in Congress ... I attended a meeting of the CBC that set me on a path toward what I consider to be my single most important legislative victory: The imposition of sanctions against the racist apartheid regime in South Africa. ... I had not gone to Congress in 1971 to take up the banner of ending apartheid, but I had been swept into the fight. More than two decades after introducing that first disinvestment resolution, I could see the worth of the long-distance run that had begun with that effort.
>
> Rep. Ronald Dellums, D-California

On 9 April 1986 Rep. Ron Dellums (D-Calif.) launched a new sanctions offensive by reintroducing his 1985 bill which had received 100 votes before being overtaken by a more moderate version sponsored by fellow black Democrat Rep. William Gray of Pennsylvania. Dellums had been trying to get a disinvestment bill passed for over a decade. This time around, however, Dellums was set for a spectacular victory in what he called a "long-distance run." In his recent memoir of his years as a US Congressman, Dellums argues that the sanctions bill was his proudest accomplishment. The so-called Dellums Bill had been 13 years in the making. It had emerged during Dellums's first year in Congress when he promised to support the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement in their struggle to get Polaroid Corporation to pull out of South Africa (see chapter three). After receiving a petition from the PRWM activists, Dellums and the CBC urged President Nixon to discourage

US investment in South Africa without success. Dellums then asked his staff to draft a disinvestment resolution that he introduced for consideration by the House in February 1972. Fellow Black Caucus member Rep. John Conyers cosponsored the measure. Although the Black Caucus did not expect the disinvestment resolution to pass overnight, the legislators felt that they had raised the issue before Congress and provided activists with an organizing tool with which to pressure the local and state representatives. According to Dellums:

> For me, the meeting with the Polaroid workers also drove home the point that while the Black Caucus as a group and I as an individual representative could provide such a rallying point for issues brought to us by constituents, above all I was --we were-- now in a position to do something legislatively to advance their concerns. They were not coming to the CBC to ask us for help with community organizing; they were asking us to legislate on their behalf. In doing so, they helped us define our mission in those early days.[1]

Thus the CBC was responding to pressure from radical grassroots anti-apartheid organizations in proposing the first sanctions resolution in Congress. By taking on the cause of the PRWM, a radical black organization that was heavily influenced by the left/nationalist perspectives of the 1970s, Dellums was representing the interests of a group of people that had never been considered in the formulation of foreign policy before. Dellums was particularly suited to this role as "people's representative." He had been recruited into politics to represent what was known as the "people's republic" of Berkeley and was immediately branded a "left-wing radical" by the Southern barons of the Democratic-controlled Congress. When Dellums was nominated for the position, Vice President Spiro Agnew called him "an out-and-out radical" who needed to be "purged from the body politic."[2] According to Dellums:

> When certain political leaders and much of the establishment press looked at me they did not see Ron Dellums, a member of Congress the equal of all others under our system, where districts grant mandates to representatives through the ballot --they saw Ron Dellums, representative of that "commie-pinko leftwing community of 'Berzerkely'" and a person whose ideas belonged outside the legislative chamber, if anywhere.[3]

Dellums's experience in Congress was path breaking in many ways, but it is his sophisticated use of the legislative machinery and what Jesse Jackson referred to as "street heat" that demonstrated his vision as a long distance runner. By 1980 Dellums had shifted his anti-apartheid strategy from submitting the disinvestment proposal for consideration of a resolution --largely a rhetorical device-- to "crafting a bill that would impose statutory requirements for disinvestment, economic sanctions, and other prohibitions against doing business as usual with the regime."[4]

After Reagan's election in 1980, Dellums moved the issue of South Africa to the top of his agenda, bringing a sophisticated understanding of the legislative process to the movement. Dellums and his staff created a wish-list of sanctions including termination of airplane landing rights, a ban on the sale of South African gold and gold coins called krugerands, prohibiting intelligence cooperation, ending bank loans and credits, compelling disinvestment and forbidding trade. Throughout the process, Dellums's office cooperated with other members of the Black Caucus and included provisions suggested by CBC members in other committees --Foreign Affairs, Banking, Ways and Means, and Commerce –who used their positions to promote the anti-apartheid cause.[5]

By 1985 Dellums and the Black Caucus were ready to fight for the "Dellums Bill" which had become a rigorous piece of legislation that required the United States to sever all ties with the white supremacist regime in South Africa. The bill (H.R. 997) was written to manifest the demands of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and representatives of the African National Congress. The anti-apartheid movement, however, was split between those who supported Rep. William Gray's more moderate bill that would only prohibit new investments, and Dellums's Bill, which sought complete withdrawal of US firms or disinvestment. Although the CBC stood behind the Dellums Bill, its members also co-sponsored the Gray Bill to move the debate forward. Dellums argues that although he was loath to split the movement, he felt that it was necessary to maintain pressure on Congress from the left.[6] When the Gary bill was eventually brought to the House floor for a vote, Dellums offered his bill "in the nature of a substitute" to the Foreign Relations Committee bill. Although both the House and Senate passed weaker bills, both versions included language similar to the Dellums initiative like a ban on computer and nuclear technology transfers and prohibition of new loans. Through various shenanigans engaged in by Senators Richard Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Malcolm Wallop (R-Utah) the bill was delayed until Reagan signed an executive order implementing some of the sanctions in the bills.

During the 99th Congress, both the Gray and Dellums bills were still active. At a House hearing on the new call for sanctions, Chester Crocker argued against

extension of sanctions because they would worsen South Africa's economic situation and cost the US between $1 and $2 billion in exports while creating a windfall for Russia. Despite this opposition, the Gray bill again sailed through the process and was brought to the floor for a vote. The result in 1986 was very different, however. When the Gray bill came up for a vote on 19 June 1986, Dellums again presented his bill as a substitute and it was entered in the Rules Committee as an amendment but granted only one hour for debate in the ten hour period allocated for Gray's bill. Dellums, however, was satisfied because they gave him a chance to push the debate to the left and provide an organizing tool for anti-apartheid groups. When the chairman called for a vote on the amendment, a temporary majority of Democrats in the House carried the day in a voice vote. "The ayes have it," the chair announced, sealing Dellums's fate.

Passage of the bill stirred a storm of protest and debate over sanctions. Press reports puzzled over why the Republican House Manager had not called for a recorded vote suggesting that opponents had not wanted to go on record as supporting apartheid. This strategy backfired, however, because there were more Democrats present at the time the vote was called. Nevertheless, Republicans and media commentators were convinced that Dellums's victory would not last. *The Oil Daily,* for instance, explained on 20 June that:

> Republican leaders say the Dellums substitute is so extreme in its impact on US companies that the Senate probably won't attempt a bill at all. Realizing this the Republican opponents decided to let the bill go forward on a voice vote, confident that this would speed the Dellums measure into oblivion without their having to vote against it. It also freed them from having to cast a vote that could be construed as soft on apartheid, or actually in favor of it.[7]

Supporters, however, argued that by passing the Dellums bill, the House had sent a message to the Republican-controlled Senate that it was serious about imposing sanctions on South Africa. The expectation was that the seriousness of the challenge would prompt Senators to pass a stronger bill than they might have done otherwise. Dellums himself argued that "nothing will be the same again." He observed that neither the Democrats nor the Republicans wanted to be seen as supporters of apartheid. He argued that the bill had placed a marker below which the House of Representatives would never sink. The vote had also placed pressure on the Senate because the anti-apartheid movement would demand the Senate match the House bill.[8] Dellums's strategy of presenting a radical substitute to push anti-apartheid legislation to the left had worked.

As Dellums had predicted, the Senate passed a sanctions bill sponsored by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar and colleague Senator Nancy Kassebaum. Lugar made it clear, however, that he could not guarantee a report out of the Senate if the House forced a conference on the Dellums bill. Shortly after, the Black Caucus met with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, supporters of the anti-apartheid legislation in the Senate and representatives of anti-apartheid groups where it was decided that the CBC should accept a compromise. Despite his deep

disappointment, Dellums agreed to compromise: "My role has been to advocate the position of the grassroots movement on behalf of the people of South Africa, and to put that advocacy into legislative form. That is what I have tried to do. If it is the collective wisdom in this room that it is not advantageous to go forward now, I will not press the point."

On 12 September 1986 *The Washington Post* reported that "House Democratic leaders agreed yesterday to accept the Senate's version of legislation imposing sanctions on the white minority government of South Africa." The report said the Black Caucus had agreed to go along to assure passage over a presidential veto. "We want very much to see this legislation move forward," said Mickey Leland (D-Texas) chairman of the Black Caucus. The Senate bill prohibited new investment in South Africa, banned imports of steel and other products, denied landing rights to South African Airways, and imposed restrictions on government and commercial ties. In contrast, the Dellums bill would have banned all trade ties between the US and South Africa and required complete withdrawal of US companies from South Africa -- disinvestment.[9]

On September 23 the White House announced that Reagan would veto the sanctions bill despite a warning from Senator Richard Lugar that "his own personal world leadership on this issue is really at stake. We really need to be on the right side of history in this case."[10] Reagan vetoed the measure anyway on September 25. On the eve of the Senate's vote to override the president's veto, South Africa's Foreign

Minister Reolef Botha called several conservative senators and warned them that South Africa would stop importing grain from the United States if Reagan's veto was overridden. Lugar denounced Botha's calls as an act of "bribery and intimidation" calculated to influence the vote on sanctions. Media reports indicated that the calls might have pushed some senators to vote for the override because they felt Botha was trying to intimidate them and interfere in US affairs. Senators saw the long-distance lobbying effort as a last-ditch, "go-for-broke" effort to prevent the United States from imposing economic restrictions.[11] On October 3, *The Washington Post* reported that: "The Republican controlled Senate yesterday completed a yearlong revolt against President Reagan's policy toward South Africa, voting by a wide margin to override Reagan's veto of legislation imposing new economic sanctions against the white minority regime in Pretoria." The 78 to 21 vote was the most serious foreign policy defeat for Ronald Reagan and the first time Congress had overridden his veto.

In Johannesburg, the South African Broadcasting Corporation said in a commentary on the Senate vote that South Africans wished to "serve notice that they will map out their future not as outsiders with but as they themselves decide through negotiation." South African Foreign Minister Botha described the Senate vote as "thoughtless" complaining that "It was clear to me that the decision was taken regardless of our reform program, and no reason or argument could stop this emotional wave."[12] Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu welcomed the sanctions as "a moral decision" that was "not anti-South Africa ... it is anti-injustice, anti-apartheid."

In the United States, members of the Congressional Black Caucus were ecstatic. "This is probably the greatest victory we have ever experienced," Rep. Mickey Leland, chairman of the Black Caucus said. Leland said members of the CBC were jubilant despite the fact that the bill had been "compromised." Randall Robinson struck a similar note after receiving congratulations from the crowd watching the Senate vote from the galley. "Our jubilance is tempered by the fact that we understand this to be the beginning not the end."[13]

In London, *The Guardian*'s Alex Brummer argued that President Reagan had "badly underestimated the strength of ethnic identity." Brummer argued that the president's "myopia' was clearly to blame for the debacle. "All around, from the President's own state of California which divested this summer, to trade unions in Chicago and his own friends in the business community, the nation has been waking up to the moral force of Black ethnic politics. But Mr. Reagan was dozing in his cocoon of white advisers.[14] These advisers continued to claim that sanctions would hurt Africans and that they would not change Pretoria. *The National Review*, for instance, editorialized on 6 June 1986 that "Capitalism has been the principal lever of amelioration in the lives of black South Africans. Bishop Tutu and the shanty-of-the-week set have their program for South Africa's future, but there can be others." George F. Will claimed that "South Africa needs more of what sanctions will diminish. It needs foreign capital operating under the rules of foreign justice." On 10 December 1986 *The Wall Street Journal* said anti-apartheid activists were not interested in reform but in revolution: "they know the U.S. civil rights techniques of 20 years ago,

in which you pressed a little harder and got a little more. The effect in South Africa scarcely matters: the point is to enact the ritual." In a July 1987 *Commentary* article titled "Fantasies About South Africa," P. Berger and B. Godsell declared that "people in the West who have used South Africa as their ventilation valve for their own moral and political frustrations, finding in it a convenient surrogate or an easy analogy for issues at home whose complexity has rendered them intractable."

This conservative backlash against sanctions continued into December with a *New York Times* commentary by Heramn Nickel, a former US Ambassador to South Africa titled: "The Anti-apartheid Act Boomerangs." Nickel, who was ambassador between 1982 and October 1986, expressed the administration's position that the South African Government had become more truculent after sanctions. "Pretoria is no longer prepared to even listen, let alone respond positively to American pleading." Nickel insisted that sanctions were bad for black workers in South Africa, concluding "the unique realities of South Africa demand accommodation."[15] *The Washington Post* also expressed doubts about sanctions in an editorial on 12 December titled "Have Sanctions Already Failed?" The editorial reviewed questions raised by opponents about the South African government's suggestion that sanctions had led to an increase in violence and that it was costing the United States what little influence that it had on South Africa. "Many had hoped for a quick shock effect .. Now real people are losing real jobs." Despite the doubts, the editorial concluded, "there is reason enough to dismiss early declarations that already the law has backfired and proved itself a

failure." Nevertheless *the Post* argued that the United States should proceed with caution and "watch what happens."[16]

Meanwhile South Africa launched a major offensive against anti-apartheid protesters. In a pre-dawn raid, the government rounded up dozens of black activists, labor officials and student leaders. Also arrested in the raid was Zwelakhe Sisulu, editor of the black newspaper *New Nation* and son of imprisoned ANC leader Walter Sisulu. President P.W. Botha announced that the crackdown was necessary to counter what he called a bloody terrorist campaign by ANC guerrillas. "Our security forces have .. been compelled to conduct certain preventive security measures (against) the terrorist alliance," Botha said on television hinting that cross border raids would resume. The government also issued orders prohibiting protests against the six-month-old state of emergency, the release of political prisoners or the withdrawal of troops from black neighborhoods. New censorship regulations also prohibited reporting of security forces operations.[17]

This new crackdown led to a subtle shift in US policy when Secretary of State George Shultz announced that he was planning to meet with Oliver Tambo, the exiled leader of the ANC. The Shultz-Tambo meeting would be unprecedented in the Reagan administration, which had hitherto referred to the ANC as a terrorist organization. This meeting would also mark a change in the "constructive engagement" policy of seeking change through the white minority regime. This political recognition by the United States was cautiously welcomed by the ANC, which had also met with British Foreign

Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe in September. As one ANC official put it: "South Africa's closest allies --the United States and Britain--now talk to the ANC." The officials said however that the meeting should not be seen as a tilt toward the United States, "there are still a number of points on which we disagree ... Most importantly, we re on different wavelengths over how far they should go to pressure this (South African) regime."[18]

During the presidential campaign season in 1987/88, TransAfrica kept the issue of apartheid alive by rating presidential candidates according to their votes on the South Africa sanctions bill in what TransAfrica called the "Faces Behind Apartheid" campaign. Launching the campaign, Randall Robinson said the aim was to make US policy toward South Africa a "litmus test" for presidential candidates seeking the black vote. "If a candidate does not see the importance of this issue as an indicator of a candidate's sensitivity on race relations, then that candidate does not understand black America," Robinson said. The plan was to identify one public figure a month for the "honor." The first two targets were Sens.. Bob Dole and Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina.

As soon as Senate Republican leader Robert Dole (R-Kansas) made his candidacy official, TransAfrica singled him out as "a friend of apartheid." TransAfrica bought newspaper advertisements in Dole's home newspaper *The Wichita Eagle Beacon* on 5 March 1987 claiming that Dole was "one of the faces behind apartheid." citing his opposition to the Senate's successful override of President Reagan's veto of

sanctions legislation against South Africa. TransAfrica also charged that Dole had made matters worse by hiring John Sears, a registered lobbyist for South Africa, as his campaign adviser. *The New York Times* confirmed that Sears had received $506,824 from South Africa as a paid lobbyist in 1985 according to the Justice Department, which reported that Sears "communicated the foreign principal's opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa to members of Congress."[19] Justice Department records also showed that Sears had received over $3 million from South Africa between 1981 and 1985. Robinson said stronger US sanctions were needed because the existing measures were "circumventable." Dole initially dismissed the ads as "a fund-raising gimmick" sparked by his high visibility. Nevertheless he found himself answering question about the ads repeatedly in the first few days of this campaign. On March 7 he defended his civil rights record "with a hint of annoyance" in an interview with *The New York Times.* As Dole launched his campaign, TransAfrica ran the ad to coincide with the candidate's appearances on various campaign stops. The result was that reporters asked Dole about the ads at every stop. In Iowa, TransAfrica ran the ad in *The Des Moines Register* to coincide with Dole's visit. Asked about the ad Dole angrily told *United Press International* that Robinson was "a big-lipped liberal Democrat" adding that his civil rights record was "spotless" and that he would not be "intimidated" by Robinson. In response, Robinson said Dole's ad hominem attack that is unresponsive to the issue raised is really unbecoming of a presidential candidate and raises serious questions about his worth for high office." Robinson also ridiculed Dole's defense of his civil rights record, which,

Robinson said, was irrelevant to the discussion over sanctions, a foreign policy issue where Dole's role in trying to block sanctions had been deplorable.[20]

In June, TransAfrica celebrated its first decade of existence at the pinnacle of success. The stunning victory in passing the sanctions legislation in Congress had raised the organization's profile. Robinson had hired a staff of 15 and raised more than a million dollars for an endowment fund and was planning to buy an office building to house its offices and library. Despite these signs of institutionalization, TransAfrica's 10th anniversary gala resembled a call to arms. Robinson attacked presidential aspirant Robert Dole for calling him a "big-lipped liberal." He also skewered Rep. Dick Gephardt (D-Mo) for calling a meeting of African Americans without consulting with leaders of the CBC and TransAfrica. Robinson served notice that African Americans would not be taken for granted in the 1988 election asking why none of the presidential candidates, with the exception of Jesse Jackson, had accepted invitations to attend the gala.[21]

In an assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions a year after they were passed, David Newsom, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, argued that expectations that US sanctions would lead to the dismantling of apartheid had proved "highly unrealistic." Instead, the South African Government had shifted to the right and reversed some moderate reforms. "Those who argue that sanctions have 'backfired' and have slowed down the pace of reform have logic on their side," Newsom wrote. He noted, however, that for black radicals, the intent of sanctions was

not to reform apartheid but to dismantle the system entirely. For these groups, sanctions and disinvestment were a success because they were designed to isolate South Africa, not influence the white supremacist government. This group saw the withdrawal of US companies and the meeting between Secretary of State George Shultz and Oliver Tambo of the ANC as a breakthrough. Newsom warned that the polarization of attitudes made moderate proposals remote.[22]

In November, TransAfrica again sponsored newspaper ads in Iowa attacking presidential candidate Bob Dole for his efforts to block sanctions against South Africa. In an angry response Dole said: "These phony attempts to distort my record aren't going to fool anyone." He attacked TransAfrica's Randall Robinson as someone "who uses tactics that every responsible civil rights leader would reject." The ads showed footage of violence in South Africa with a voice over charging that "While thousands of black are brutally jailed, Bob Dole just votes to looks the other way." "We don't want a president who will do business with racists in South Africa," the voice-over continued as a "White Only" sign flashed on screen. The ad reportedly cost $1,500 to produce and ran 100 times in Iowa, a key state in the 1988 campaign. Dole released a statement defending his civil rights record and claiming to be a staunch opponent of apartheid. Meanwhile Dole attacked the timing of the ads: "Randall Robinson spewed out this venom once before but his effort fell flat. Now he thinks he'll get a bigger audience, and maybe raise some money, by trying to exploit my announcement."[23]

Unfortunately 12 Iowa television stations rejected the ad as too controversial in November. Two months later, however, WNEV and WCVB, Boston's CBS and ABC affiliates, accepted it. The ads were also accepted in New Hampshire where TransAfrica was also planning a demonstration at Dartmouth College, the location of the Republican Party debate involving six candidates.[24] In February, TransAfrica found a new target in Pat Robertson who had told South African television on 10 February that African Americans view the struggle against apartheid as "an extension of the United States civil rights movement. I think they don't understand what they are dealing with, really, in this South Africa thing. And so, it becomes an American political issue to say if you want support among American blacks for American political office, you have to bash South Africa. I think that's wrong." Robinson said the remark belittled African Americans and their understanding of foreign affairs. "One is unsettled by this only because he is being seriously taken by the voters. I can't say I'm surprised by this kind of remark that comes from a racist, redneck fundamentalist."[25]

On March 8 the United States and Britain vetoed a Security Council resolution that called for selective mandatory sanctions against South Africa after its crackdown on anti-apartheid activists and the banning of black newspapers. The vote was 10 in favor and 2 against. The vote came at the request of African states that sought condemnation of South Africa for imposing a total ban on the activities of 17 anti-apartheid groups. Meanwhile, Congress and the White House renewed their battle over sanctions as House members introduced bills to broaden anti-apartheid legislation

passed in 1986. Ron Dellums and 95 other members introduced the most comprehensive bill. Like the 1986 version, Dellums's bill called for total disinvestment, a trade ban and end to military and intelligence cooperation. This time around Dellums believed that there was a much greater chance of success because of the daily reports of repression emanating from South Africa. "I believe that it is a moral and political imperative that the government of the United States make a powerful, clear, clean, unambiguous, uncomplicated, unequivocal statement about the deteriorating situation in South Africa," Dellums said. Harold Wolpe (D-Mich) who was the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa argued that South Africa's intransigence had created a "broad bipartisan consensus in the House ... for stronger economic sanctions and for presidential leadership of an international campaign of economic and diplomatic pressure to end apartheid." Although Wolpe was right on the first count, he would be proved wrong on the second. Reagan and his advisers had no intention of changing their minds on South Africa. Instead the administration sent four assistant secretaries of state to register strong opposition to the Dellums bill during a House Foreign Affairs hearing.[26]

Nevertheless the bill survived the dreaded committee process. By 1988 the Dellums bill had become the House bill with the full support of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Although still known as the Dellums Bill, Harold Wolpe, chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, managed it on the floor. In April, the House Foreign Relations Committee approved legislation patterned on Dellums's bill banning all U.S. trade with and investment in South Africa. "The situation in South Africa has

continued to deteriorate, and we have a obligation to continue the pressure," Dellums said, adding that he hoped the renewed debate over sanctions would make apartheid an issue in the 1988 presidential elections. Despite the House action, Republicans and administration officials continued to oppose the bill. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind) claimed that the Dellums approach was too radical: "A manifesto that all is lost so you simply cut off every tie." Lugar argued that the United States should reward P.W. Botha for suggesting that Africans could be given a limited role in the selection of the next president.

The sanctions legislation provided US corporations one year to dispose of their holdings in South Afirca. It also banned direct and indirect trade, shipment of petroleum products to South Africa in US vessels; intelligence cooperation between US and South African intelligence and military agencies; required the US to impose sanctions on countries that take advantage of US sanctions; and authorized $40 million to assist black people in South Africa. These provisions brought a flood of criticism from conservative journals. *The US Journal of Commerce* for instance published a piece by Donald deKierffer titled "Aiming right for the briar patch" which ridiculed the House debate on the Dellums bill as "a circus sideshow" and praised business interests for refusing to testify because "any corporate witnesses would have wound up as the entree of a cannibal feast."[27] The writer went on to argue that the bill's effects would "include the biggest windfall for the South Africa economy in the past 50 years."

The Jackson Doctrine

Meanwhile, however, Jesse Jackson had taken the anti-apartheid struggle to the national stage in his campaign for nomination as the Democratic Party's candidate for president in 1988. During his 1988 campaign, Jackson's position on the apartheid question was informed by his now extensive contacts with leaders in the southern Africa region. His campaign also coincided with the climax of the anti-apartheid movement which had won significant victories in Congress, universities and colleges throughout the country and in influencing states and major cities to place sanctions on corporations that continued to invest in South Africa. The Rainbow Coalition's South Africa plank was part of an overall foreign policy platform called The Jackson Doctrine on the Third World that was developed in opposition to the Reagan-Bush doctrine. In the case of South Africa, Jackson opposed "constructive engagement" that emphasized the role of South Africa as a bastion against anti-communism in Africa and its importance as a NATO ally. In a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Publishers in Washington DC. On April 14, 1988, Jackson argued that Reagan's policies were "based on a fundamental misconception of the world. The countries of the Third World are not drawn to communism ... They tend towards non alignment, for they seek aid and investment wherever they can find it."[28] The Jackson Doctrine called for support for international law, self-determination, human rights, and the promotion of economic development and justice in the Third World. It called for the United States to take the lead in the struggle against apartheid by convening a "summit of the Front-line states;" offering military assistance to these countries so they could

defend themselves against South African aggression; work to get both South African and Cuban troops out of Angola and to free Namibia.

In an "Issue Brief" on the South African question, Jackson condemned the Reagan administration for continuing to ignore the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 which had required South Africa to make significant progress toward ending its system of apartheid or face full economic sanctions. The legislation required the repeal of emergency laws; respect for the principle of equal justice before the law; the release of black political prisoners; and the right of the black majority to participate in the political process. Jackson argued that none of these goals had been met and accused Reagan of ignoring the law by continuing with the "constructive engagement" policy. He proposed that South Africa be declared a terrorist state to allow the implementation of comprehensive sanctions; a summit of the Front-line States, the United States and European community; implementation of comprehensive sanctions and a complete ban on trade with South Africa and a date by which all U.S. corporations are forced to withdraw from South Africa; aid to the Front-line states to free them from South African domination; and an end to the United State military aid to UNITA rebels in Angola and tactical support to RENAMO guerrillas in Mozambique.[29]

In an interview published in *Africa Report* of May-June, 1988, Jackson explained that his Jackson Doctrine:

> Calls for the total redefinition of our relationship to Africa. It calls for U.S. goals and interests to be more in line with those of African leaders and their peoples. It calls on the U.S. to recognize that African economic, political and social goals are based on fundamental realities of their people and not on rigid ideological lines."[30]

Jackson backed progressive or "third world" positions on foreign policy like increased development aid to countries in sub-Saharan Africa; debt restructuring; increased trade; the strengthening of sanctions against South Africa; freedom for Namibia; and the end of aid to UNITA and other right wing movements and regimes in southern Africa.[31] This has led scholars like Karin Stanford, *Beyond the Boundaries Jesse Jackson and International Affairs*, to argue that Jesse Jackson advocated a "third world" approach to international relations.[32] She argues that this approach is based on his experience in the United States that he describes as a "Third World experience right here in America."

In contrast, a survey of the Investor Responsibility Center (IRC) found that all Republican candidates from Sen. Bob Dole to Pat Robertson, and Vice-President George Bush opposed new sanctions against South Africa. Robertson favored eliminating sanctions already in effect. The Republicans also supported Reagan's continued aid to UNITA in Angola. Dole and Robertson called for sanctions against Angola and the withdrawal of U.S. companies and also support Renamo guerrillas in Mozambique. George Bush was also reported to have made some contact with the South African-backed Renamo rebels while Robertson wanted to recognize the group as "freedom fighters" and provide them with military aid.[33] The survey showed that all the Democratic candidates supported new sanctions although Dukakis opposed the

imposition of new sanctions unless the European community agreed to the proposal. Democratic Party nominee Michael Dukakis finally agreed to adopt Jackson's South Africa plank which supported the Dellums Bill and declared South Africa a terrorist state, called for comprehensive sanctions, a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. corporations, Namibian independence, assistance to Mozambique and an end to the support for UNITA rebels in Angola.[34]

On 11 August 1988 the House passed the Dellums bill imposing new, tougher sanctions on South Africa. The *Los Angeles Times* described the bill in a front-page story as "far more radical than the sanctions that Congress imposed against South Africa two years ago over President Reagan's veto" and as a bill that would "virtually halt trade and cancel all U.S. investments in South Africa." Republicans opposed the measure on grounds that it would hurt black South Africans and increase the determination of the white minority to remain in power. The bill forced U.S. oil companies to dispose of their investments in South Africa; required US companies to divest in 180 days and imposed an import ban on all South African goods except strategic minerals. Rep. William S. Broomfield (R-Mich) was even quoted saying that "This is a Dukakis-Jackson foreign policy initiative." [35] Thus Jackson's influence in the Democratic Party's Africa policy was clearly felt on both sides of the Congress. This admission of his influence in the Legislature demonstrates the impact of Party platforms on voting patterns in Congress.

The Washington Post described the bill as "a declaration of economic war" that would also require retaliation against the EEC and Japan if they took advantage of US measures. It would also force oil companies to choose between trading with South Africa and receiving any new coals, oil or gas leases from the United States. The House Foreign Relations Committee reported that US companies held $1.4 trillion in direct investments and $2.5 billion in indirect investments in gold-mining companies in 1986. The US had also provided South Africa with $2.95 billion in bank loans as of September 1987 and $200 million in taxes paid to the South African government by US corporations.[36]

According to *the Post,* "The most emotional moment came during a speech by Ron Dellums who came to Congress two decades ago as an activist firebrand and who grew gray-haired and into the House establishment." Dellums received a standing ovation for his speech that included even some Republican members. The passage of this bill was a major victory for Dellums, who had introduced the first sanctions bill in Congress in 1971 and had seen some provisions of the bill pass into law in 1986. The 1988 bill, however, included broad new restrictions including:

(1) A ban on US investments in South Africa and a requirement that American companies and individuals rid themselves of investments there

(2) A prohibition against all imports from South Africa except strategic minerals and publications

(3) A ban on all exports to South Africa except for farm products

(4) A ban on new federal coal, gas and oil leases to US subsidiaries of companies that export oil to South Africa

(5) A requirement that US ships do not carry oil destined for South Africa

(6) A ban on intelligence and military cooperation with South Africa

Despite the major victory in the House, conservative Republicans blocked the measure in the Senate. President P.W. Botha of South Africa called the sanctions vote "reckless." Nevertheless, black leaders argued that the threat of more sanctions forced the South African regime to the negotiating table on the issue of Namibia. On a trip to the United States in January 1989, for instance, United Democratic Front leader, Allan Boesak said sanctions had played a role in South Africa's decision to settle conflicts in Namibia and Angola. Boesak also said sanctions had slowed down South Africa's economy and made it harder to maintain the armed forces.[37]

Meanwhile black church leaders launched a campaign to mobilize support for sanctions. Leaders of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, AME Zion Church, Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Church of God in Christ, National Baptist Convention of America, National Baptist Convention U.S.A. and Progressive National Baptist Convention pledged to mobilize their collective membership of 19 million for the anti-apartheid cause. In a statement, the church leaders said they were motivated by "The intensifying brutality of the Pretoria regime --death and detention of children, attacks against the churches and church leaders -- and the war against South Africa's

neighbors compel us to speak out as one united voice for an end to the pain being inflicted upon our sisters and brothers."[38]

The church initiative emerged from a challenge from Rev. Allan Boesak in September 1987 when he called on black churches to mobilize support for sanctions. In September 1988, a delegation of black church leaders visited southern Africa and met with church leaders and leaders of the African National Congress. The delegation was denied entry into South Africa. After the tour, the group resolved to support stronger sanctions as contained in the Dellums Bill; economic aid for front-line states; an end to US support for UNITA rebels in Angola; and an international boycott of Shell Oil. Bishop Ruben Speaks of the AME Zion Church said at the meeting that there was no consensus on whether to support the ANC which "had been accused of terrorism." Others, however, voiced support for the ANC "We do not agree with others who have called them terrorists and communists," said Rev. Mac Charles Jones of National Baptist Convention of America.

By May, mainstream Protestant denominations and the U.S Catholic Conference had joined the church leaders, who called themselves the "South Africa Crisis Coordinating Committee." On 17 May the group launched a nationwide ecumenical campaign to protest apartheid. The committee called for a day of fasting on May 26. It also organized a series of speaking tours by US and South African clerics between June 1 and June 15 followed by a day of lobbying at the Capitol on June 16. The committee called on supporters to sign a "covenant" stating: "The time

has come for the faith, prayers, energy of the worldwide church of Jesus Christ to be clearly focused on bringing an end to the diabolical system known as apartheid. We hereby make a covenant with the church and the people of South Africa until South Africa is Free."[39]

In May, TransAfrica hosted a meeting between South African clerics and 80 top U.S. government officials and corporate and civic leaders brought together in Washington D.C.[40] The summit culminated in the delegation meeting with President George Bush at the White House. No breakthroughs came from this first meeting between the representatives of South African blacks and a U.S. president. Bishop Desmond Tutu, the leader of the delegation described the meeting with Bush as follows, "He said he didn't want to give the impression of benign indifference, that he wanted to be a catalyst for change ... As the first black South African delegation to be received, we obviously were looking for signals... It may come to nothing. Pray God it doesn't."[41]

In June President Bush invited members of the CBC to the White House for the first time in years. During the meeting Ron Dellums, chairman of the CBC, pushed Bush on sanctions and other issues for over an hour. Afterwards Dellums said that although Bush was against sanctions, he thought the new president might take a different approach from Reagan's. Bush quickly signaled a change in policy by inviting Albertina Sisulu to the White House. Sisulu was both the wife of jailed ANC leader Walter Sisulu and co-chairman of the United Democratic Front. Because Sisulu

was banned, South Africa had to relax restrictions to allow her to travel to the United States for the meeting. Activists hailed this flexibility on both sides of the Atlantic.

Meanwhile Dullums continued with efforts to pass stronger sanctions legislation. In response, the Bush administration reversed itself and began to admit that sanctions were having a positive effect on South Africa. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Herman J. Cohen told the *New York Times's* Anthony Lewis he believed that there was "new thinking" on both sides. "Sanctions have had a major impact on the thinking of the white community. There is no capital inflow. There is disinvestment. People worry about the future. They say to themselves 'this is preventing us from having the kind of economy that will maintain living standards for our children.' So sanctions have had a positive effect, though I think further sanctions would not." Cohen said the future of South Africa would depend on the black community and the international community coming together to force the apartheid regime to the negotiating table.[42] The White House also indicated that it would invite F.W. de Klerk, the head of the National Party, to meet the president later in the year. The invitation was hastily withdrawn after 100 Congressmen sent the president a letter of protest.

Nevertheless rumors of a negotiated settlement continued to spread. Throughout 1987 media reports had suggested that Mandela had softened his position on negotiations with the National Party. He had talked secretly with at least four Cabinet ministers and agreed to a meeting with Botha who had told his fellow whites

to "adapt or die" as far back as 1979. On 5 July Nelson Mandela met with President P.W. Botha for tea and what he called "talks about talks."[43] The controversial talks were met with confusion on both sides. Afrikaners called Botha a "traitor" for meeting with their longtime foe while the ANC, which had rejected any contact with the whites until Mandela was released, remained tightlipped. Rev. Frank Chicane and Winnie Mandela immediately released a statement claiming the talks were not supported by the ANC. Mandela himself released a counter-statement arguing that "dialogue with the mass democratic movement, and in particular with the African National Congress, is the only way of ending violence, and bringing peace."

Anti-apartheid groups saw this movement toward negotiation as a result of sanctions. Randall Robinson argued "South Africa is in a tough way and it is in a tough way in large part because of sanctions, if the effect has been limited, that is because the sanctions are themselves limited." Robinson argued that sanctions had blocked economic growth, reduced business confidence and led to a flight of foreign investment capital. Sanctions had also sparked disinvestment by US companies. In April 1989 Mobil Corp., the largest US company still in South Africa had announced that it was pulling out of South Africa because of a 1987 change in tax law sponsored by Congressman Charles Rangle of New York which banned US companies from claiming an American tax benefit for taxes which their South African operation paid to the South African government. Mobil had 400 million in assets and nearly 3,000 employees. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, 28 companies had withdrawn in 1988, 56 in 1987 and 52 in 1986.[44]

The momentum for reform was increased with the resignation of P.W Botha and his replacement by Frederick W. de Klerk, who, *The Economist* said, "smiled rather then snarled when the old chief barked." Robert Bauer, special counsel to Rep. Ron Dellums, who was sponsoring new legislation against South Africa, argued that de Klerk was merely a "sophisticated face on the system." Robert Price, professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley agreed, "The South African government under de Klerk will be representing to the outside world a new face in hopes they can reverse sanctions." Victor Mashabela of the ANC office in New York also urged the West to continue with sanctions despite the ascension of de Klerk. "Our own thinking is not to wait but to escalate pressure so de Klerk finds he has no other way to maneuver." Conservatives, however, continued to insist that black Africans would suffer more from sanctions. Peter Dunigan, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, claimed that black people would be much better off if they worked with the South African government. Dunigan called for a system of rewards and penalties toward South Africa. He argued that the withdrawal of over 100 US companies had led to a growth in unemployment and frightened off foreign investors pushing the country further to the right.[45]

In September South Africa held parliamentary elections that excluded seventy five percent of the population. This election served as the catalyst for a renewal of mass protests throughout the country and the world. During the elections, De Klerk ordered one of the most powerful crackdowns to curry favor with the white electorate.

Foreign observers reported the use of tear gas, water hoses, whips, clubs and bullets to disperse peaceful demonstrators. Archbishop Tutu was tear-gassed after persuading a group of youths not to march on the police station. Tutu was arrested the next day while protesting the beating of clergymen. Anti-apartheid groups renewed calls for protests. In a commentary titled "A New Face Shows His True Colors," TransAfrica's Randall Robinson claimed that de Klerk was one of the most conservative members of Botha's cabinet. "Despite his talk about reform and negotiation, the priority of the country's new leader, Frederick De Klerk, is the perpetuation of white supremacy."[46]

In contrast to TransAfrica and the anti-apartheid movement, the Bush administration congratulated De Klerk on his victory calling the vote a mandate for "real change." The State Department also issued a statement that offered US support while calling on de Kerk to deliver reforms. The statement listed a number of conditions including release of all political prisoners including Nelson Mandela, the return of political exiles, the lifting of the state of emergency and the unbanning of Black Nationalist organizations and individuals. Meanwhile the chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, Harold Wolpe (D-Mich.), predicted that Congress would pass stronger sanctions if de Klerk did not "dismantle apartheid by early 1990." Wolpe said Congress was watching de Klerk and talking with the White House about appropriate legislative actions if de Klerk did not move quickly to institute reforms. The state department also said it was working with Congress "to develop a bipartisan approach toward South Africa."[47]

In October, the expected prisoner releases began with the announcement that President de Klerk had freed eight prominent political prisoners including Walter Sisulu and four other nationalists sentenced to death at the infamous Rivonia Trail of 1964. Nelson Mandela was not on the list of those released in October. Media reports quoted Rev. Frank Chicane saying that "Mandela does not believe his release is the critical thing. His release without a package to end apartheid system would be meaningless. I understand him to be saying that his release cannot be a substitute for the freedom of the people." The announcement was seen as an effort to preempt the expected imposition of stronger sanctions by the Commonwealth at its annual meeting in October. Archbishop Desmond Tutu said de Klerk was "forced" to release the prisoners. "We are pleased our leaders are out, but not satisfied, as many others remain behind locked doors. What is the use of releasing them when we still have a state of emergency and when our organizations are still banned?"

De Klerk said he hoped the releases would increase the "spirit of reconciliation, which is currently evident in our country." The South African Council of Churches warned that if de Klerk did not meet all the demands of black organizations they would press for more sanctions. "The oppressed people need an unequivocal indication from the government that it is willing to enter into genuine negotiations aimed at ending apartheid immediately." The United Democratic Front also called the move a "massive victory" for black people.[48] In an editorial on de Klerk's actions *The Washington Post* argued that "one of his purposes is to head off a threat of further economic sanctions."[49] *The Christian Science Monitor* also argued

that the release of prisoners could "forestall stronger economic sanctions ... and open the door for eventual black-white negotiations."[50] *The New York Times* editorial called on the United States and other western countries to "help by holding off further action at this time." Nevertheless, even the *New York Times* admitted that the new eagerness of the South African government to talk "no doubt owes much to existing sanctions, like a ban on imports of South African textiles, agricultural products and iron and steel and threatened sanctions like Representative Ronald Dellums's proposed total two-way trade ban." The *Times* went on to say that the Bush administration had admitted that the sanctions imposed in 1986 had "helped promote the new accommodating atmosphere in Pretoria."[51]

The South Africa government won immediate gains from the release of the prisoners. The Commonwealth meeting on October 22 issued a declaration demanding accelerated reforms and threatening harsher reprisals but did not vote for stronger sanctions. Meanwhile Pretoria was able to reschedule $8 billion in short-term debt closing the door to an international campaign to force a catastrophic immediate repayment. The key to the negotiation process, however, was Nelson Mandela, who had released a detailed proposal for negotiations as early as April despite the ANC's preference for more radical measures.[52] Reports at the Commonwealth meeting in Kaula Lampur indicated that the release of Nelson Mandela was imminent. *The Toronto Star* reported on 18 October that an ANC official in Malaysia for the Commonwealth conference had said that there were plans for a meeting between F.W. De Klerk and Mandela.

[1]Ronald V. Dellums. Lying Down With The Lions A Public Life from the Streets of Oakland to the Halls of Power. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000) p. 124-125

[2]Quoted in Dellums, p. 4

[3]Dellums, p. 4

[4]Dellums, p. 124

[5]Ronald V. Dellums. Lying Down With The Lions A Public Life from the Streets of Oakland to the Halls of Power. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000) p. 127

[6]Dellums, p. 130

[7]*The Oil Daily* 20 June 1986 p8

[8]Dellums, 134

[9]*The Washington Post* 12 September 1986 A1

[10]*The New York Times* 24 September 1986 A8

[11]*The Toronto Star* 2 October 1986 A16; 3 October 1986 A4

[12]*The San-Diego Tribune* 3 October 1986 A10

[13]*The Washington Post* 4 October 1986 A16; G1

[14]Alex Brummer, *The Guardian* (London) 8 October 1986

[15]*The New York Times* 8 December 1986 A27

[16]*The Washington Post* 12 December 1986 A22 Editorial

[17]*The Los Angeles Times* 13 December 1986 A8

[18]*The Christian Science Monitor* 22 December 1986 pg. 7

[19]*The New York Times* 5 March 1987 B8

[20]*The Washington Post* 2 April 1987 D3

[21]*The Washington Post* 8 June 1987 C1

[22]David Newsom, "South Africa --a year later," *The Christian Science Monitor* 23 September 1987 pg. 14 Opinion.

[23]*The Washington Post* 6 November 1987 A3

[24]*The Washington Post* 10 January 1988 A19

[25]*The Washington Post* 14 February 1988 A24.

[26]*The Washington Post* 23 March 1988 A21

[27]*Journal of Commerce* 7 July 1988 8A Editorial

[28]Clemente, F and Watkins, F. (eds.) Keep Hope Alive Jesse Jackson's 1988 Presidential Campaign A Collection of Major Speeches, Issue Papers, Photographs and Campaign Analysis. Boston: South End Press, 1989. pg. 189.

[29]Keep Hope Alive, pg. 199-201.

[30]"The Reverend Jesse Jackson Setting the Policy Agenda," *Africa Report.* May-June, 1988. pg. 17.

[31]*Africa Report*, ibid., pg. 20.

[32]Stanford, ibid., pg. 74.

[33]*The Christian Science Monitor*, March 31, 1988. pg. 5.

[34]*Jackson Action, Bulletin of the Rainbow Coalition*, 1988.

[35]*Los Angeles Times*, August 12, 1988. pg. A1.

[36]*The Washington Post* 12 August 1988 A1

[37]*The Los Angeles Times* 14 January 1989 pg. 15

[38]*The Los Angeles Times* 14 January 1989 pg. 15-18

[39]*The Los Angeles Times* 13 May 1989 pg. 12

[40]*The Washington Post*, May 19, 1989. pg. D1.

[41]ibid., pg. D1

[42]*The New York Times* 28 June 1989 B3 Editorial

[43]*Time* 24 July 1989 v11134 n4 p29

[44]*The Financial Times of London* 20 June 1989 pg. 2.

[45]*Journal of Commerce* 16 August 1989 A1

[46]*The Los Angeles Times* 3 September 1989 pg. 5 Op-ed

[47]*The Washington Post* 8 September 1989 A30

[48]*The Washington Post* 11 October 1989 A1

[49]*The Washington Post* 12 October 1989 A22 Editorial

[50]*The Christian Science Monitor* 12 October 1989 pg. 4

[51]*The New York Times* 13 October 1989 A32 Editorial

[52]*Newsweek 30 October 1989 pg. 58*

CHAPTER 10

DISMANTLING APARTHEID

> We not only regard Congressman Bill Gray, Ron Dellums and TransAfrica's Randall Robinson as friends, but as brothers who have done everything expected of them to help us sustain our struggle against South Africa. ... But it is important to say that their legislative work is not finished. The message of the ANC is that sanctions must continue against the South African government. They must continue not because we want conflict, but we believe that maintaining sanctions is the best way to force the government to dismantle all remaining pillars of apartheid.
>
> Nelson Mandela, interview with *Ebony* May 1990

"Who is this man Mandela?" *The U.S News & World Report* asked in January 1990 and could only come up with three short paragraphs about the ANC leader. The sketch of Mandela's life seemed to be drawn from a Who's Who collection detailing his early education, legal practice and arrest by South African authorities in August 1962. Referring to him a as a "living legend" a "martyr" and "saint" the article nevertheless concludes that "Mandela has not been photographed or quoted directly since his final statement from the dock."[1]

Nobody knew what Mandela looked like after 27 years. Yet the effort to ban his image and words backfired. Instead he acquired a near messianic aura. The "Free Mandela Campaign" launched after he was charged with sabotage at the "Rivonia Trial" in 1963, became one of the most visible international human rights movements of the 20th century. The United Nations General Assembly repeatedly called for his

unconditional release. Trade unions, political parties and student groups around the world joined the campaign to free the leaders of the ANC. In 1984, both Houses of the US Congress adopted a "Mandela freedom resolution." Mayor Eugene Gus Newport of Berkeley, California, proclaimed 9 June 1984, "Nelson and Winnie Mandela Day." Detroit's City Council adopted a resolution on 10 September 1984 calling for the freedom of Nelson and Winnie Mandela. On 11 October 1984 anti-apartheid organizations in the US presented the United Nations with petitions for the release of Nelson Mandela signed by over 34,000 people. In 1986 the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group described Mandela as a "living legend."

While in prison, Mandela had received thousands of honors and awards including the Simon Bolivar International Prize, the Third World Foundation Prize, national awards from Cuba and the German Democratic Republic; freedom of the cities of Rome, Florence, Olympia, Sydney, Birmingham, Greenwich; honorary degrees from City College in New York, University of Lancaster, Free University of Brussels, Amhadu Bello University, and the University of Havana. Numerous buildings and streets around the world are named after him and he has been elected honorary member of trade unions and other organizations.

The imminent release of what the London *Times* called "the colossus of African nationalism in South Africa" sent media around the world into a frenzy. "Waiting for Mandela" became the standard headline. In an article titled "Awaiting Mandela" *The Economist* wrote: "the man jailed a quarter of a century ago on sabotage

charges now holds the key to peaceful resolution of his country's racial conflict." Nevertheless, the magazine managed to spend most of the editorial giving credit to de Klerk for his "reforms." Returning to Mandela at the end, the editor observed: "Prestige apart, this is true: when arrested 25 years ago, Mr. Mandela was merely one of the party's four provincial leaders."[2]

"*Nightline* makes history," Ted Koppel declared from Cape Town where he had relocated to cover Mandela's release live. Koppel hosted a "town meeting" before the event where de Klerk's henchmen were given an opportunity to promote the new, "reasonable" face of apartheid. From the beginning, however, it was clear that the US media were out of their depth. The Mandela story did not fit into the neat news routines of the United States. First, the release was delayed by several hours, throwing everybody's deadlines off. Then, organizers allowed members of the South African Communist Party to hang the red flag on the podium and make "radical" speeches. Finally, Mandela's first speech in 27 years began with fifteen minutes of salutations to all the dignitaries assembled and freedom fighters past and present who had made that moment possible.

Soon after Mandela's release, media reports turned to the growing threat of "black-on-black violence." In a diabolical attempt at agenda setting, the South African government shifted the focus from apartheid to "tribal animosities" by orchestrating massacres to provoke violence between the UDF and the Inkatha. As the South African Truth Commission has now revealed, the government orchestrated a campaign

of "black-on-black" violence to discredit Mandela and the ANC and hold the township violence as a trump card in negotiations over power sharing and sanctions. The strategy worked in the United States where President Bush immediately began a campaign to "reward" South Africa for its "reforms." As soon as the government of South Africa announced that Mandela was about to be released President George Bush, who had opposed the CAAA of 1986, announced that he would be reviewing the sanctions legislation.[3] After Mandela's release Bush expressed "delight" at the news and issued an invitation to de Klerk to visit the White House.[4] The invitation raised hackles in Congress and the anti-apartheid community. Randall Robinson called the move a "serious mistake" and charged that Bush was assisting South Africa in its quest for respectability in the international community. Robinson suggested that de Klerk should meet lower level officials such as Secretary of State James Baker. "To open it (the White House) to a regime of this ilk, is a major slap in the face, particularly of black Americans, but for all people who cherish freedom everywhere. I think the administration is resistant to majority rule in South Africa."[5] Robinson also argued that Bush had rushed to embrace Polish labor leader Lech Walesa and Congress pledged $900 million for Poland and Hungary while President Bush had to be forced to meet with Archbishop Desmond Tutu. In March TransAfrica urged Secretary of State James Baker to provide $20 million to the ANC to support its transformation from a liberation movement to a political party "in the same way we funded the Solidarity Movement and opposition parties in Nicaragua."[6]

By April, *The U.S. News & World Report* was announcing that "Nelson Mandela's honeymoon is over."[7] The editorial claimed that "high hopes engendered by Mandela's release from prison are fading into fears of chaos." It blamed "unrealistic expectations" from both blacks and whites for Mandela's predicament and concluded: "For the moment, South Africans are left to wonder why they imagined one man could undo a century of suffering and distrust." To counter the negative publicity engendered by the violence, Mandela embarked on a 13-nation tour of the West to persuade governments not to relax sanctions against the South African regime until all the pillars of apartheid had been dismantled. Just as Mandela started his trip through Europe, de Klerk announced that the four-year-old state of emergency had been lifted in three of South Africa's four provinces. This move was clearly designed to undercut Mandela's position in Western capitals. Despite this undercurrent, Mandela told reporters in Paris that the move was "a victory for the people of South Africa" although he expressed disappointment over the retention of the sate of emergency in Natal.[8]

Nelson and Winnie Mandela arrived to a tremendous reception at John F. Kennedy International Airport on 20 June 1990. 750,000 New Yorkers lined Broadway for a "ticker-tape" parade usually reserved for returning war heroes and sports teams. Mandela was riding through New York in a specially built bullet-proof vehicle nicknamed the "Mandelamobile" by New York police. That night 100,000 jammed Harlem's Africa Square to hear Mandela speak at the same podium where Malcolm X had called on the South African government to release Mandela two

decades before. New York also honored the ANC leader with a rally of 80,000 at Yankee stadium complete with a rock concert and vendors selling Mandela T-shirts, Mandela flags and Mandela caps. Introducing Mandela, the equally legendary Harry Belafonte said there had never been a voice more identified with freedom. Rising to the moment, Mandela donned a Yankees cap and broke into an impromptu rendition of the *toyi toyi* a South African victory dance. The next day he attended a star-studded $2,500-a-ticket fund-raiser hosted by Eddie Murphy, Spike Lee and Robert De Niro. The function reportedly raised $500,000 from celebrities like John Woodward, Paul Newman and Mike Tyson. Mandela and his entourage then left for another function at the Park Avenue home of Democratic Party fund-raisers Arthur and Matilde Krim where they picked up another $500,000. *Time* editors, astonished at the reception, titled the next issue "A Hero in America."[9]

During his eleven days in the United States, he visited eight cities (six of them led by black mayors), made 26 televised speeches, attended 21 meetings and fund-raisers and addressed five news conferences. Questions at these news conferences ranged from Dan Rather's sophomoric: "What was the worst thing that happened to you in prison?" followed by the inane, "What was the best thing?" ABC's Ted Koppel did a little better with his question: "How does it feel to be admired by millions of people around the world?"

The interviews also produced dramatic confrontations. In a pointed exchange with Koppel during a nationally televised "town meeting" at City College of New

York, Mandela defended his right to meet with leaders of "rogue states" like Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat and Muammar Gaddafi. "They support our struggle to the hilt," Mandela told Koppel and proceeded to lecture him on gratitude and self-determination. "Any man who changes his principles according to whom he is dealing," he told Koppel to applause from the audience, "that is not a man who can lead a nation." Koppel was speechless. Breaking a protracted silence, Mandela laughed, asking "I don't know if I have paralyzed you?" A members of the Jewish Congress at the "town meeting" argued that Mandela's support for the PLO was unacceptable but quickly added that they appreciated Mandela's statement that he supported Israel's right to exist.[10] After Mandela's comments on the PLO, Koppel asked Sen. David Boren D-Okla. whether he thought Mandela's comments would lead to backlash among powerful American interest groups. "No," Boren replied. "I think the American people understand what is going on in South Africa. We know many families are divided because they have been classified according to race. We know that people are denied the right to vote because of race. We know that people are detained and not given a trial, because of race. And the American people regardless of party of position or other issues, are not about to relieve the pressure until the system is changed."[11]

The Castro issue was less amenable to Mandela's charm. On June 28 the Cuban-American mayors of Miami and surrounding cities refused to meet with Mandela because of his statements about Fidel Castro. The airwaves of Spanish-language radio in Miami were filled with attacks on Mandela for his comments.

Outside Miami Beach Convention center, African-American activists faced off with Cuban-Americans during an appearance by Mandela attended by some 5,000 cheering admirers.[12] This snub from Miami's Cuban-American community led to a three-year boycott of Miami's tourism industry by African Americans organized by Boycott Miami: Coalition for Progress which announced in 1993 that Miami had lost over $50 million in revenues from cancellations by black businesses. The boycott ended in August 1993 after an agreement that called on Miami's business community to commit to black empowerment through providing loans, bonding, insurance and contracting opportunities. The agreement also included commitments by the $7 billion tourism industry to provide jobs, scholarships, internships and job training for black students seeking careers in tourism. The Knight Foundation also donated $250,000 for 125 scholarships to train black students and to deposit $2.5 million in the Peoples Bank of Commerce the only black-owned bank in Florida.[13]

Meanwhile Mandela was getting a hero's welcome in black-led cities. In Detroit Governor James Blanchard, Mayor Coleman Young and Owen Beiber, president of the United AutoWorkers met him. He attended several fund-raisers, visited a Ford Motor Co. plant and made an appearance at a rally at Tiger Stadium where he quoted Marvin Gaye's "What's Goin On" and partied with a throng of 70,000. In Boston, 300,000 turned up at the Esplanade to hear Mandela thank anti-apartheid activists for their part in the anti-apartheid struggle. "We knew that our cause would triumph," he told supporters. "We found great comfort in the knowledge that you were with us. Not for a single day did you forget us, not for a single hour."[14]

Mandela also attended a $5,000 a couple of fund-raisers in Boston and landed a $200,000 donation from the National Council of Churches.

In Washington, his schedule included meetings with the President George Bush in the White House and a rare nationally televised address by a foreigner to a joint session of both Houses of Congress. During this address, Mandela called on the United States to maintain sanctions until apartheid had been dismantled. He also linked the anti-apartheid struggle to that of American freedom fighters like John Brown, Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass and Paul Robeson. In Atlanta, he paid tribute to the leaders of the civil rights movement and laid a wreath on the tomb of Martin Luther King Jr. Mandela made a powerful plea to Congress to "cede the prerogative to the people of South Africa" of determining when to lift economic sanctions. He outlined a five-stage process: (1) the removal of obstacles to negotiations; (2) negotiating a mechanism to draw up a new constitution; (3) forming the said constitution-writing body; (4) writing the constitution; and (5) holding elections.[15] Mandela's position sparked a new debate about sanctions because the conditions he proposed went beyond the provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. The CAAA had only called for the release of political prisoners, repealing of the state of emergency, unbanning of black political parties, repealing of the Group Areas and Population Registration acts and a "commitment to enter into negotiations" before sanctions could be terminated. President Bush refused to accept Mandela's conditions maintaining that the United States would terminate sanctions according to US law. In Congress, however, the Black Caucus and its allies

were willing to cede the initiative to the South Africans. Ron Dellums, who had nursed sanctions legislation through Congress for over two decades, argued that "Sanctions should be lifted only when the oppressed people of South Africa say they should be lifted." Later in a meeting with President F.W. De Klerk, Dellums said that he would be willing to rethink sanctions if the South Africa government could demonstrate in "word and deed" their commitment to an early total dismantling of the apartheid system. But I also stated unequivocally my view that the current sanctions must be kept in place until the major conditions of the 1986 sanctions law passed by Congress had been met and a process established to achieve that transition to a democratic, nonracist society."[16]

The standing ovation bestowed on Mandela by the US Congress sparked angry editorials in both the liberal and conservative white press in South Africa. In a June 28 editorial titled "Amazing" *The Citizen* complained that Mandela did not deserve this "godlike" status:

> Mr. Mandela is not a Martin Luther King who preached nonviolence; he was a black revolutionary. ... That the American legislators can give Mr. Mandela an ovation suggests that they either do not know his or the ANC's background, or that it doesn't matter ... they have turned him into a Hollywood star. Mr. Mandela has won the battle for sanctions, in Europe and the US, (but) when the heady days of hero worship are over Mr. Mandela will have to get down to the less exultant process of negotiating, with others, the future of South Africa. And there is nothing godlike about that.

Mandela's final stop in the United States was in Oakland, California, Ron Dellums's district and widely known as the "cradle of the divestiture movement."

Dellums was ecstatic about the visit. "I was elated when he agreed to come to Oakland to attend a rally in our municipal stadium. With tens of thousands of community activists filling the ballfield and the stands, Mandela was greeted with thunderous cheers. Being able to bring Mandela home to my community and introduce him to my people brought to my mind the words of a popular rap tune "Can't touch this."[17] Nowhere had the anti-apartheid movement taken hold like in the San Francisco Bay Area. In the mid-1980s longshoremen refused to unload South African cargo at Bay Area ports. Cities like Oakland adopted some of the toughest divestment laws in the country. In Berkeley, students boycotted classes, built shanties, occupied buildings and were arrested in efforts to get the university to divest. In 1986 Gov. George Deukmejian signed legislation proposed by Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-Los Angeles) allowing the state's pension fund to divest its $13 billion in assets. A flood of withdrawals followed this action by California from South Africa by over 100 US companies including IBM and Coca Cola.[18]

Mandela's historic tour ended with his most difficult challenge, a meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a rabid opponent of sanctions who, in a 1988 debate on sanctions, had referred to the ANC as "a typical terrorist organization." After meeting with Thatcher for three hours, Mandela said he was "encouraged" although it was clear that Thatcher had maintained her position that the EEC should repeal sanctions to reward de Klerk.[19] Despite Thatcher's opposition, the EEC voted to maintain sanctions by 177 votes to 47 after the group's leaders met with Mandela in Strasbourg. Mandela claimed that his historic mission to preserve sanctions against the

South African government "Succeeded beyond our wildest dreams. We go back to our country feeling we have the full support of the international community," Mandela said, insisting that the tour would enhance his position in negotiations with the de Klerk government.[20]

Like Thatcher, American conservatives maintained a hard-line against Mandela and his "maintain sanctions" campaign. President Bush and his aides in the State Department used every opportunity to praise F.W. de Klerk. During Mandela's visit, Bush took time to discuss his warm regard for de Klerk even though the questioner had not asked about him. The White House had also tried to invite de Klerk for a state visit several times only to reverse itself because of popular opposition. According to *The Washington Post*, "Mr. de Klerk can depend on a warm center of support in the White House. While Mr. Mandela has been a hero to the masses, Mr. de Klerk is officialdom's champion."[21] *The Post* argued that Bush's regard for de Klerk was based on a "habit" of supporting South African whites. Summing up Bush's position, *The Post* concludes: "Although American officials admire Mr. Mandela, they believe Mr. de Klerk is more important, and his departure from the scene would most upset prospects for peaceful change."

National Review's editor Samuel Barber agreed with Bush but went further to raise questions about Mandela's character and whether he was "exploiting the uncritical reverence of his foreign worshippers to strengthen the organization's hand in the pursuit of sole power?"[22] Barber, who begins his story by comparing Mandela to

Stalin and Ceausescu, blamed reporters for not questioning Mandela closely about his ties to communists and his refusal to renounce armed struggle. Apparently privy to inside information, Barber claimed George Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker found Mandela "arrogant, 'dogmatic' and 'too liberation struggle minded.'" Barber went on to lecture Mandela about how "the ANC's old friends and their ideologies were now irrelevant, that Western democracy as embedded in the US was the only game on the planet, and that he would henceforth have to play by its rules if he wanted its help." He claimed the ANC was an extremist organization that sent its members to "gulags" and eliminated competition. He also blamed the ANC for the "tribal" violence in South Africa.

Forbes also joined the bash-Mandela club with an article by Michael Novak titled "No hard Questions Please, Nelson Mandela and the US Media." Novak accused reporters of "racism" and "double standards" for supposedly placing Mandela above criticism. "If Mandela were white --if he were Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, Fidel Castro or even Mikhail Gorbachev--his substantive views would certainly have been subjected to criticism." Ironically, Novak then contradicts himself by referring to Mandela's spirited answer to questions about his relations with the PLO, Gadaffi and Castro on ABC's *Nightline* and the *McNeal-Lehrer Newshour* on PBS. Novak also claimed Mandela was merely a pleasant face of a "secretive and extremist organization" that "maintains a close alliance with the Communist Party." "Recent African precedents are not reassuring," Novak wrote, pointing to the experience of

other countries in the region. "If Nelson Mandela is leading his people into socialist light, then he is no liberator. And his name will eventually live not in glory but in infamy. It behooves those who would be his friends to question him closely ... and direct his attention to the disasters that have befallen socialist regimes during the 27 years he was in prison."[23]

In an assessment of the impact of Mandela's tour on blacks and whites in the United States, the *U.S. New & World Report* argued that the visit was "an unalloyed triumph within black America." While admitting that some whites rallied to Mandela's side, the *U.S. News* pointed out that other whites were put off by his embrace of Arafat, Gadhafi and Castro. "More striking were signs that despite enormous media coverage, much of white America wasn't paying serious attention. A riveting interview with Ted Koppel on ABC, broadcast during prime time, drew a meager 9 percent share of the television audience. ... Mandela discovered the same lesson as Gorbachev on his last visit: It's hard for any foreign visitor to fire the American imagination these days."[24]

This conservative backlash continued during the rest of the year as reports of "black on black violence" clouded debates over sanctions and the constitutional process. In August, the ANC blamed South Africa's security forces for the violence that had taken 183 lives in the country's black townships in one month. "Elements of the state's security services are employing tactics ... in order to bring about insecurity, fear and a willingness to submit to draconian measures," the ANC's statement

declared, calling on the international community to condemn the South African government for its actions. Despite the increase in violence, the number of strikes, protests, boycotts and marches against the white minority government continued to escalate. At a rally of more than 100,000 pro-ANC Zulus, for instance, Mandela called on activists to throw their guns, pangas and knives into the sea.[25]

Although leaders of the Organization of African Unity and South Africans themselves had blamed the government for fomenting the violence, US media generally framed the violence as "tribal." *The Seattle Times,* for instance, argued in an editorial titled "Black on Black --South Africa Convulses with Tribal Violence" that ancient tribal feuds were likely to plunge South Africa into civil war as soon as apartheid was dismantled. "After years of focusing on the abuses of white-minority rule in South Africa, the global community has been shocked by the ferocity of black-on black violence," the editorial observed. "Bloody clashes between two large South African tribes put a harrowing and puzzling damper on the good news of progress toward the end of apartheid." These doubts were exactly what the South African government was hoping for in its escalation of surrogate violence against innocent civilians.[26]

On 3 September leaders of the seven front-line states meeting in Lusaka at a summit chaired by President Kenneth Kaunda blamed the South African government for the violence. "The summit sent a message to President de Klerk of South Africa to stop the carnage," President Kaunda told reporters after the summit.[27] Later that month

South African "liberal" Alistair Sparks wrote in *The Washington Post* that a recent massacre of passengers in rush-hour traffic "bore the stamp of careful planning and precise execution, factors that support a view here that there is an organizing hand behind the violence in South Africa's black townships." For weeks de Klerk had rejected claims that a "third force" was fomenting violence to derail the negotiations taking place between the government and the ANC. Eyewitnesses in Soweto claimed they saw whites in black-face and ski-masks participating in the killing and driving the getaway vehicles. After the rush-hour massacre de Klerk admitted that there may be a "third force" and appointed a commission to study the issue. Although media reports in South Africa identified the source of the violence in the South African security forces and provided details of training camps for terrorist gangs, the de Klerk government was unable or unwilling to do anything about the extremists in its forces. Mandela and the ANC had repeatedly called on de Klerk to control the violence. According to Mandela: "De Klerk's inability to take decisive steps to stop this violence arises from the fact that some highly skilled, professional death squads are linked with the security forces in this country."[28]

In October de Klerk made his long-awaited trip to the Untied States where he managed to convince conservatives that "black on black violence" was the main obstacle to reform and that sanctions should be lifted. In a column published in the *St. Louis Post Dispatch,* for instance, Cal Thomas spoke for conservatives when he called on Bush to repeal sanctions as soon as possible. Thomas heaped praise on de Klerk for reforming apartheid and declared "someone should nominate him for the Nobel Peace

Prize."[29] Randall Robinson denounced the meeting as "A superficial photo opportunity, staged with the assistance of President Bush, to put a smiling face on a sad and tragic situation. George Bush is an accomplice to a colossal public relations fraud which attempt to portray F.W. de Klerk as a moderate reformer. The American public and U.S. policy makers must be reminded that the major pillars of apartheid remain firmly in place in South Africa."[30]

In a meeting between Mandela and de Klerk later that month, de Klerk cynically refused to accept evidence that a "third force" was causing the violence in the townships. Instead he claimed that black violence was the main obstacle to peace talks. De Klerk's dirty tricks worked. In an editorial titled "Scrap Sanctions Now" *The Economist* argued that "Mr. de Klerk has embraced change more than the ANC has. ... perhaps it is Mr. Mandela who now needs the goading." The editorial claimed that the road to negotiations "has been blocked by township slaughter." It claimed Mandela's demand that the government allow peaceful demonstrations was "not persuasive" because "Peace demonstrations are a normal democratic right but in abnormal South Africa they often turn lethal." Thus peaceful marchers were to blame when police opened fire on them.[31] In another article a week later *The Economist* claimed the black nationalist movements in South Africa were "still crawling."

In January Mandela was featured in *Time* magazine's Men of the Year section. The magazine credited Mandela with initiating the negotiation process and moving South Africa toward reconciliation. The tribute noted, however, that Mandela had

been "unable to stamp his authority fully on his organization and its restless following." Citing the "bitter fighting between the ANC and the Zulu-based Inkatha movement" the article laments that Mandela had refused to hold peace talks with Inkatha. Nevertheless *Time* argued that without Mandela the country would have been worse off.

In mid-June South Africa announced that it would scrap the Population Registration Act, one of the pillars of apartheid. The White House promptly let it be known that it was reconsidering sanctions in light of South Africa's "reforms." Officials told the media that South Africa had met all but one of the conditions established by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Under the sanctions law South Africa was required to comply with five conditions before restrictions could be removed: ending the state of emergency; unbanning the ANC, PAC and other liberation movements; beginning negotiations with representatives of the black majority; repealing apartheid laws and releasing all political prisoners. Administration officials claimed the first four conditions had been met and that South Africa had pledged to release 300 political prisoners left in the country despite the fact that the United Nations and human rights groups put the number at 2,000. Under the sanctions law, the president had to certify to Congress that the conditions had been met after which the Congress had 30 days to pass a joint resolution to block the measure. A likely scenario given the CBC's implacable opposition to lifting sanctions. CBC members argued that the CAAA's conditions had not been met because only multiracial elections would insure the full integration of the liberation movements in

the government. They also argued that South Africa would have to release all 2,000 political prisoners and not the 300 that the Bush administration was willing to accept.[32]

On June 26 members of the Congressional Black Caucus met Bush to urge him to maintain sanctions against South Africa. In a 90-minute meeting the president told skeptical lawmakers that he was compelled by law to lift sanctions against South Africa because it had fulfilled most of the conditions set forth in the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986. "I don't have much flexibility," Bush told the black lawmakers. Dellums criticized Bush for taking a "narrow definition of his role" and insisted that South Africa had only complied with two conditions: ending the state of emergency and beginning negotiations with the black majority. Rep. John Lewis (D-Ga.) charged the president with "sowing seeds of discontent and the seeds of frustration" by calling the civil rights bill a "quota bill." On sanctions Lewis said his gut feeling was that the administration had already decided to lift sanctions against South Africa. Even the *New York Times* urged the president to "go slow" on sanctions. "For Mr. Bush to lift sanctions before reasonable doubts are resolved would be indefensible as stretching the law's language to prolong sanctions."[33]

Bush, however, remained unmoved by appeals from church leaders, member of Congress, civil-rights groups and human rights organizations around the world. On July 10 he signed an executive order lifting economic sanctions against South Africa. "We've seen a profound transformation of the situation in South Africa," Bush

declared at a White House news conference. He praised de Klerk's "forward looking" leadership for this transformation. In South Africa de Klerk hailed the move and predicted it would boost the country's battered economy. The ANC, however, deplored the action, calling it premature. In the US, anti-apartheid activists were outraged. TransAfrica's Randall Robinson called Bush a "disgrace" charging that Bush was "a president who never wanted sanctions now has taken an opportunity to distort and violate American law to lift those sanctions." Robinson argued that South Africa had hardly met one of the conditions and that lifting sanctions was a travesty. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) accused Bush of being "irresponsible" and "disobeying the law." The Congressional Black Caucus called the move "utter hypocrisy." CBC members argued that by lifting sanctions the president was responding to the argument of corporations and conservatives in the State Department who had opposed sanctions from the outset. President Bush was also accused of being insensitive to the needs of people of color in general. The lifting of sanctions, for instance, came on the heels of several unpopular decisions including his threat to veto a civil rights bill and the controversial nomination of conservative Judge Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall on the Supreme Court. According to John Conyers "Taken together, these steps show a profound and growing disinterest in the aspiration of Africans and African-Americans for fundamental fairness and progress."[34]

President Bush's announcement went a long way toward ending the isolation of South Africa in the international community. It came after the International Olympic Committee ended a 21-year ban on South African participation in the Olympic Games.

The European Community had also lifted sanctions in April 1991. Despite this thaw in South African isolation, several other separate sanctions remained in effect. These included the limitations in IMF and Export-Import Bank lending, a ban on all exports to South Africa's military and police, a mandatory United Nations arms embargo and a ban on all intelligence sharing. In addition, 28 states and 92 cities enacted some sanctions that would remain in effect.

Despite these drawbacks, South Africa moved inexorably toward majority rule. Between 1989 and 1993, the government had freed Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; legalized opposition parties and political organizing for all races; repealed the Group Areas Act and population Registration Act; and agreed to enter into negotiations with black liberation movements without preconditions. The ANC and other liberation movement called on the global community to maintain pressure on de Klerk until apartheid was totally dismantled. The state and local sanctions still in place in the United States remained in place until the summer of 1993 when the ANC formally called for the end of sanctions and essentially the end of the anti-apartheid movement.

In early July 1993 Mandela embarked on a coast-to-coast tour of the United States that was described as "the first campaign swing of the 1994 South African elections." Sponsored in part by Coca-Cola and several other U.S. companies, Mandela's 1993 tour was aimed at raising funds from corporations unlike his historic 1991 swing through that mobilized popular support. This time Mandela accepted the

sponsorship of corporate executives to raise a $20 million election fund for the ANC and called for the infusion of foreign investment to create jobs and ease the transition to majority rule. The ANC also encouraged support for a new US group called the South Africa Free Election Fund formed to raise $10 million for the electoral process. The group was chaired by the president of H.J. Heinz & Co. Anthony J.F. Reilly and included prominent African Americans in its board like A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. a former appeals court judge and Theodore C. Sorensen, a former advisor to President John F. Kennedy. The ANC and anti-apartheid activists justified Mandela's fund-raising among US corporations because of the magnitude of the challenge facing the ANC and the need to mobilize 22 million first time black voters in eight months. TransAfrica's Randall Robinson argued that "to raise money fast and create some semblance of a level playing field over the next eight months will take a quick turnaround in giving. That means corporate and foundation gifts. If you can possibly imagine any other alternative to the campaign among corporations and foundations, Mr. Mandela would be glad to hear it."[35]

Although Mandela did not officially call for the end of sanctions during his two-week tour of the US, he did urge US corporations to prepare for a return to South Africa as soon as democratic elections were held. According to the Investor Responsibility Center 27 US companies had reopened offices since President Bush lifted government sanctions against South Africa in July 1991. Because some companies never left, there were 132 US companies in South Africa with direct

investments and employees in South Africa and 405 companies, including Coca-Cola, with licensing and distribution agreements.[36]

The institutionalization of the South African liberation movements as political parties was paralleled by the institutionalization of TransAfrica as the premier black foreign policy lobby in the United States. This evolution from a movement to a formal foreign policy lobby or "think tank" was reflected in a campaign to the purchase a $3.5 million headquarters for the organization in a renovated Dupont Circle mansion that once housed the German Embassy. The new headquarters was inaugurated on 4 June 1993 as the Arthur Ashe Foreign Policy Library and Resource Center at a black-tie reception featuring Haitian President Jean-Betrand Aristide, Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder, Dorothy Height, Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy and news anchors Bryant Gumbel, Ted Koppel and Bernard Shaw. The institute's new five-story headquarters included a 6,000-volume library, a computer center, a public reading room and space for meetings, administrative work and scholars' advisory council. In 16 years the organization had grown to a staff of 15, boasted 20,000 members in 12 chapters and many prominent black leaders on its board. It attracted high profile and impressive corporate support: Reebok gave $375,000 for the building, Coca-Cola $150,000, Philip Morris $200,000, and Time Warner and Anheuser-Busch $100,000 each. Celebrities also pitched in; Bill Cosby raised $430,000 at two dinners while Sugar Ray Leonard wrote a personal check for $250,000.[37] Robinson told reporters that the plan was to build a foreign policy "think tank" that could influence policy in the interest of Africa and the Caribbean. "We have never competed institutionally in

the area of foreign affairs. That's why we wanted a fully fleshed out think tank to grind out the analysis that represents the interests of our community."

The ANC waited until September and the formation of a multi-racial Transitional Executive Council to oversee South Africa's first democratic elections set for 27 April 1994 before calling on the world community to lift non-military sanctions that had cost South Africa an estimated $50 billion. The White House immediately hailed the move and announced that the US would "soon move ahead on measures to engage resources of the American private sector and the international financial and donor community to assist South Africa." Hundreds of African-Americans, many of them veterans of the voting rights campaign of the 1960s in the southern states of the US volunteered to help rural South Africans exercise the franchise. The NAACP donated $50,000 to the election effort; the Martin Luther King Center for Nonviolent Social Change sent experts to South Africa to conduct voter-education seminars; traditionally black Howard University and Clark Atlanta University were among institutions sending observers. It was estimated that 5,000 international observers witnessed the emergence of the new South Africa. The South African government had accredited 26 local and 77 international NGOs ranging from the Association of West European Parliamentarians to the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation; from the Pan Africanist Poll Watch Africa, to the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. The international presence included technical advisers and consultants connected to the IEC. The heavy presence of technical expertise from the North was balanced by the presence of hundreds of volunteers from African, Asian

and Latin American countries who were placed on the front lines of the voter registration campaign to counter charges of Northern arrogance. The foreign presence was so pervasive that some South Africans wondered whether it was their election.[38]

By May 2 incomplete tallies of the voting showed that the ANC had 63.6 percent of the vote compared to 30.2 percent for the national Party and 5.9 percent for Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party. Although the tally was not complete, F.W. de Klerk conceded defeat, saying Mandela had "walked a long road and now stands at the top of the hill. A traveler would sit down and enjoy the view but a man of destiny knows that beyond this hill lies another and another ... As he contemplates the future I hold out my hand in friendship and cooperation." Hours later Mandela claimed victory at a Johannesburg hotel. In a gracious speech, Mandela congratulated de Klerk and the people of South Africa, calling the moment "A joyous night for the human spirit." On Friday May 6 the Independent Electoral Commission announced its final vote tally 62.6 percent for the ANC, 20.3 for de Klerk's National Party, and 10.5 percent for Inkatha. On May 8 planes approached South Africa from all corners of the earth bearing the largest gathering of black heads of state ever. Three of these planes carried the 44-member official US delegation led by Vice President Al Gore and his wife Tipper, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and a Congressional Delegation. The overwhelmingly black delegation marked an historic stage for African-American participation in US foreign policy.

Vice President Al Gore emphasized the African-American connection in his official remarks generally ignored by the mainstream US press. "The history we are present to witness marks a transition in the history of the world. We have a delegation of Americans that includes many who have participated in a highly personal way, for a long period of time, in assisting the peaceful negotiated revolution here in South Africa. The transition here and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States have been closely intertwined longer than many realize. The lessons of the spirit which came out of America's civil rights movement have been vigorously exported to South Africa and have, in turn, been taken to the United States." The ceremony was followed by an African and African-American healing ceremony at Johannesburg's integrated Marker Theatre where poet Maya Angelo and South African artists raised up the names of the ancestors who had made the moment possible. Al Gore raised up the names of Du Bois and the African Methodist Episcopal Church and other African American activists who had participated in the struggle. "To the United States, this transformation has special significance. After all, for years Americans agonized over the horrors of our own apartheid. And the struggle for justice in South Africa and in the United States has in many ways been one struggle."[39]

[1]*U.S. News & World Report* 22 January 1990 v108 n3 p33

[2]*The Economist* 6 January 1990 v314 n7636 p40

[3]*The Boston Globe*, 3 February 1990 pg. 1

[4]*The Washington Post*, 12 February 1990 A23

[5]*The Boston Globe* 21 February 1990 pg. 3

[6]*The Washington Post* 13 March 1990 A13

[7]*The US News & World Report* 9 April 1990 v108 n14 p15

[8]*Mclean's* 18 June 1990 v103 n25 p30

[9]*Time* 2 July 1990 v136 n1 p14

[10]*The New York Times* 1 July 1990 pg. 16 (Letters to the Editor) --letter to the editor signed by Henry Siegman, executive director of the American Jewish Congress.

[11]*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* 24 June 1990 3A

[12]*The Saint-Louis Post Dispatch* 29 June 1990 A16

[13]*Black Enterprise* August 1993 v24 n1 p19

[14]*Ebony* September 1990 v45 n11 p132

[15]*The Washington Post* 2 July 1990 A10

[16]Ron Dellums, Lying Down With the Lions, pg. 142-144

[17]Dellums, Lying Down With the Lions pg. 146

[18]*The Los Angeles Times* 1 July 1990 A3

[19]*The Los Angeles Times* 5 July 1990 A6

[20]*The Los Angeles Times* 1 July 1990 A3

[21]*The Washington Post* 11 July 1990 A12

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CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

This study traced the role of African American activists in the international anti-apartheid movement from its inception in the late 1940s to the attainment of majority rule in South Africa in the elections 1994. It begins with the forgotten years of the movement between 1946 and 1955 when the Council on African Affairs organized famine relief campaigns, legal defense funds, sit-ins and demonstrations at South African embassies and petitioned the United Nations to impose international sanctions. In 1946 CAA members Alphaeus Hunton and Eslanda Robeson worked with India's representative Vijaya Pandit to block South Africa's attempt to annex South West Africa and to impose sanctions on the regime for discriminating against people of Indian descent. In addition to the rally, the CAA also organized a picket at the South African embassy on November 21, 1946. To the surprise of South Africa, the Council's view prevailed and the UN rejected South Africa's attempt to annex South West Africa.

While the efforts to pass sanctions against South Africa was vetoed by the United States and the United Kingdom, the campaign to raise the world's awareness of the plight of nonwhites in South Africa was a resounding success. It set in motion the sanctions movement that would eventually succeed in isolating South Africa and expelling it from the United Nations. As more African and Asian countries joined the United Nations in the 1950s and 1960s, the body moved inexorably toward sanctions. These efforts paid off on 6 November 1962 when member states voted in the General Assembly to sever diplomatic, transportation and economic relations with South

Africa. Although this resolution was non-binding, it was a major victory for the external anti-apartheid movement. To be effective, however, the movement needed the support of the Security Council where the UK and the US continued to block mandatory sanctions.

The study examines the United States government's role in suppressing radical anti-colonial organizations and financing the establishment of cold war alternatives like the African American Institute and the American Society of African Culture. These organizations were ostensibly created by African-American liberals to establish ties between African nationalists and African-Americans but were really designed to influence African students in the United States by steering them away from "radicals" like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois. These official and unofficial interests in Africa's minerals and anti-communism also led to the establishment of African studies as a legitimate field of study in the United States. The early African studies programs were funded by the CIA and Pentagon, which encouraged scholars to produce reports about the emergence of African nationalism. The African studies programs established had a distinctive cold war ideology and orientation. They were the academic arm of US imperialism in Africa. They provided the data that were used to make decisions about the importance of the Congo and South Africa to the United States. By the 1960s, these cold war organs were discredited and their journals considered anti-black and neocolonialist. Both AMSAC and ANLCA folded after revelations of CIA funding. The AAI continued to exist as a predominately white organization. These new tensions were demonstrated in the withdrawal of African Americans and Africans from the African Studies Association in 1969 because of differences over involvement in political actions like the anti-apartheid movement and the lack of representation of people of African descent in the board of directors. These black scholars then formed the African Heritage Studies Association with a political action committee that

included many of the veteran anti-apartheid activists who would work behind the scenes in the formation of TransAfrica and the Free South Africa Movement. Among the members of this committee were Hershelle Challanor, Willard Johnson and Ronald Walters who would all become members of the board of TransAfrica and TransAfrica Forum in the 1980s. It is this group that brought in Randall Robinson to lead TransAfrica after the organizing conference in 1976.

The study argues that radicals played an important role in pushing the movement to support the national liberation struggles in southern Africa. In the 1970s, radical groups espousing ideologies ranging from Black Nationalism to Maoism to Marxist Leninism played an important role in pushing the movement to support armed struggle. This was demonstrated in the 30,000-strong crowd that attended the Africa Liberation Day march in Washington D.C. in 1972 and the large crowds that returned for ALD activities throughout the 1970s. These groups reflected a revival of pan-Africanist sentiment that created the conditions for the emergence of an anti-apartheid culture in the United States. Like the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the anti-apartheid movement introduced a new language and culture with its own language, values and heroes to the United States. A specific discourse on sanctions, divestment, divestiture, disinvestment and krugerrands was clearly associated with the movement. Images of Nelson Mandela, Robben Island, Soweto and Sharpeville became tools for galvanizing outrage against the racist regime. SNCC and the Black Panthers evolved into anti-imperialist and Third Worldist organizations. SNCC formed an international affairs desk under James Forman in 1966 and organized sit-ins at the South African Embassy in Washington D.C. Forman attended the International Conference on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa in 1967 where he presented SNCC's position paper on apartheid. By its demise in 1970, SNCC had taken on a strong Pan Africanist orientation although it was split between the "back to

Africa" emigrationists and those who saw their future in the United States. This latter group became very important in moving the anti-apartheid movement from a pacifist orientation to unequivocal support for the armed struggle.

It was also this upsurge in popular anti-apartheid sentiment in the African American community that led the CBC to take up the issue of apartheid. Ron Dellums drafted the first sanctions bill introduced in the US Congress in response to a petition from the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Union. It is this bill that becomes the basis for US sanctions against South Africa thirteen years later when Congress passes the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over President Reagan's veto. The PRWM's access to Congress demonstrates how the black freedom movement in the United States created the conditions for the success of the anti-apartheid movement. It is the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and the election of African American legislators that led to a key turning point in the U.S. anti-apartheid movement. Before the election of African Americans to Congress, anti-apartheid activists were outsiders with no access to the decision-making process. It is the establishment of the Congressional Black Caucus in 1969 that made the institution of a black lobby (TransAfrica) possible in 1977. The CBC included South Africa in its legislative agenda from the outset. The Black Caucus was also the source of the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act of 1986 that transformed U.S. policy toward South Africa.

This collaboration between congressional leaders and human rights activists was reflected in the Free South Africa Movement, which organized the arrests of thousands of demonstrators outside the South African Embassy in Washington D.C. in the early 1980s. During the demonstrations numerous African American Congressmen were arrested along with ordinary citizens and celebrities in the sit-ins outside the South African Embassy. The study examines the complex process through which this

loose coalition of politicians, activists, scholars, students, ministers and journalists was established to implement on of the most remarkable examples of grass-roots human rights groups influencing the foreign policy of a major superpower. The movement forced the pro-apartheid Reagan administration to change its foreign policy and debunked the myth that foreign policy is the preserve of national elites.

Prior to the emergence of the CBC, anti-apartheid organizations were limited to disseminating information to the media and the public without having any impact on the Congress where decisions were being made. With the election of African-American legislators following the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, the anti-apartheid movement acquired important allies in Congress and moved to a different level. The CBC itself also recognized the need for a partnership between black legislators and activists in the effort to change domestic and foreign policies. This need stemmed from the fact that CBC initiatives like sanctions against South Africa were not likely to be sponsored by corporations or the traditional lobby groups that control interest group politics in Washington. Thus the CBC was involved in the formation of advocacy organizations like TransAfrica and the Free South Africa Movement as an alternative source of influence and power. This collaboration between legislators and activists was the key to the transformation of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa. This partnership also points to the weaknesses of the "interest group politics" theories of the political scientists that fail to account for the role of racism in U.S. foreign policy. Classical political science theories consider foreign policy the preserve of a small elite usually working in close contact with Congress and the president. The focus is usually on the influence of "interest groups" formed by corporations and other powerful elites who have investments abroad and, therefore, a stake in U.S. policies. There is no place for Blacks, Native Americans, Hispanics or community-based organizations in this theory as they have no

investments abroad and do not finance elections. As we have seen, most studies of the anti-apartheid movement fail to deal with the issue of racism in U.S. policies and the impact of black organizations in the antiapartheid movement. The role of the CBC, TransAfrica and FSAM in the transformation of U.S. policies toward South Africa, however, can only be understood through an examination of the links between racism and U.S. foreign policy and the roots of the anti-apartheid movement in the black freedom movement of the 1940s.

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